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I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930' and general powers of the

United States International Trade Commission (ITC)2 provide the

Commission with a range of actions in cases of unfair methods of competition or unfair acts involved in importation of articles or in their
sale.3 This comment will discuss the actions available to the Commission under Section 337, and suggest how the Commission should apply
them.4
1 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amendedby Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-417, § 604, 94 Stat. 1727, 1744.
2 These include the power to make procedural and substantive rules, 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976),
power to conduct informal investigations, 19 U.S.C. § 2482 (1976), and implied consent and settlement agreement powers under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
The United States International Trade Commission is the successor agency to the United
States Tariff Commission, which Congress established on September 18, 1916. The powers of
both agencies under the several versions of what is now Section 337 are analogous, and this comment will refer to both agencies as the "Commission," unless the distinction is material. It will
also refer to the successor agency as the "ITC." For a comprehensive history of the Commission,
see J. DOBSON, Two CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACKGROUND AND EMERGENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION (1976).
3 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976) states that:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United
States, or in their sale, by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or
tendency of which is t6 destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are declared unlawful, and
when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided in this section.
A range of statutes other than Section 337 accord remedies for specific types of unfair import
competition, such as dumping, mislabeling, or product subsidization. For an overview of these
statutes and their operation, see Jacobs & Hove, Remediesfor Unfair Import Competition in the
United States, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. I (1980). See also Silberger, TradeAct of.1974: New Remedies Against Unfair Trade Practicesin InternationalTrade, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 77 (1975).
4 The discussion below is confined to Commission action in cases of alleged and proven violations of Section 337. For a concise summary of the overall operation of Section 337, see Garfinkel, Guide to Import Relief and Unfair TradeActions Available Under United States International
Trade Law, 15 INT'L LAW. 240, 245-246 (1981). For more detailed summaries of Commission
procedure under the statute, see H. KAYE, P. PLAIA & M. HERTZBERG, 1-2 INTERNATIONAL
TRADE PRACTICE §§ 4-12 (1981), and Kaye & Plaia, Tarif9rAct Section 337 Revisited A Review of
Developments Since the Amendments of 1975, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 3, 64-80 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Kaye & Plaia, Section 337 Revisited]. Discovery procedures in Section 337 actions are
discussed in Brunsvold, Analysis of the United States InternationalTrade Commission as a Forum
for IntellectualPropertyDisputes, 60 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 505, 514-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Brunsvold, IntellectualPropertyDisputes]. The Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Commission has also written an overview of Section 337 adjudications and considerations related to them.
Duvall, The Expeditious Adjudication of Section 337 Unfair Trade Practice Cases at the United
States InternationalTrade Commission, 9 APLA Q. J. 157 (1981). ITC adjudicative procedures
under Section 337 are codified at 19 C.F.R. § 210.1 et seq. (1981).
There is no violation of Section 337 if there is not an injury to a domestic industry, and the
ITC will take no final remedial action in such cases. For an examination of the standard of injury
required for the ITC to find a Section 337 violation, see Brunsvold, Schill & Schwendemann,
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Section 337 is an increasingly popular statute.5 One reason for this
is the relief it makes available to complainants, which is effective
throughout the United States.6 This relief, of course, is the statute's
principal strength; yet, at the same time, it is the most difficult part of
the statute for the Commission to apply.7 Each time the Commission
Injury Standardsin Section 337 Investigations, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 75 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Brunsvold, Injury Standards]. See also Certain Combination Locks, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-45, Pub. No. 945 (Feb. 1979), 1 INT'L TRADE RE'. DEC. (BNA) 5462;
Certain Attache Cases, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-49, Pub. No. 955 (Mar. 1979).
In addition, the complainant industry must be efficiently and economically operated before it may
obtain relief. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976); see Brunsvold, IntellectualProperty Disputes, supra at
510. Finally, the ITC may not take action under Section 337 if such action would be contrary to
the public interest. See infra note 8; see also infra notes 356-66 and accompanying text.
5 As of December 1, 1981, for example, fifteen of the seventy-six investigations in progress
were Section 337 investigations. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, CALENDAR
OF HEARINGS AND OF DEADLINE DATES FOR PENDING INVESTIGATIONS 1-8 (Dec. 1, 1981) [hereinafter cited as ITC HEARINGS CALENDAR]. There were eight Section 337 investigations pending
on September 30, 1976, 1976 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. 9; twenty-one cases pending
on September 30, 1978, 1978 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. 14; and fifteen Section 337
cases pending on September 30, 1979, 1979 INT'L TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. 13. This five year
period contrasts with the thirty-two year period from 1936 to 1968, during which the Tariff Commission received only thirty-six Section 337 complaints and recommended three exclusion orders,
all of which were rejected by the President. Note, The Revitalizationof Section 337ofthe Tarff.4ct
of 1930 Under the Trade,4ct of 1974, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 167, 183 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Section 337 Revitalization] (citing remarks of Bruce E. Clubb, International Trade Commissioner, before the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, at 9 (Mar. 19, 1970)).
6 In contrast, federal district court relief would apply only within the court's jurisdiction.
7 The contentions surrounding the Commission's decision in Certain Headboxes and
Papermaking Machine Forming Sections, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82, Pub. No.
1138 (Apr. 1981), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5481, disapprovedby President, 46 Fed. Reg.
32,361 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Headboxes I], dramatize the tensions involved when the ITC
balances what it perceives to be the need to remedy private injury which results from an unfair
import trade practice with the need to make ITC actions consistent with the public interest. A
headbox is a large, expensive piece of machinery essential to paper manufacture. In its Headboxes
I investigation, the Commission found that the respondent's imported headbox infringed the
product of the complainant United States manufacturer. On the basis of this finding, the ITC
issued an order excluding all headboxes which might infringe the patent from importation into the
United States.
United States importers criticized the ITC order as being too broad, and charged that it
caused difficulties for them with United States Customs officials, who were charged with implementing the order. Future ITC Recommendations Will Get Closer Look, USTR Official Says,
[Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE ReP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 77, at A-14, A-15 (May 13,
1981). Also, the United States Paper Institute vigorously lobbied the President to disapprove the
ITC's overall determination. Written Comments of the ITC Investigative Attorney 4 (Aug. 11,
1981) (filed with the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., in connection
with Certain Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-82A, Pub. No. 1197 (Nov. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1992 [hereinafter cited as Headboxes II]). The President agreed with the importers and paper producers.
Under subsection (g)(1)(B) of Section 337, the Commission must submit its final determinations to
the President for review. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(1)(B) (1976). In his letter of disapproval, the President stressed his belief that the Commission's broad exclusion order was unnecessary. United
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takes action under Section 337, it must balance the private interest in
relief from unfair import trade practices with the public interest in an
open United States economy.8 If the ITC properly balances its action,
States and foreign manufacturers alike made few headboxes, and the time between order and
delivery was long; if the domestically-produced machines became unavailable, a broad exclusion
order, as the Commission had issued, should not stand in the way of the importation of machines
which the ITC had not actually found to have infringed the complainant's patent. Thus, the
President urged the Commission to recommend "an exclusion order directed only to the respondent's [infringing] products, or a narrowly drafted cease and desist order." 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361
(1981).
Since no Commission action applied to the infringing headboxes after the President's disapproval, the Commission took up a new investigation limited to questions of remedy and the public
interest. [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 82, at A-16 (June 17,
1981). A month and a half later, the Commission issued a new, narrow exclusion order which
applied only to the respondent's infringing headboxes, and to those of its affiliated firms.
Headboxes II, supra at 9-12.
By letter dated January 18, 1982, the President expressly approved the Headboxes II order.
This was the first time since the Trade Act of 1974 that a President had made such an express
approval, rather than simply to let the sixty day approval period run and have the Section 337
order go into effect. An Administration source stressed that. the President did not intend his
approval as a "pat on the head of the ITC," but noted that the approval was designed to make the
Administration's position clear before the end of the review period and to expedite the appeals
process, should any of the parties have wished to appeal the Headboxes II order. PresidentApprover Modifled Exclusion Order by ITC in Headbox Investigation, [Oct.-Mar.] INT'L TRADE REP.
U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 112, at 391 (Jan. 27, 1982). The fact that the approval came
only a few days before the review period would have run, however, casts doubt on the Administration source's explanation. Compare,ITC.4dopts NarrowerOrder In Headboxes Case, PresidentialApprovalSeen,But Stern Critical, [Oct.-Mar.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
No. 99, at 72-73 (Oct. 21, 1981).
The President recently disapproved of another broad Commission exclusion order, 47 Fed.
Reg. 29,919 (1982), which the ITC issued in Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-99, Pub. No. 1246 (May
1982). See PresidentRejects 1TC Determinationin Sandwich PaneInsertsCase, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 135, at 423-24 (July 7, 1982); Commission Order
Excludes Molded-In Sandwich PanelInsertsfrom Japan, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 128, at 227-29 (May 26, 1982). The President recommended that the
ITC replace the disapproved order with narrowly drawn cease and desist orders, since, in his
opinion, the broad order did nothing to protect the infringed process patent in question, and
discriminated between foreign and domestic products in preventing infringement. 47 Fed. Reg.
29,919. However, compared to the discussion consequent with the Headboxes cases, the Sandwich
PanelInserts disapproval has caused little controversy. See ITC to Weigh ModificationsofInserts
Decisions in Response to Disapproval, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) No. 139, at 549 (Aug. 4, 1982).
8 Congress intended that the International Trade Commission's consideration of the public
interest be foremost when the Commission determines which action to take in Section 337 investigations. COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE AcT OF 1974, S.REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 197,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7330 [hereinafter cited as TRADE AcT OF
1974, S.REP. No. 1298]. Subsections (d) (exclusion orders), (e) (temporary exclusion orders, entry
under bond), and (0(1) (cease and desist orders) of Section 337 provide that when issuing exclusion orders, temporary exclusion orders, or cease and desist orders, the Commission must consider
the effect of such orders upon "the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and
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Section 337 has the potential to play a dynamic role in the elimination
of distortions in United States import trade. But, administered as protectionist legislation, Section 337 can only be a hindrance in United
States trade policy and an aggravation for the Commission.
Moreover, a discussion of the scope of ITC action under Section
337 is important because of increased presidential and court oversight
of that action. Presidential disapproval of a Commission exclusion order, and subsequent Commission reconsideration of those orders, has
given rise to fears about the executive's erosion of the Commission's
position as an independent agency.9 And, under the Customs Court
Act of 1980, t° the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
now has the mandate to review fully Commission actions against Section 337 violations.1 1
Finally, an examination of Commission action under Section 337
is especially relevant at this time because the Commission has revised
United States consumers ...." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(e), (f)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). If the
order's effect would be detrimental to these public interest factors, the order may not issue. Id
9 The President disapproved of the Commission's decision in Headboxes I, in June, 1981. 46
Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981). See supra note 7; see also Commissioner Paula Stem's dissent to the
ITC's Headboxes II opinion, where she emphasized that by taking action "which the President
found more acceptable. . .[t]he Commission has thus placed itself in a position where the basic
structure of the statute has been compromised and the appearance of impropriety exists."
Headboxes H, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82A, Pub. No. 1197 at 8-9 (Nov. 1981),
3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1992, 2001-02 (Stem, Comm'r, dissenting). Trade practitioners
voiced similar concerns about threats to the Commission's independence inherent in the President's disapproval of the HeadboxesI determination, and the events surrounding it. See Proposed
Section 337 GuidelinesArouse Debate Over Executive Branch's Role in Review Process, [Apr.-Sept.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 80, at B-1, B-2 (June 3, 1981).
10 Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727. Section 701(a) of the Act provides that the amendments
to Section 337 by the Customs Court Act "shall take effect on" November 1, 1980. Id, 94 Stat. at
1747.
11 Section 604 of the Customs Court Act of 1980, id, 94 Stat. at 1744, amended subsection (c)
of Section 337 by inserting the words "for review in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5, United
States Code" and also inserting the following:
Commission determinations under subsections (d), (e), and (f)
with respect to its findings on
the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, the amount and nature of bond, or the appropriate remedy shall be reviewable in
accordance with section 706 of title 5, United States Code.
The Administrative Procedure Act sets standards for review of agency decisions. 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1976). Courts must compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, id
§ 706(1), and overturn decisions which are an abuse of agency discretion. Id § 706(2)(A).
Section 337(c) provides for a Court of Customs and Patent Appeals review of final Commission determinations. "Final determinations" include findings that there have been Section 337
violations, and permanent actions against those violations. The court has also ruled that it may
review any findings unfavorable to a complainant under subsections (d), (e), or (f)
of Section 337
which are not yet referrable to the President. Import Motors Ltd. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 530 F.2d 940, 945 (C.C.P.A. 1976). For a discussion of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals' pleading and practice by Judge Rich of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, see
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its rules to allow for the ITC to waive review of its Administrative Law
Judges' (ALJ) recommended determinations.' 2 This change could
mean that the Commission will spend increased time on the issues of

remedy and the public interest since the Commission may accept the
ALJ's findings of fact and thus choose not to hear the parties repeat
their factual arguments before the Commission.13 Indeed, given the
inseparability of Section 337 action from the Section's overall effective-

ness, Commissioners, staff, and Section 337 practitioners may spend as
much time in considering Section 3374 action as they have spent in the
past proving violation of the statute.'
Rich & Duft, Doing it Better in the U.S. Court of Customs and PatentAppeals, 9 APLA Q.J. 84
(1981).
In Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 989 (C.C.P.A. 1981),
the court stated that "[i]n view of the ITC's expertise in evaluating the likelihood of injury to
American business, and absent a showing of loss of protectable rights, it is not the function of a
court to substitute a different remedy of its own design for that chosen by the ITC, or to substitute
its view of the public interest for that chosen by the ITC." However, SealedAir Corp. was filed
before November 1, 1980-the date after which the amendments expanding Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals review of Commission actions took effect. While the Commission still has
wide latitude to shape its Section 337 actions, see Canadian Tarpoly v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 640 F.2d 1322, 1326 (C.C.P.A. 1981), the 1980 Customs Court Act amendments signal a
heightened standard of review for the Commission's Section 337 actions. A discussion of the
review of Section 337 determinations is in H. KAYE, P. PLAIA, & M. HERTZBERG, supra note 4 at

§ 13.
In March, 1982, Congress passed H.R. 4482, the "Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,"
which will consolidate the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims into a
new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. However, the consolidation does not affect review
of Section 337 determinations, and, hence, this comment will refer to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals as the ITC's primary reviewing court. For the text of H.R. 4482, see [Oct.-Mar.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 121, at 678-687 (Mar. 31, 1982).
12 47 Fed. Reg. 25,134 (1982), codfledat 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.21-.22, .36, .43, .50-.51, .53-.56, .60
(1982). Under former rules, the ITC made a complete review of all of its Administrative Law
Judges' recommendation determinations. This gave each Section 337 complaint a double hearing
within the Commission. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.55 (1981). For a discussion of the Commission's
present rules, see ITC Amended Rules Providefor New Initial Determination Procedure, [Apr.Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 132, at 318 (June 16, 1982).
13 See Alberger Urges ExpandedRoleforALJs in Section 337 Cases, [Apr.-Sept. 1980 Transfer
Binder] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 45, at A-6 (Sept. 24, 1980).
14 A survey of Commission opinions shows that the ITC has devoted much more time to the
proof of violations than to the decision on action against those violations. One reason for this is
that most Section 337 actions have involved patent infringement and thus have been highly technical. Also, given the demand of making technical assessments in previous Section 337 cases, the
ITC has not developed a comprehensive jurisprudence relating to action against violations.
Whereas the federal courts have developed extensive tests, standards, and precedents for the evaluation of unfair trade practice and patent infringement cases, the Commission alone has been
responsible for developing standards for Section 337 action until the amendment of the judicial
review provisions of Section 337 in 1980. As this comment will indicate, the development of such
standards is difficult; it is not hard to see why the ITC has concentrated its opinions on already
developed areas of law.

239
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This comment first addresses the legislative history which controls
the Commission's Section 337 actions. 5 Next, it discusses the Commission's Section 337 subject matter jurisdiction. 6 After an analysis of
action available to the Commission under Section 337,17 the discussion
ends with suggestions of what the proper scope of action should be in
Section 337 cases.' 8
II.

HISTORY OF COMMISSION ACTION UNDER SECTION

337

Section 337 is the successor to Section 316 of the Tariff Act of
1922.19 The 1922 Act was protectionist legislation which Congress

designed to insulate United States manufacturers from the post-World
War I revitalization of European industry.2 ° In particular, Section 316
was a catch-all provision for the Act, intended by Congress to ensure
the effectiveness of a tariff which it thought could be defeated only by
unfair methods of competition.2 '
The Act came at a time when debate between protectionists and
free traders was at a high pitch.2 2 Consequently, Congress passed Section 316 after considerable debate over its role in forming trade policy.
Section 316 reflected these contentions, and embodied the goal of pro15 See infra text accompanying notes 19-55.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 56-107.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 108-352.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 353-413.
19 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, sec. 316, 42 Stat. 858, 943 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The major difference between Section 316 and the 1930 version of
Section 337 is the range of remedies provided. See infra text accompanying note 24. For a further
discussion of Section 337 history, Brunsvold, Injury Standards, supra note 4 at 77-81. See also H.
KAYE, P. PLA1A & M. HERTZBERG, supra note 4, at § 4.
20 In Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 259 (C.C.P.A. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
852 (1930), the court noted that since:
one of the express objects of the Tariff Act of 1922, as stated in its title, was "to encourage the
industries of the United States," it is very obvious that it was the purpose of [Section 316] to
give to industries of the United States, not only the benefit of the favorable laws and conditions to be found in this country, but also to protect such industries from being unfairly
deprived of the advantage of the same and permit them to grow and develop.
See also J. DOBSON, supra note 2, at 33-35.
21 Musrey, TarffAct's Section 337- Vehiclefor the Protection and Extension of Monopolies, 5
L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 56, 60-61 (1973). In the debate immediately prior to the 1922 Act's passage,
Senator Smoot, the Act's primary sponsor, declared that Section 316 was to be:
an antidumping law with teeth in it-one which will reach all forms of unfair competition in
importation. This section (316) not only prohibits dumping in the ordinary accepted meaning
of that word; that is, the sale of merchandise in the United States for less than its foreign
market value or cost of production; but also bribery, espionage, misrepresentation of goods,
full-line forcing, and other similar practices frequently more injurious to trade than price
cutting.
62 CONG. REC. 5874, 5879 (1922).
22 See J. DOBSON, supra note 2, at 31-33.
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moting fair trade, as well as that of protecting American industry.23
The Commission could not take independent action under the

1922 Act. If it found a violation of Section 316, the Commission could
only recommend that the President exclude articles imported unfairly.

Alternately, the Commission could advise the President to authorize
duties "not in excess of 50% or less than 10% of the value of the article
imported in violation of the Section as would offset the unfair method
or act employed."24 Once the President received the Commission's
Section 316 determinations, he followed or ignored them. 25
The Tariff Commission received only twenty-three Section 316
complaints while the statute was in effect.2 6 During this time, the Commission only conducted six Section 316 investigations; four of these
ended with recommendations to the President that he exclude the un-

fairly imported article.27
Congress created a new Section 337 in the Tariff Act of 1930 and

struck Section 316's excess duty provision.28 Also, the 1930 revision of
Section 337 eliminated the provision of direct Supreme Court review of
Tariff Commission determinations,2 9 and provided for the Secretary of
the Treasury to admit goods under bond which the President suspected
to be unfairly imported.3 0
The Tariff Commission heard few Section 337 cases between 1936
and 1974. The primary reason for this was that the Tariff Commission
23 As the Supreme Court emphasized, Section 316 was "not happily drafted." Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 446 (1929).
24 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, sec. 316(c), (e), 42 Stat. 858, 943-44.
25 Id
26 Section 316 was in effect from 1922 through 1930. It was repealed by the Tariff Act of 1930,
ch. 497, sec. 651, 46 Stat. 590, 762.
27 The affirmative investigations were Revolvers, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 316-1 (1925),
approvedbyPresident,T.D. 41,655,49 Treas. Dec. 1049 (1926); Manila Rope, U.S. Tariff Comm'n
Inv. No. 316-5 (1927), approvedby President, T.D. 42,257, 51 Treas. Dec. 959 (1927); Synthetic
Phenolic Resin, Form C, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 316-4 (1927), approvedby President,T.D.
44,411, 58 Treas. Dec. 722 (1930); Laminated Products, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv.No. 316-6 (1928),
approvedby President,T.D. 42,801, 53 Treas. Dec. 652 (1928). The Tariff Commission found no
injury in Sanitary Napkins, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 316-3 (1926), or in Briarwood Pipes,
U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 316-2 (1926). For a discussion of these decisions, see Musrey, supra
note 21, at 62-69.
28 Ch. 497, sees. 337, 651, 46 Stat. 590, 703, 762. With this change Congress affirmed the
findings of the House Committee on Ways and Means, which had recommended that the excess
duty provision "should not be retained for the reason that the imposition of penalty duties to offset
violations [was] entirely inadequate to prevent further violations [of Section 337]. The effective
remedy is to exclude the article from entry." H.R. REP. No. 7, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1929).
29 Compare Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 563, sec. 356(c), 42 Stat. 858, 944 (authorizing certiorari),
with Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, sec. 337(c), 46 Stat. 590, 703-04 (Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals judgment is final).
30 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, sec. 337(f), 46 Stat. 590, 704.
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grew increasingly reluctant to apply the statute in the years leading up
to 1936. Not only did the Commission feel that it lacked expertise in
the field of unfair competition law, but it also viewed itself as primarily
a fact-finding and not as an adjudicative body.3 1 The breaking point
was the Court of Customs and Patents Appeals' decision in In re Amtorg Trading Corporation3 2 that importation of articles into the United
States made under United States process patents was not an unfair
method of import competition. Prior to Antorg, the Commission had
maintained that Section 337 was inequitable to importers33 because it
did not allow for a review of patent validity, 34 and Amtorg gave the
Commission reason to restrain all patent-based actions under Section
337. Indeed, in 1936, the Commission attempted to have Congress remove its Section 337 jurisdiction.3 5 Since Congress refused to do this,
the Commission introduced a very high injury standard to Section 337
proceedings under which it was nearly impossible for complainants to
Commission did not consistently lower this barrier
obtain relief.36 The 37
until the late 1960s.
The second reason for the paucity of Section 337 cases prior to
1974 was the time and expense involved with Section 337 litigation. A
complainant who believed that he had any chance for redress under the
statute had to wait an average of three years for the Commission to
complete the requisite investigation.3 8 This long wait made Section 337
actions much less attractive to injured complainants than a speedier but
perhaps less comprehensive court action.
The Trade Act of 197431 significantly changed the Commission's
role under Section 337. Historically, the ITC had served as "the adviser of the President or Congress in the business of [international
trade] legislation. ' 40 Congress intended from the beginning, however,
that the Commission be independent from political pressure so that it
could act impartially.4 ' The 1974 Act enforced this intent by providing
31 1935 TARIFF COMM'N ANN. REP. 12-14.

32 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935).
33 See infra note 45.
34 Note, Section 337 Revilalization, supra note 5, at 187-88; Musrey, supra note 21, at 69-7 1.
35 1935 TARIFF COMM'N ANN. REP., supra note 31, at 12-14.

36 Note, Section 337 Revitalizaton, supra note 5, at 189.
37 Musrey, supra note 21, at 72.
38 Kaye & Plaia, Section 337 Revisited, supra note 4, at 31-32.
39 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
40 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 321 (1933).
41 J.DOBSON, supra note 2, at 83-93.
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for statutory terms of office for Commissioners, 42 making the Commission's budget dependent only on Congressional approval, 43 and symbolically indicating the Commission's new functions by giving it its
present name.' Indeed, when Congress passed the 1974 Act, Congressman Al Ullman, one of the bill's sponsors, stressed that Congress
"had adopted some rather far-reaching reforms [for the Commission]
which in some respects might very well produce a truly independent
agency, one that is immune from pressures from the President or anyone else.

' 45

The first major change that the Trade Act of 1974 made to Section
337 was to give the Commission the power to "investigate any alleged
violation" of Section 337.46 Also, while the Commission was to determine injury and remedy in much the same way as it did prior to 1974,
the 1974 Act gave the Commission the authority to make its determinations final and not merely advisory. Thus, Congress withdrew from the
President all revision power over Commission decisions except for the
power to disapprove of Commission decisions for "policy reasons."'4 7
The 1974 Act further gave the Commission power to issue cease and
desist orders48 and the responsibility of setting a bond for the entry of
goods during the sixty day presidential review of Commission orders.4 9
Nonetheless, under the 1974 Act, any action which the Commission
took against Section 337 violations had to be consistent with the public
50
interest.
Finally, the 1974 additions to subsection (c) of Section 337 provided that respondents in Section 337 investigations could present all
"legal and equitable defenses" and that parties who were adversely affected by Commission determinations could appeal to the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.5 t
42 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 172(b), 88 Stat. 1978, 2010 (1975) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1976)).
43 Id § 175, 88 Stat. at 2011 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2232 (1976)).
44 Id § 171, 88 Stat. at 2009 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1975)).
45 120 CONG. REC. 41,796-97 (1974).
46 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978, 2053 (1975) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1337(b) (1976)).
47 Id § 337(g), 88 Stat. at 2055 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1976)).
48 Id § 337(f), 88 Stat. at 2055 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0 (Supp. IV 1980)).
49 Id § 337(e), 88 Stat. at 2054 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976)). This had previously
been the responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury. See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, sec.

337(0, 46 Stat. 590, 704.

50 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978, 2054-55 (1975) (codified at 19

U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(t) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
51 Id § 341, 88 Stat. at 2054. Two court decisions prompted this amendment. First, in
Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930),
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The Trade Agreements Act of 197952 further amended Section 337
when it provided the Commission with civil enforcement mechanisms
for its cease and desist orders and set out a number of situations within
Treasury Department antidumping and countervailing duty jurisdiction where the Commission was not to take action.53 Finally, in 1980,
Congress amended Section 337 to provide for Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals review of Commission action against Section 337 violations, including determination of the effect of that action on the public
interest. 54 The court must overturn those actions which are a breach of
55
Commission discretion.
III.

SECTION

337

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Subsection (a) of Section 337 gives the Commission jurisdiction
over "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either."56 Subsection (b) states that the
Commission "shall investigate any alleged violation" of Section 337.57
The Commission reads the language of these subsections to give it
broad subject matter jurisdiction on which to base remedies for Section
337 violations,5" and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has
the court held that the Tariff Commission had no power to declare patents invalid. After that
decision, complainants whose patents might not have survived in a civil action could ask the
Commission for a remedy regardless of whether they had a valid interest to protect. While the
Commission still presumes that complainants' patents are valid, the amendment allows respondents to present such defenses as misuse and fraud to challenge validity. See Sterne, PatentInfringement Practice Before the U.S. InternationalTrade Commission, 2 INT'L TRADE L.J. 190
(1977).
The second decision was Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 582 (1962), where the Court stated
in dicta that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals may not have been able to review Tariff
Commission determinations since it was an Article III court, and the Commission's determinations were only advice to the President. There were no challenges to Commission determinations
in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals after Glidden and before the Trade Act of 1974.
52 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1105, 93 Stat. 144, 311 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3), (c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
53 Id See also infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
54 Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 604, 94 Stat. 1727, 1744 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. IV 1980)).
55 See supra notes 10- 1land accompanying text.
56 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976).
57 Id at § 1337(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
58 In Certain Copper Rod Production Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA89, Pub. No. 1132 (Oct. 1980), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5597, 5600, the ITC noted that
under the authority which Congress granted it in Section 337, the Commission may "prevent
unfair acts in their incipiency ....
The provision relating to unfair methods of competition in
the importation of goods is broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair practice .... "
See also Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-55, Pub. No. 991 at
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confirmed the Commission's interpretation.5 9 In the past the Commis-

sion has likened its jurisdiction over unfair practices in import trade to
that of the Federal Trade Commission over domestic unfair trade practices6 ° under Article 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.6" In fact,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has suggested that the Com-

mission may have "wide discretion in determining what practices are to
be regarded as unfair" since "[t]he importation of articles may invoke

questions which differ materially from any arising in purely domestic
competition." 62 Though the court reserves the right to determine what
6 (July 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5400 ("The terms 'unfair methods of competition'
and 'unfair acts' have been held to have a broad and inclusive meaning."). However, the ITC has
also noted that while its jurisdiction over unfair practices is broad, "[i]t behooves the Commission
...to formulate rational and generally acceptable reasons for treating certain practices as unfair." Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA29, Pub. No. 863 at 17 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, 5254, disapprovedby
President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
59 The court stated in In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 830-31 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935):
[it] is not necessary that a particular act, or method, or practice must have been declared by
the courts to be unfair before the Commission could properly find such act, method, or practice to be unfair, but, to be unfair, it must fall within the general domain of practices "heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith,
fraud, or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly
to hinder competition or create monopoly." This language is broad and comprehensive. It
covers a large field, as do the words "due process of law," "unjust discrimination," and the
like. The words "unfair method of competition" may include acts which have never been
specifically declared by the courts to be unfair (citations omitted).
Accord In re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447, 454-55 (C.C.P.A. 1934); In re Von Clemm, 229
F.2d 441, 443-44 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
60 See 6 TARIFF COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1922); see also Certain Copper Rod Production Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-89, Pub. No. 1132 (Oct. 1980), 2 INT'L TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 5597, 5600; Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-29, Pub. No. 863 at 39 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA)
5245, 5262, disapprovedby President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 ("It is reasonable to assume that the
framers of Section 316 were cognizant of the legislative and judicial history of Section 5 of the
FTC Act .... ").For a list of trade practices which the FTC has found to be unfair, see 1957
FED. TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. 72.
61 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The court in In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d
826, 830 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935), cited Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421,427 (1925), as defining those practices which the Tariff Commission could remedy under
Section 337. Gratz was at the time the leading case defining the FTC's subject matter jurisdiction.
Also relevant is the Supreme Court's citation of Section 337, otherwise without direct comment, in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 533 n.12 (1935). Schechter held unconstitutional the President's delegation to the FTC of power to promulgate industry codes under the
National Recovery Act (NRA). Section 337 was cited in a discussion of the definition of unfair
methods of competition under the FTC Act; the Court concluded that "[w]hat are 'unfair methods
of competition' are ... to be determined in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of
particular competitive conditions and of what is found to be a specific and substantial public
interest." .d
62 In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 444 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
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is and is not an unfair trade practice under Section 337,63 it has never
overruled a Commission determination on the grounds of inadequate
subject matter jurisdiction.
The importation of goods which infringe a United States patent
has been the "unfair method of competition" against which the Commission has most often taken action in Section 337 proceedings.6 4 Although patent infringement is generally insufficient to support a count

of unfair competition in federal district courts,65 both Congress 66 and
63 In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 463 (C.C.P.A. 1934); Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d
247, 259 (C.C.P.A. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930) ("Each case of unfair competition must
be determined upon its own facts, owing to the multifarious means by which it is sought to effectuate such schemes.").
64 For example, twenty out of twenty-two ITC exclusion orders in effect on December 1, 1981
were based on claims under United States letters patent. ITC HEARINGS CALENDAR, supra note 5.
65 See, e.g., In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 446 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (Cole, J. dissenting, citing
Unit Const. Co. v. Huskey Mfg. Co., 241 F. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1917)); R.R. Donnelly & Sons v. Haber,
43 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1942)).
66 In 1940, Congress first indicated that it intended the Commission to take jurisdiction over
patent infringement cases under Section 337 when it added Section 1337a to Title 19 to provide
that:
The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product made, produced, processed, or mined
under or by means of a process covered by the claim of any unexpired valid United States
letters patent, shall have the same status for the purposes of section 337 of this title as the
importation of any product or article covered by the claims of any unexpired valid United
States letters patent.
Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 515, 54 Stat. 724 (codifed at 19 U.S.C. § 1337a (1976)). Congress added
this section in response to the decision in In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935), holding that the importation into the United States of goods
which were manufactured under a United States process patent was not an unfair trade practice
under Section 337, since the actual manufacture abroad was permissible under foreign law. The
court found no infringement because United States design patents only covered manufacture in
the United States.
More recently, in its report on the Trade Act of 1974, the Senate Finance Committee stated its
opinion that the ITC should take jurisdiction under Section 337 over patent infringement cases.
TRADE AcT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 8, at 195-96, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7328-29. Indeed, several proposed versions of the Trade Act of 1974 would
have allowed the ITC to take independent action under Section 337 only in patent infringement
cases. The Nixon Administration's original proposed legislation, H.R. 6767, would have amended
Section 337 so that a finding of patent infringement alone, without any other proof of injury,
would have constituted a Section 337 violation. H.R. 6767, sec. 350(a), § 337(a), reprintedinTrade
Reform, Hearingson H
6767 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 4, 63 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HR. 6767 Hearings]. For criticisms of this bill, see id at
1353, 1362-63 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger). H.R. 10710, the Ways and Means Committee
version of the bill, provided that any Commission determination of an unfair import trade practice other than patent infringement would only be advisory to the President, who would act on the
determination at his discretion. Under 10710, the ITC would remedy patent infringement directly, upon finding that the infringement caused immediate and substantial harm to the patent
holder. Both H.R. 6767 and H.R. 10710 are reprinted in Kaye & Plaia, Revitalizationof the Unfair
Trade Causes in the Importation of Goods.- An Analysis of the Amendments to Section 337 (Part
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the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals6 7 have encouraged the Commission to regard the importation of goods produced as a result of the
infringement of a United States patent as tantamount to aper se violation of Section 337.68
Since the enactment of the 1974 Act, the Commission has heard

allegations of unfair import practices involving the infringement of
common law trademarks,6 9 predatory pricing,7" unauthorized use of
II-Conclusion), 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 269, 298-300, 302 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kaye &

Plata, Amendments Analysis 1975, PartI].
However, Congress' rejection of the two proposals and its approval of the Senate bill which
became the Trade Act of 1974 seems to have confirmed the Commission's broad jurisdiction over
unfair import trade practices. See the comments of former ITC Chairman Daniel Minchew in
Minchew & Webster, Regulating Unfair Practicesin InternationalTrade: The Role ofthe United
States InternationalTrade Commission, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 39 (1978), that "[t]he new
powers of the Commission were the most significant in the Trade Act for dealing with unfair trade
practices. It would seem to be inconceivable that the amendments which were thought to be so
important by the Congress were intended only to improve the procedures for handling patent

violations."
It is noteworthy that Congress has never specifically stated that patent infringement or any
other "unfair trade practice" is within Section 337's subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals has emphasized that observations of administrative practice are only
as valuable as other "extrinsic aids" in clarifying questions of construction of tariff laws such as
Section 337. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 1352, 1361 (C.C.P.A.
1973). However, it has also held that Congress incorporated long-standing administrative construction into a statute when it reenacted relevant portions of that statute without substantive
change. C.J. Tower & Sons v. United States, 44 C.C.P.A. (Cust.) 41, 44 (1957). Given the collection of extrinsic aids supporting the ITC's view that importation of goods which infringe United
States patents is a Section 337 violation, patent infringement will remain a valid action under
Section 337 unless Congress changes the statute. Such a change is unlikely since Section 337 is
especially effective against some types of infringing imports. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
67 In Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852
(1930), the court held that patent infringement could constitute an unfair act under Section 316,
the predecessor statute to Section 337. Also, in In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955),
the court specifically approved the Tariff Commission's view that it could hear claims of patent
infringement alone as violations of Section 337, absent any allegations ofacts generally considered
to be unfair. Finally, in Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 640 F.2d
1322 (C.C.P.A. 198 1), the court affirmed an ITC order excluding infringing articles, although the
ITC had not specifically determined that unfair methods of competition or unfair acts existed, as
subsection (e) of Section 337 requires (see 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1976)).
68 The ITC reasoned in Headboxes II, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82A, Pub.
No. 1197 at 13 (Nov. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEc.-(BNA) 1992, 1997, that since patent infringement was unfair competition, competition from infringing goods was not included in the
Section 337(e) formula of considering competitive conditions in the United States economy, since
the respondent had no competitive right to infringe a valid United States patent. For a discussion
of ITC action in patent infringement cases, see infra notes 379-93 and accompanying text.
69 Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No.
1126 at 12 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158, 1159; Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-55, Pub. No. 991 (July 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.
(BNA) 5400; Certain Vacuum Bottles and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.
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72
trade secrets and know-how, 7 1 passing off or simulation of design,
false designation of origin,7 3 copyright infringement,7 4 palming off, reverse palming off, trade libel, misappropriation of trade dress and trade
name,7 5 trade dress infringement and false designation of origin,7 6 false
No. 337-TA-108, notice of investigation, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,543 (1981); Certain Cube Puzzles, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA- 112, notice ofinestigation, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,964 (1981).
70 Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-23,
investigationterminatedon the basis of consent order, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,492 (1977); see alro Certain
Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-29, Pub. No.
863 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, 5255, disapprovedby President, 43 Fed.
Reg. 17,789 (1978) (opinion of Commissioners Moore, Minchew, and Alberger); Certain AboveGround Swimming Pools, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-25, Pub. No. 815 (Apr.
1977). In Certain Welded StainlessSteel ipe and Tube, a majority of the Commission agreed that
Section 337 was broad enough to cover predatory pricing schemes which violated Section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The majority held that a Section 337 violation could occur when foreign
competitors of United States interests engaged in unreasonably low pricing "with an intent, either
individually or collectively, to destroy competition in the United States market." 1 INT'L TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) at 5255. Although the President disapproved of the Stainless Steel Pipe and
Tube decision, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978), he did not specifically disapprove of the ITC taking
action against predatory pricing under Section 337. However, the Justice Department stated that
"unilateral below cost selling by a non-dominant firnr is not an 'unfair method of competition'
encompassed by Section 337," and that the Commission should dismiss complaints containing
such allegations "as a matter of law and policy." Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube,
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-29, Pub. No. 863 at 17, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.
(BNA) at 5254 n.37. No Section 337 investigation has dealt with predatory pricing since Stainless
Steel Pipe and Tube.
71 Certain Apparatus for the Continuous Production of Copper Rod, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-52, Pub. No. 1017 (Nov. 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5006; Numerically Controlled Machining Centers and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-34, investigationterminated based on settlement, 43 Fed. Reg. 5591 (1978).
72 Certain Steel Toy Vehicles, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-3 1, Pub. No. 880
(Apr. 1978); Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69,
Pub. No. 1126 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158. This is analogous to the unlawful copying of trade dress. See Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-55, Pub. No. 991 at 6 (July 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5400, 5403. The ITC
stated in CertainAirtight Cast-IronStoves that "fa]lthough the Commission does not necessarily
adopt the analogous case law on passing off under the Lanham Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act in total, it does consider passing off an offense cognizable under section 337." U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No. 1126 at 3-4, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at
1160.
73 Certain Surface Grinding Machines and Literature for the Promotion Thereof, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-95, requestforpublic comment on proposedtermination of respondents based on settlement, 46 Fed. Reg. 47,895 (1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 61,521 (1981), termination
notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1981).
74 Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-87, Pub. No. 1160 at 12-23 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1212,
1218-22.
75 Certain Surface Grinding Machines and Literature for the Promotion Thereof, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-95, requestforpublic comment on proposedtermination based on
settlement, 46 Fed. Reg. 47,895 (1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 61,521 (1981), terminationnotice, 46 Fed. Reg.
62,969 (1981). 47 Fed. Reg. 2957 (1982).
76 Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-55, Pub. No. 991 at 6
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and deceptive advertising,7 7 unfair use of advertising and promotional
materials,7" and tortious interference with the business relationships
between a complainant and its dealers.79 Before the passage of the
1974 Act, the Tariff Commission considered Section 337 cases involving unfair simulation8 ° and mislabeling a low quality product to indito cases involving patent infringement
cate higher quality,8 ' in addition
2

and types of passing off.1
Statements by Commissioners further indicate the Commission's

opinion that it has broad subject matter jurisdiction under Section 337.
Former ITC Chairman Daniel Minchew stated that the 1974 Act empowered the Commission "to extend its investigations into all cases

where imports occur in conjunction with false pricing, false advertising,
mislabeling, and false representation of source."" He also suggested
protection,
that Section 337 action might issue in favor of 8consumer
4
and against breaches of public international law.

The Commission may also take action under Section 337 against
an unfair import trade practice which "has the effect or tendency...

to restrain or monopolize U.S. Commerce."8 5 Noting the similarity of
this portion of Section 337 with Section 1 of the Sherman Act

6

and

(July 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5400, 5403, 5406; Certain Cube Puzzles, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-1 12, notice of investigation, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,964 (1981).
77 Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No.
1126 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158; see also Convertible Game Tables and
Components Thereof, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-34, Pub. No. 705 (Dec. 1974), 1 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5094, 5101 (additional statement of Commissioners Moore, Leonard,
and Ablondi; Chairman Bedell, concurring).
78 Alternating Pressure Pads, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-48, investigation terminated on the basis ofsettlement, 44 Fed. Reg. 12,286 (1979).
79 Woodworking Tools, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-1 15, notice ofinvestigation,
47 Fed. Reg. 4165 (1982).
80 Revolvers, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 316-1 (1925), approvedby President, T.D. 41,655,
49 Treas. Dec. 1049 (1926).
81 Manila Rope, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 316-5 (1927), approved by President, T.D.
42,257, 51 Treas. Dec. 959 (1927).
82 Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 260 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852
(1930). For another survey of"unfair acts" which Section 337 might cover, see H. KAYE, P. PLAIA
& M. HERTZBERG, supra note 4, at § 5.
83 Minchew, The Expanding Role of the United States International Trade Commission, 27
MERCER L. REv. 429, 437 (1976).
84 Minchew & Webster, supra note 66, at 44.
85 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976).
86 In Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub.
No. 1126 at 58 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L. TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158, 1160, the Commission observed that Section 337's prohibition of acts which "restrain . . . trade and commerce in the
United States ... is generally modeled after Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1976)] .... " However, the ITC found no antitrust violation.
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Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,87 the ITC maintains
that "if there is found a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act...
or of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, there may also
be a violation of Section 337."88
After Congress gave the Commission the power to issue cease and
desist orders under the 1974 Trade Act, the ITC had an appropriate
action to pursue when dealing with a situation involving domestic monopoly or oligopoly. 89 Some commentators have argued that when
87 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
88 Electronic Audio and Related Equipment, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-7,
Pub. No. 768 (Apr. 1976), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5211, 5222 (recommended determination of Presiding Officer Minchew, incorporated into Commission opinion by reference). Although the ITC found no antitrust violation in this investigation, it announced that it was
incorporating into its opinion the corpus of existing antitrust laws as precedent. It also indicated
that it was limiting its statement regarding antitrust jurisdiction to this particular proceeding, and
in the future, would assess its antitrust jurisdiction on a case by case basis. Id However, in
Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No. 1126 at
3-4 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158, 1160, the Commission stated that it will
not adopt all of the analogous case law under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for application in its
Section 337 decisions. Noting the differences between Section 1 and Section 337, the ITC stressed
that Section 1 requires combination, while Section 337:
requires only that a restraint be shown and contains no requirement of concerted action. It is
certainly possible to conceive of the same level of restraint by one company acting alone.
However, it obviously is more difficult to show that one company acting alone has the market
power to restrain trade than to show market power if there is concerted action. Where an
unfair course of conduct is independently pursued by a number of competitors, that conduct
may have a cumulative negative effect on competition even though such conduct is not the
product of an agreement.
Id Pub. No. 1126 at 6,3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1160-61. Thus, it appears that the
Commission regards its antitrust power under Section 337 to be more in the nature of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act (monopolization), without that Section's intent requirement.
Commentators disagree over whether it is appropriate for the Commission to apply Section
337 as an antitrust statute. While Congress designed antitrust laws generally to promote competition, Congress conceived Section 337 as protectionist legislation. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text; see also McDermid, The TradeAct of1974 Section 337 of the Tarij9Act and the
PublicInterest, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421,429-31 (1978). However, the language of Section
337, analogous to that of the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts, certainly allows the
Commission to apply principles developed under those and similar pieces of antitrust legislation.
TariyAct Provision Seen as One Possible Avenuefor Antitrust Cases, [Oct.-Mar.] INT'L TRADE
REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 107, at 275 (Dec. 16, 1981) (reporting remarks of Tom
Schaumberg before a Federal Bar Association conference on international antitrust issues).
Whether this is advisable is another question altogether. See infra text accompanying notes 39497.
89 Subsections (d), (e), and (f)(1) of Section 337 provide that the ITC must consider the effects
of Section 337-based action on a number of public interest factors, including "competitive conditions in the United States economy." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(e), (f)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The
Senate Report serves as a main source of legislative history for the present Section 337, and explains that the ITC may refuse to issue an order excluding foreign products if the competing
domestic industry has engaged in "price gouging" or monopoly practices. TRADE ACT OF 1974, S.
REP. No. 1298, supra note 8, at 195-96, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 732829. The Senate Finance Committee removed "price gouging" from the final language of the 1974
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Congress granted the Commission cease and desist powers, 90 its specific
intent was to allow the Commission to consider antitrust situations and
to remedy them since an exclusion order would have been counterproductive if the offending party was in the United States. 91
Under its antitrust jurisdiction, the Commission has dealt with allegations of group boycotts, 92 refusals to deal, 93 conspiracy to restrain
trade, predatory pricing,94 and pricing below variable cost of production without commercial justification. 95 The ITC, however, has handled few antitrust cases, and seems reluctant to handle them.9 6 No
doubt this is because each time the Commission has taken up an anti-

trust-based complaint under Section 337, difficult procedural and political problems have arisen.9 7

In addition to the requirement that the Commission may only inamendments to Section 337. The Nixon Administration's proposed legislation for what became
the Trade Act of 1974, H.R. 6767, would have taken all antitrust jurisdiction away from the ITC
leaving it to consider only patent infringement questions under Section 337. See supra note 66.
Companion legislation, S. 1774, would have amended the Federal Trade Commission Act to deal
specifically with cartel or monopoly practices in connection with import trade. See H. 6767
Hearings, supra note 66, at 101, 108 (message of the President), and at 1364-65 (statement of Noel
Hemmendinger).
90 19 U.S.C. § 1337(t)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
91 See Minchew & Webster, supra note 66 at 31-32. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 gave
the Commission the power to enforce its cease and desist orders in federal courts. See infra notes
341-54 and accompanying text.
92 Tractor Parts, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-22, Pub. No. 443 (Dec. 1971). The two
Commissioners stated without comment that group boycotts are a Section 337 violation. See also
Certain Angolan Robusta Coffee, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-16, investigationterminated on the basis of settlement, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,418 (1976).

93 Certain Angolan Robusta Coffee, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-16, investigation terminated on the basis ofsettlement, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,418 (1976); Chicory Root--Crude and
Prepared, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-27, investigation terminated, 42 Fed. Reg.
17,923 (1977).
94 Chicory Root, Crude and Prepared, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-27, investigation terminated, 42 Fed. Reg. 17,923 (1977); Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-23, investigation terminated on the basisof consent order, 42 Fed.

Reg. 39,492 (1977).
95 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA29, Pub. No. 863 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, disapproved by President, 43

Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
96 The court in Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 659 F.2d 1038
(C.C.P.A. 1981), upheld the ITC's dismissal of a Section 337 complaint which simply alleged,
without support, that respondents had committed monopoly practices. The basis for the ITC's
dismissal was that the complaint was not properly filed under ITC rule of procedure 210.12, 19
C.F.R. § 210.12 (1981). The Commission's argument was that Section 337 complaints require a
minimum of substantive allegations in order to serve as the basis for the commencement of a
formal Section 337 investigation by the ITC staff. In the future, before the Commission accepts an
antitrust-based complaint, it will require the allegations in the complaint to be thoroughly
supported.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 393-396.
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vestigate unfair acts or practices which occur "in the importation of
articles into the United States or in their sale,"98 there are only two

statutory limitations on the ITC's Section 337 subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Commission may not initiate, or once initiated, must
terminate any investigation of matters which are based solely on alleged acts or effects which are within the purview of the several statutes

applying to countervailing duties9 9 or to antidumping.100 However, if
98 This requirement, from subsection (a) of Section 337, related to the acts of owners, importers, consignees, and their agents, who import articles into the United States. Thus, the subsection
defines both the instances of unfair practices which the Commission can reach under Section 337
and also defines the ITC's inpersonamjurisdiction under the section. For a discussion of this in
personamjurisdiction, see infra notes 168-183 and accompanying text.
The ITC has developed no clear interpretation of how far Section 337's subject matter jurisdiction extends with respect to the location of unfair acts or unfair competition. Indeed, the Commission has appeared to determine this on a case by case basis. One Commission opinion
suggested that no violation of Section 337 occurs until there is an importation into the United
States, along with an act of importation or sale by an "owner, importer, consignee, or agent of
either." Electronic Audio and Related Equipment, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-7,
Pub. No. 768 (Apr. 1976), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5211, 5212-13, 5221 (recommended
determination of Presiding Officer Daniel Minchew, approved by reference). However, a later
opinion emphasized that subsection (a)'s use of the word "or" indicated that Section 337 did not
limit the Commission to prosecution of those acts arising during importation. Thus, Section 337
could control the unfair acts of owners, who might be foreign manufacturers, importers, consignees, or their agents, regardless of where those acts took place. The only limit to this application,
the Commission noted, was that there had to be some nexus between the unfair method of competition or unfair acts and importation into the United States. Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe
and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-29, Pub. No. 863 at I1 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, 5252, disapproved by President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
With respect to acts occurring within the United States after importation, a 1974 ITC opinion
held that Section 337 encompassed merchandise withdrawn from Customs and available for direct
sale to consumers by importers or retailers. Convertible Game Tables and Components Thereof,
U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-34, Pub. No. 705 at 7 (Dec. 1974), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.
(BNA) 5094, 5096-97. Yet, in another case, the ITC dismissed as respondents two distributors of
importers who were also respondents in that case. The Commission dismissed the distributors
because to be within Section 337, a sale had to be directly concerned with importation. In the
Commission's view, distribution was not such a direct concern. Also, the ITC maintained that the
respondent importers could adequately represent the distributors' interests. Monolithic Catalytic
Converters, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-18, investigation terminatedby reason of
licensing agreement, 41 Fed. Reg. 41,478 (1976).
99 Specifically, Subtitle A of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by The Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. IV 1980), and Section 303 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For a short description of these
statutes, see Garfinkel, Import Relief Guide, supra note 4, at 243-44.
100 Subtitle B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amendedby The Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979). For a description of this statute, see Garfinkel, Import
Relief Guide, supra note 4, at 241-43.
The entire provision excluding ITC jurisdiction over those "acts or effects. . .[solely] within
the purview" of the countervailing duty and antidumping laws appears at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3)
(Supp. IV 1980). Congress added the provision as part of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to
codify the intent which the Senate Finance Committee expressed in its report on the TRADE ACT
OF 1974, S.REP. No. 1298, supra note 8, at 195, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
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the ITC has reason to believe that the countervailing duty or antidumping laws only partially cover the matter before it under Section 337, it

may continue its investigation. 10 1 Thus, if a complaint includes allegations of unfair import trade practices other than those which the coun-

tervailing duty or antidumping laws cover, the Commission will retain
Section 337 jurisdiction. Allegations of unfair import practices would
be relatively easy to include in a complaint for the purpose of keeping a

matter before the Commission. 02
The second express limitation on ITC Section 337 jurisdiction is

that ITC orders based on United States patent claims do not apply to
importations for federal government use. 10 3 If there is such importa-

tion, the patent holder may gain relief by bringing action in the Court
of Claims for "reasonable and entire compensation."'"
The Commission has independently limited its jurisdiction on four
occasions. Three of these arose after full determinations early in the
Commission's history, 05 while the fourth occurred after the Trade Act

of 1974 in a ruling that the complaint was "not properly

filed."'10 6

at 7328, that "[it is expected that the Commission's practice of not investigating matters clearly
within the purview of either Section 303 [19 U.S.C. § 1303 countervailing duty statute] or the
Antidumping Act [of 1921, 42 Stat. II, codofed at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV 1980)] will
continue."
101 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
102 See Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-23,
investigation terminatedon the basis of consent order, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,492 (1977), where the complainants alleged both predatory pricing and "unfair economic benefits and incentives by a foreign government." Both of these allegations arguably fall within the purview of the respective
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes. But see Syntex Agribusiness Inc. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 659 F.2d 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1981), where the court describes the ITC's refusal to
initiate an investigation because the alleged acts were solely within the purview of the Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV 1980).
ITC Chief Administrative Law Judge Donald Duvall has noted that the Commission views
the limitations under subsection (b)(3) of Section 337 "as constituting merely a procedural obligation rather than a substantive limitation on its subject matter jurisdiction." Duvall, supra note 4, at
170. On its face, however, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980) does not support the ITC's
view.
103 19 U.S.C. § 1337(i) (1976).
10
4 1d
105 Sanitary Napkins, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 316-3 (1926) (importation of articles in
cartons similar in size and color to United States manufacturer's cartons not a violation, where
size was functional and United States manufacturer had no exclusive right to the color of the
carton); Briarwood Pipes, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 316-2 (1926) (sales below marginal cost
not a violation); Russian Asbestos, Docket No. 1, Jan. 16, 1933 (not an unfair trade practice under
Section 337 to import goods produced by foreign government monopolies, state trading corporations, or prison labor).
106 Crocheted Bootie Sets from Korea, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 603-TA-2, investigation terminated,41 Fed. Reg. 32,793 (1976). For a discussion of the ITC's use of its investigative
power under Section 603 of the TariffAct of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 2482 (1976), to informally dispose
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Given Section 337's mandate that the ITC shall investigate any alleged
violations of the statute,10 7 however, it is unlikely that the Commission
will choose to further limit its subject matter jurisdiction.
IV.

ACTIONS AVAILABLE AGAINST SECTION

337

VIOLATIONS

Under Section 337 and related legislation, Congress has provided

the Commission with a range of actions in cases involving unfair practices in import trade. Section 337 specifies that when the Commission
finds a violation of the Section, it may issue either an exclusion order' 0 8
or a cease and desist order.'0 9 Moreover, Section 337 provides that
during the ITC's investigation of a complaint, the injured complainant
may apply for several kinds of temporary orders."10 If the ITC grants
such an order, or during the time a final Commission determination
issuing an exclusion or cease and desist order is before the President for
review, the ITC must allow entry under bond of the imported articles at

issue. "II
The Commission has also taken six other types of action not specified in the statute in connection with Section 337 investigations. First,
the parties in Section 337 proceedings have often settled their disputes
themselves, and the Commission has based terminations of the proceedings on the settlement orders. 1 2 Second, the ITC has used its position among the parties to negotiate consent orders in which it joins as a
party and agrees to supervise the order. Further, the ITC has termiof possible Section 337 violations, see infra notes 306-312 and accompanying text. Under its rules,
the Commission may reject a complaint which is not "properly filed," 19 C.F.R. § 210.12 (1981),
and the ITC rejected the Booties complaint on this basis. While the rule itself seems to permit the
Commission to dispose of complaints which it deems, for apparently substantive reasons, not
properly filed, the language of a related rule suggests that "properly fied" means only that a
complaint must be sufficient and in compliance with "the applicable rules" of the chapter. 19
C.F.R. § 210.11 (1981). The chapter provides that a complaint must contain the names of parties,
"concise and direct pleading," and other information which related to procedural sufficiency. 19
C.F.R. §§ 210.5, 210.20 (1981). Thus, it would appear that the Commission's rules require it to
proceed with investigation once a complaint is fied which meets the procedural requirements of
its rules. Compare this with the court's ruling in Syntex Agribusiness Inc. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comn'n, 659 F.2d 1038, 1044 (C.C.P.A. 1981), that the ITC properly dismissed, as "not
properly filed," a complaint which did not provide an adequate factual basis for its claims of a
conspiracy and monopoly-based violation of Section 337.
107 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(I) (1976): "The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of
this section on complaint under oath or upon its initiative." (emphasis added).
108 Id § 1337(d); see infra text accompanying notes 122-63.
109 19 U.S.C. § 1337()(1) (Supp. IV 1980); see infra text accompanying notes 164-97.
110 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976); see infra text accompanying notes 198-219.
111 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e), (g)(3) (1976); see infra text accompanying notes 220-43.
112 See infra text accompanying notes 244-258.
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nated Section 337 investigations on the basis of consent orders.1 13 The
issuance of advisory opinions 14 and suspension of proceedings 115 have
also been ITC responses to questions involved in Section 337 investigations. In addition, the Commission has the power to take informal
action to investigate possible Section 337 violations1 16 and, on the basis
of an investigation, to enter into consent settlements with the investigated party.' 17 Finally, the ITC has modified its orders to cover

changed circumstances
such as when the basis for the original violation
18

has ceased."

Substantive rulemaking is an action which may be available to the
Commission to aid in the administration of Section 337, but one which
it has not used.1 9 The ITC also has not used the statutory procedures
which provide for the enforcement of a Commission cease and desist
order. 20 Equally untested are enforcement mechanisms which the ITC
has created through procedural rulemaking. 2 1
A.

Exclusion Orders

Exclusion orders are one of -he actions which the Commission
may take if it determines that there has been a violation of Section
337.122 While the ITC will direct its order toward the complainant's
113 See infra text accompanying notes 259-274.
114

See infra text accompanying notes 275-284.

115 See infra text accompanying notes 285-305.
116 19 U.S.C. § 2482 (1976).
117 See infra text accompanying notes 306-12.
118 See infra text accompanying notes 313-16.
119 See infra text accompanying notes 317-35.
120 See infra text accompanying notes 339-42.
121 See infra text accompanying notes 339-42.
122 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1976). Prior to the Trade Act of 1974, exclusion was the only action
which the Commission could take against a Section 337 violation. Under the unamended Tariff
Act of 1930, the President could issue an exclusion order upon Commission recommendation, if
he agreed that there had been a Section 337 violation, and agreed that exclusion was proper. No
criteria guided how broad the exclusion order could be. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, sec. 337(e), 46
Stat. 590, 704.
Section 337 exclusion orders become effective on the date of their publication in the Federal
Register, and become final on the day after the close of a sixty-day period of presidential review,
or before that time, if the President expressly approves the order. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1976); 19
C.F.R. § 210.56 (1981) (ITC rules); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39 (1981) (Customs Service rules). When the
ITC first issues its order, and later, when the order becomes final through presidential approval or
inaction, the Commission transmits notice of the order to the Secretary of the Treasury, who
notifies Customs officials of the order. These officials communicate the order to district Customs
directors, who inform importers of the excluded goods that the Commission's order is in effect. 19
U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 210.56(c) (1981) ("An exclusion order shall be enforceable
upon receipt of notice thereof by the Secretary of the Treasury."); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(3) (1981)
(Customs Service rules). Importers of excluded goods must destroy or export those goods not
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injury, it must also consider "the effect of such exclusion order upon
the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles
in the United States, and United States consumers."' 2 3 Thus, the Commission may exercise its exclusion power if it has subject matter jurisdiction, and if the public interest permits. 2 4 An exclusion order will
remain in effect until the Commission finds that the conditions which
led to the order no longer exist,' 25 and the order may be as broad or as
narrow as the ITC determines is necessary.
The main efficacy of exclusion orders is that they are actions in
rem. Since the orders operate against goods, not parties, their success
does not depend on whether or not the Commission can secure inper126
sonam jurisdiction over respondents.
Another argument often advanced in support of the ITC's use of
exclusion orders is that they are uniquely helpful to domestic industries
which would otherwise have to bring a multiplicity of actions in order
to obtain relief against unfair, shifting imports.' 27 Section 337 exclusion orders are effective throughout the United States, whereas court
decrees apply only within the court's smaller jurisdiction. Also, since
the Customs Service polices exclusion orders at United States ports of
entry, neither complainants nor the Commission must monitor those
accepted into United States commerce through Customs at the time the President approves the
exclusion order or the sixty-day period passes without disapproval. If the importer does not do so,
and the goods were entered on an import bond (as distinct from the ad valorem or similar type
bond imposed under Section 337; see infra notes 220-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these bonds), the district director who released the articles "shall assess liquidated damages in the
full amount of the bond rider if the importer or consignee fails to export or destroy the released
articles under Customs supervision within [a] thirty day period." 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(3) (1981)
(Customs Service rules).
123 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
124 Id

125 Id § 1337(h) (1976); see also Charia & Co. v. United States, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252, 260
(Cust. Ct. 1954) (a patent-based exclusion order may last as long as the patent is in force).
Twenty-three Section 337-based exclusion orders were outstanding on December 1, 1981. All but
two of these were issued against patent-based violations. ITC HEARINGS CALENDAR, supra note
5.
126 Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1981). In
Sealed Air Corporation, the court said:
The Tariff Act of 1930 . . .and its predecessor, the Tariff Act of 1922, were intended to
provide an adequate remedy for domestic industries against unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts instigated against foreign concerns operating beyond the inpersonamjurisdiction of domestic courts . . . . Authority to provide such remedy is grounded in Congress'
plenary constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce, a portion of which power Congress delegated to the ITC under 19 U.S.C. § 1337. That Congress has wide discretion concerning procedures barring imports has been judicially confirmed in numerous cases."
Id at 985-86 (footnotes and citations omitted).
127 See infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
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28
orders on an ongoing basis.'

Yet critics have viewed the Commission's Section 337 exclusion
power as a drastic remedy which the Commission has often applied
beyond the scope of necessary relief.129 Part of this criticism flows from
the belief that the ITC's exclusion power is inflexible because it is applicable against only a general category of goods and is ineffective

against the goods of individual manufacturers.

30

Thus, the argument

goes, the Commission should only apply its exclusion power against
imports which infringe a United States patent since policy arguments
for supporting United States patent rights are strong. 131
There is support for the argument that exclusion orders are inflexi-

ble in so far as the argument relates to the Commission's extension of
exclusion orders to the components and spare parts of excluded

goods.132 Such parts may have a lawful use in the United States and
their separate importation would not be a Section 337 violation. Thus,
relief exceeds injury in the case where the ITC excludes parts of excluded goods since domestic manufacturers not only benefit from protection of their main products, but 133
also from the order's effect of
insulating the market for spare parts.
The Commission has shown, however, that it can use exclusion
orders flexibly to address certain situations. For example, the exclusion
128 Certain Window Shades and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337TA-83, Pub. No. 1152 (May 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1309, 1314.
129 TRADE ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 8, at 198, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7331; TradeAct f1973, HearingsBefore the Committee on Financeon S.
1447, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1999, 2011 (written statement of Harvey Kaye and Paul Plaia, Jr.)
[hereinafter cited as 1974 TradeAct Hearings--Senate];Tractor Parts, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv.
No. 337-22, Pub. No. 443 at 9 (Dec. 1971); Easton & Lang,A Comment: Kaye andlaiaon Section
337-PricingJurisdiction, 3 INT'L TRADE L.J. 359, 368 (1978).
130 Rosenthal & Sheldon, Section 337 A View From Two Within the Department of Justice, 8
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 47, 59 (1978).
131 Id See infra notes 374-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of ITC action under
Section 337 in cases of patent infringement.
132 For examples of ITC exclusion orders which included an exclusion of parts and components, see Headboxes 1I, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82A, Pub. No. 1197 (Nov.
1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1992; Certain Large Video Matrix Display Systems and
Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-75, Pub. No. 1158 at 28 (June
1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1474, 1485.
133 The ITC issued one exclusion order which allowed importation of components if the importer presented an affidavit at Customs stating that he did not intend to use the goods in an
infringing way. Convertible Game Tables and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-2, Pub. No. 705 (Apr. 1976), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5094. There
seems to be no other approach than this to regulate the importation of spare parts to items excluded under a Section 337 order. However, it is not reasonable to expect the Customs Service to
uniformly assess intent on each occasion of spare parts importation. Thus, no order short of one
excluding all spare parts will be totally effective against infringement.
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order which the Commission drafted against infringements of a United
States process patent in CertainMulticellularPlasticFilm13 4 called for
those who desired to import film to petition the Commission for a determination of whether their film would infringe the process patent.
The Commission would allow non-infringing film to be imported. In
Headboxes J1,135 as another example, the Commission reconsidered
the broad exclusion order it issued in Headboxes I and which the President disapproved, and replaced it with a narrow order applying
only to
36
the respondent's and related companies' merchandise.
If the Commission applies its exclusion orders narrowly, as it did
in HeadboxesII, it can escape a second set of objections to its exclusion
powers. Broad exclusions, according to this criticism, provide a remedy
which exceeds the complainant's injury, and unjustifiably expand the
complainant's rights. 37 In addition, such orders may stifle the flow of
legitimate trade.' 38 Indeed, subsection (d) of Section 337 arguably precludes such exclusion orders.' 39 Under this subsection, there must be
appropriate findings that the "articles concerned" are involved in a violation of Section 337. Therefore, the ITC may not exclude a general
class of articles unless it has found that each of the class members has
been involved in a Section 337 violation. 4 ' A related criticism stresses
that when the ITC subjects imports to an exclusion order requiring licensing or approval without including those imports in a Section 337
investigation, it creates an unwarranted, unnecessary barrier to
134 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-54, Pub. No. 987 (June 1979), 2 INT"L TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 5056, aft'd, Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 640
F.2d 1322 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
135 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.No. 337-TA-82A, Pub. No. 1191 (Nov. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 1992.

136 Id Pub. No. 1191 at 9-12, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1997-98. See also supra note
7.
137 See Headboxes I, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82, Pub. No. 1138 (Apr. 1981),
2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5481, 5499 (views of ITC Chairman Bill Alberger regarding
remedy and the public interest), disapprovedby President, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981).
138 Certain Airless Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-90, Pub. No. 1199 at 17 (Nov. 1981), 3 INT'' TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 2041, 2049. Customs officials might apply broad orders in an overly expansive way, or potential exporters to the
United States of related, but non-infringing articles might decide not to export because of the
business uncertainties which a broad order would create. Id
139 The pertinent portion of subsection (d) of Section 337 states that "[i]f the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this section, that there is a violation of this section, it
shall direct that the articles concerned ... be excluded from entry." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1976)
(emphasis added).
140 Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 640 F.2d 1322, 1329 n.6
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (Nies, J., dissenting).
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trade. 141 Such a barrier runs counter to United States obligations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 142 and the
GATT Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.1 43 Hence, the
Commission has announced that both the complainant and the ITC
Investigative Attorney in Section 337 actions have the affirmative duty
to use reasonable efforts to notify, through the Commission Secretary's
office, all persons whose goods might be affected by the actions, "serving all with copies of the notice of investigation to insure that they are

on notice of the pendency of a Section 337 action."'"
However, if the Commission would limit the scope of all of its

exclusion orders to the articles of specific parties, it would remove those
orders' effectiveness against injuries to United States industries caused
by unfairly imported, easily produced articles. Once the ITC excludes

such articles of one foreign producer, another could easily begin importing the articles, and a new Section 337 investigation would-be necessary.145 As a result, there is a need for the ITC to retain its discretion
to draft broad exclusion orders in certain cases. 146
In Certain Airless Spray Pumps, 147 the Commission announced

that it would require complainants who seek broad exclusion orders in
patent infringement cases to prove both a widespread pattern of unauthorized use of its patented invention, and "certain business conditions" which indicate that manufacturers other than the named

respondents in the investigation might attempt to enter the United
States market with infringing articles. Evidence of widespread unauthorized use could include:
(1) a Commission determination of unauthorized importation into the
141 See Letter from Stephen L. Gibson, Counsel for TVW Paper Machines, Inc., to Hon. William E. Brock, United States Trade Representative (May 14, 1981) (filed in the Docketing Office
of the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Washington, D.C., in connection with Headboxes I, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82, Pub. No. 1138 (Apr. 1981), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.(BNA)
5481, drapprovedby President,46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981)).
142 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, arts. XI, XX.
143 GATT Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, openedfor signature Apr. 12, 1979, 93
Stat. 144, 148 T.I.A.S. No. 9788, - U.N.T.S. -, art. 3(a).
144 Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97 (June
1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP.DEC.(BNA) 1342, 1345 n.3 (interlocutory appeal of administrative law
judge ruling by respondents), exclusion orderissued, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,352 (1981), revoked, 47 Fed.
Reg. 2950 (1982).
145 Certain Airless Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-90, Pub. No. 1199 at 18 (Nov. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.(BNA) 2041, 2048-49.
146 See infra text accompanying notes 405-14.
147 Certain Airless Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-90, Pub. No. 1199 at 18 (Nov. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP.DEC.(BNA) 2041, 2048-49.
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United States of infringing articles by numerous foreign manufacturers;
or
(2) the pendency of foreign infringement suits based upon foreign patents which correspond to the domestic patent in issue;
(3) other evidence which demonstrates
a history of unauthorized foreign
14
use of the patented invention. 8

Evidence to prove "business conditions" could include:
(1) an established demand for the patented product in the U.S. market
and conditions of the world market;
(2) the availability of marketing and distribution networks in the United
States for potential foreign manufacturers;
(3) the cost to foreign enterpreneurs of building a facility capable of
producing the patented article;
(4) the number of foreign manufacturers whose facilities could be
retooled to produce the patented article; or

(5) the cost to foreign manufacturers
of retooling their facility to pro149
duce the patented articles.

Applying the above criteria in the Spray Pumps case, the ITC held
that the complainant had proven neither business conditions nor widespread use sufficient for a broad order, and thus directed an order
against only the named respondents in the case.' 5 '
Neither the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals nor the Commission has accepted the arguments that the ITC must draft narrow
exclusion orders in all cases. Arguments stressing that orders be as narrow as possible are persuasive, though, when one is aware of the potential constraint each exclusion order can have on United States import
trade. Thus, even when applying its Spray Pumps criteria, the ITC

should seek to draft its exclusion
orders as narrowly as possible against
15 1
violations.
337
Section
148 Id Pub. No. 1199 at 18-19, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 2048-49.
149 Id

150 Id Pub. No. 1199 at 19, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 2049.
151 Significantly, all of the exclusion orders after the President's disapproval of the Headboxes
I order, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981), and until the President's disapproval of the Sandwich Panel
Inserts order, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,919 (1982), issued against the goods of specific parties. See CoinOperated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337TA-87, Pub. No. 1160 at 28 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1212; Certain Spring
Assemblies and Components Thereof, and Methods for their Manufacture, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-88, Pub. No. 1172 (Oct. 1981), 3 Ir'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1426
[hereinafter cited as Spring Assemblies]; Certain Airless Spray Pumps and Components Thereof,
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-90, Pub. No. 1199 (Nov. 1981); Certain Steel Rod
Treating Apparatus and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97,
exclusion order issued, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,352 (1981), revoked, 47 Fed. Reg. 2950 (1982). The incidence of the change in the scope of ITC exclusion orders after the President's Headboxes I disapproval is striking. What is also striking is what seems to be the executive's continued opposition to
broad exclusion orders. Yet, the President neither approved nor disapproved of the broad exclusion order which the ITC issued in Certain Coin-Operated Audiovisual Games and Components

Unfair Import Trade Practices
4:234(1982)

It is important to note, however, that drafting cannot compensate
for certain inherent limitations of exclusion orders. For example, enforcement of exclusion orders falls on the United States Customs Service. Each time an article reaches Customs, officers who enforce the
order must determine whether the article falls under it.'5 2 Thus, within
certain bounds, there is no assurance that Customs officers will administer an exclusion order uniformly.' 53 Indeed, past practice seems to
indicate that the Service tends to construe exclusion orders broadly in
some cases 54 and narrowly in others.'5 5 In both cases, the need for
Thereof (viz., Pac-Man and Rally-X), U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-105, Pub. No.
1267 (July 1982). See Owner of Copyright in "ac-Man' Came Wins ITC Exclusion Order, [Apr.Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 138, at 520-22 (July 28, 1982).
152 For example, when determining whether an imported good falls under an exclusion order
entered against design patent infringement, Customs officials apply the "ordinary observer" test of
Gorham v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871). See Kaye & Plaia, Unfair Competition in Imports: A
Review of Developments During the Year 1979 Under Section 337 of the TariffzAct of 1930, 62 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 582, 606 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kaye & Plaia, 1979 Developments]. The
"ordinary observer" test is simply whether an ordinary observer would be able to tell whether an
import infringed a design patent. There is always the possibility that a domestic manufacturer
will disagree with Customs officials who admit articles under the Gorham test. To enforce his
patent right, the domestic manufacturer could take any or all of three actions: (1) go back to the
Commission for enforcement or modification of its order, see 19 C.F.R. § 211.01 et seq. (1981);
(2) bring administrative proceedings with Customs at the port where the allegedly infringing articles entered; or (3) bring action in the port's federal district court. Thus, to enforce a Commission
order, a manufacturer subject to shifting imports might encounter more litigation than if he had
sued particular importers one at a time.
153 The ITC and the Customs Service have not implemented any procedure which would allow
Customs officials to obtain advice from the ITC as to whether particular articles fall within an ITC
exclusion order. In April, 1981, for example, ITC enforcement attorneys received a memorandum
from a Customs official in Portland, Oregon inquiring whether the patent-based exclusion order
issued in Certain Rotatable Photograph and Card Display Units and Components Thereof, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-74, Pub. No. 1109 (Nov. 1980), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.
(BNA) 1011, applied to articles which an importer was attempting to bring into the United States.
Customs Memorandum, April 1981, filed in the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office,
Washington, D.C., in connection with RotatablePhotographand CardDisplay Units. There is no
record of reply to this memorandum. Similarly, importers attempted an entry of articles with the
ITC's design patent-based exclusion order in Certain Luggage Products, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-39, Pub. No. 932 (Nov. 1978), may have covered. The Customs Service District
Director at the port of entry requested a ruling from the Director of Entry Procedures and Penalties Division of the Custom Service in Washington, D.C. as to whether the articles infringed the
design patent which the exclusion order protected. The Washington director replied that the order
did not cover the subject luggage. Customs Service Circular 79-390; see also Kaye & Plaia, 1979
Developments, supra note 152, at 605-06.
There seems to be no reason why the Commission cannot adapt its advisory opinion procedure to provide for Customs officials' requests for interpretations of exclusion orders. See generally the discussion of the ITC's advisory opinion procedures, infra notes 277-286 and
accompanying text.
154 Before the President disapproved of the Headboxes I exclusion order, directed against all
imported headboxes, see 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981), importers of non-infringing related goods
complained that the order was causing them delays at Customs. In response, the ITC sent a letter
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interpretation of Commission exclusion orders at Customs always in156
volves implications for the free flow of trade into the United States.
To facilitate administration of exclusion orders based on findings
of common law trademark infringement, the ITC has issued exclusion
orders containing pictures and descriptions of the complainant's products, 15 7 and lists of required changes to make the infringing products
acceptable for entry. 158 However, pictures are of little use in the administration of patent-based exclusion orders. When it has communicated those orders to Customs, the Commission has refused to do more
than attach a copy of the patent to the exclusion order. Any further
description, the ITC maintains, might be overly narrow and deprive the
complainant of a remedy, or might be overly broad and result in an
overly broad exclusion order. 159

The appeals process available through Customs can further limit
the uniform administration of Section 337 exclusion orders. Importers

may, for example, obtain a Customs ruling prior to importation on
whether the articles they propose to import would be subject to import
restrictions. After importation, the importer may require that the Cus-

toms Service import specialist at the port of entry seek internal advice
from Customs in Washington, D.C. on any questions of import restricto Customs clarifying how it intended Customs to enforce the exclusion order. FutureITCRecommendations Will Get Closer Look, USTR Offeial Says, supra note 7; President Disapproves ITC's
Remedy Determination in Headboxes Case, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) No. 81, at A-4, A-5 (June 10, 1981). See also Certain Airless Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-90, Pub. No. 1199 at 17 (Nov. 1981), 3
INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 2041, 2048 (Customs officials might decide, when in doubt, to
exclude items related to those covered in exclusion order).
155 See Prohibited and Restricted Importations: Solid Molded Golf Balls; Patent Infringement,
C.S.D. 80-154, 14 Cust. B. & Dec. 984 (1980). In this ruling, the Service construed the patentbased exclusion order which the ITC issued in Certain Molded Golf Balls, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-35, Pub. No. 897 (July 1978). The Service determined that golf balls
which had a separate surlyn cover molded to a polymeric solid center were not excluded, because
the patented ball was a one-piece ball.
156 The need to minimize importation delays was one of the reasons that the President disapproved the Headboxes I exclusion order. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981).
157 Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No.
1126 at 14 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158, 1164; Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-55, Pub. No. 991 at 3 n.4 (July 1979), 2 ITr'L TRADE REP.
DEC. (BNA) 5400.
158 Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No.
1126 at 14 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158, 1164.
159 HeadboxesI1, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82A, Pub. No. 1197 at 12 (Nov.
1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1992, 1998. Section 337 is the only Customs-related
statute which requires Customs officials to interpret United States patents at ports of entry. The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has ruled that this is permissible. In re Von Clemm, 229
F.2d 441, 445 (C.C.P.A. 1954).

Unfair Import Trade Practices
4:234(1982)

tions. 16 ° If a Customs officer excludes the importer's article, the importer may appeal the exclusion administratively, 16 1 and may continue
the appeal by filing a civil action in the United States Court of International Trade. The importer, may appeal a Court of International Trade
Patent Appeals, and from there
decision to the Court of Customs and
162
to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
It is not certain whether a court reviewing the exclusion of goods
at Customs pursuant to a Section 337 order would be limited to a review of whether the excluded items were covered by the exclusion order, or whether review could extend to the question of whether the
unfair import trade practice on which the ITC based the order was actually present in connection with the particular import stopped at Customs.1 63 If the more extensive review takes place, a court could
effectively alter the content of the Commission's original exclusion
order.
In sum, while exclusion orders may seem to be inclusively powerful actions under Section 337, the need for individual application of the
orders at Customs and the needs of administrative due process limit the
orders' practical effectiveness.
B.

Cease and Desist Orders

In 1974, Congress provided the Commission with the power to impose cease and desist orders "in lieu of" exclusion orders. 164 While the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the Commission
to apply cease and desist orders instead of exclusion orders in nonpatent cases, 165 the Commission has viewed cease and desist orders as
160 19 C.F.R. § 177.11(b) (1980).
161 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1976).
162 28 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (West Supp. 1981). The newly-constituted United States Court of International Trade has not reviewed a Section 337 exclusion order in connection with a claim at
Customs. However, the United States Customs Court, predecessor of the United States Court of
International Trade, reviewed one Section 337 exclusion order, and held that the order included
the plaintiffs articles. Charia & Co. v. United States, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252 (Cust. Ct. 1954).
163 See LaRue, Section 337 of the 1930 TariffAct and its Section 5 FTC Act Counterpart,43
ANTITRUST L. J. 608, 612 (1974); H. 6767 Hearings,supra note 66, at 1361 (statement of Noel
Hemmendinger).
164 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (Supp. IV 1980). The ITC has interpreted the words "in lieu of' to

mean that it may not impose a cease and desist order and an exclusion order against a single
respondent for a single Section 337 violation. However, the ITC contends that it may impose both
kinds of orders where there are several violations, or several respondents. See infra notes 188-91
and accompanying text.
165 The Senate Finance Committee expressed the view that "the existing statute, which provides no remedy other than exclusion of articles from entry, [was] so extreme or inappropriate in

some cases that it [was] often likely to result in the Commission not finding a violation of this
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an "extraordinary remedy," appropriate only "where an exclusion order is ineffective to redress completely the wrong or is insufficiently
precise in its coverage."' 6 6 Seemingly consistent with this view, the
Commission has applied cease and desist orders in only three cases.' 67
An alternate explanation for the ITC's hesitance to use its cease
and desist powers is that the ITC has never figured out how to apply
them. Part of this uncertainty stems from the fact that the Commission
must have inpersonam jurisdiction over respondents in order to apply
effective cease and desist orders. Further, the Commission is uncomfortable with the fact that cease and desist orders only reach specific
respondents, whereas exclusion orders, depending on their breadth, can

operate against the good of any existing or potential violator of Section
section, thus reducing the effectiveness of section 337 for the purposes intended." TRADE ACT OF
1974, S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 8, at 197, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
7331. A comparison of the Finance Committee's statement with draft versions of the Trade Act of
1974, H.R. 6767, H.R. 10710, and the unamended S. 1774, supports the argument that Congress
intended for the ITC to use cease and desist orders in lieu of exclusion in non-patent investigations (see supra note 66 for a discussion of H.R. 6767 and H.R. 10710). See McDermid, supra note
88, at 421, 443. H.R. 6767 and H.R. 10710 would have only given the Commission power to issue
exclusion orders, and then only in cases of patent infringement. The Senate bill, S. 1774, a version
of which became the 1974 Trade Act, provided for both exclusion and cease and desist powers.
Yet, S. 1774 again limited the use of cease and desist orders in lieu of exclusion.
Several former ITC staff attorneys have also noted that the reason the Commission considered few non-patent cases prior to 1974 was that exclusion orders--then the ITC's only powerwere inappropriate in non-patent cases. Easton & Lang, supra note 129, at 368. Arguably, Congress added cease and desist orders to the Commission's powers to make Section 337 effective
against non-patent unfair import trade practices.
166 Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-67, Pub. No. 1119 (Dec. 1980), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5572,
5581. See also Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-29, Pub. No. 863 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, 5250 (opinion of
Commissioners Minchew, Moore, and Alberger), disapprovedby President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789
(1978) (Section 337(f) cease and desist power is "ancillary and subordinate to the exclusion power.
In most cases, exclusion is our only practical means of enforcement.").
167 The President disapproved of the ITC's first use of a cease and desist order in Certain
Welded Stainless Pipe and Tube, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978), on the grounds that the order conflicted with other agencies' antitrust jurisdiction. Additionally, while the President accepted the
Commission's application of a cease and desist order in Certain Apparatus for the Continuous
Production of Copper Rod, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-52, Pub. No. 1017 (Nov.
1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5006, this acceptance was not complete. After the order
became final, the United States Trade Representative sent a letter to the Chairman of the Commission, indicating that ambiguities existed in the order, and that the Commission should explain
it to the parties involved, if deemed necessary. See infra note 193.
Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No.
1126 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158, involved the most recent use of permanent Section 337 cease and desist orders. The ITC issued six cease and desist orders against the six
domestic respondents, and issued exclusion orders against the offending products of specific foreign respondents. The President took no action on the Stoves orders. Significantly, they were the
first cease and desist orders against non-patent violations of Section 337 to become final.
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Inpersonam jurisdiction is a court's or agency's ability to "assert

' 69
judicial power over the parties and bind them by its adjudication."'
The Commission has never denied that it would have to secure inpersonam jurisdiction over a respondent in order to enforce a cease and
desist order through civil action. 170 On one occasion, however, the
Commission expressed the belief that cease and desist orders could operate without any civil enforcement to support them, 71 and viewed
cease and desist orders as being one step short of its in rem exclusion

power. Thus, the Commission concluded that there was no need to
prove a nexus between an unfair act and an importation by an importer, consignee, owner, or their agents in order for the ITC to bring a
cease and desist order to bear against those parties.1 72 At the time, this
168 For example, in Certain Window Shades and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-83, Pub. No. 1152 (May 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP.DEC.(BNA) 1309,
1314, the ITC refused to apply a cease and desist order since the window shade industry in the
named respondents' home country (Taiwan) appeared to be fluid, and since there could be "importations or attempted importations before the complainant or the Commission could become
aware of them." In another case, the ITC also declined to issue a cease and desist order where the
record developed by the Presiding Officer indicated that persons other than the named respondents had imported articles covered by the Section 337 investigation. Certain Exercising Devices,
U.S. Int'l Trade Commn'n Inv. No. 337-TA-24, Pub. No. 813 at 6 (Apr. 1977).
169 Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D.N.J. 1966). For a
concise description of the concept of inpersonamjurisdiction, see Victor, In PersonamJurisdiction,
Venue, and Service ofProcess in Antitrust Cases, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 17TH ANNUAL
ADVANCED ANTITRUST LAW SEMINAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

45,

49-57 (Corp. Law and Practice, Court Handbook Ser. No. 259, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Victor,
PLI SEMINAR].
170 Significantly, while expressing the belief that Section 337 did not require the Commission to
have in personam jurisdiction to issue a cease and desist order, the Commission, in Certain
Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-29, Pub. No.
863 at 5, 6 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE R.P. DEC. (BNA) 5245, 5250 (opinion of Commissioners
Minchew, Moore, and Alberger), disapprovedbyPresident,43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978), recognized
that "[i]n
the event that [the ITC] sought a court order to require compliance with [a cease and
desist order], it would be incumbent on a court to raise the requirement of due process before
providing the full panoply of punitive measures at its disposal." A court would violate due process requirements if it enforced an order against a defendant over whom it had no jurisdiction.
171 The ITC reasoned that there was no vested right to importation into the United States.
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493 (1904). Thus, the due process clause of the Constitution
only limited congressional exercise of power over foreign commerce insofar as it required that the
exercise of power not be arbitary. Once that standard was met, the ITC asserted, due process
requirements of personal service inside the forum jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, minimum
contacts with the forum jurisdiction, did not apply. If the ITC notified parties according to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976), as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)
(1976), the ITC believed that it would not be acting arbitrarily. Such notice, the ITC maintained,
would fully safeguard foreign respondents' constitutional and procedural rights. See Duvall,
supra note 4, at 171.
172 See Electronic Audio and Related Equipment, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA7, Pub. No. 768 (Apr. 1976), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5211, 5221 (recommended determi-
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conclusion was not clearly wrong; there was some basis for the ITC
arguing that Section 337 cease and desist orders operated in rem, while
such orders in other forums operated inpersonam,7 3 since no statutory
provision for civil enforcement of Section 337 cease and desist orders
existed and the only enforcement mechanism was exclusion.
When Congress amended Section 337 in 1979 to provide for civil
enforcement of cease and desist orders, 174 however, it undermined the
ITC's argument that Section 337 exclusion orders operate in rem. The
amendment codified congressional intent, existing since 1974, that the

ITC was to apply cease and desist orders where exclusion was inappropriate. 175 Hence, it became difficult to assert that a cease and desist
order could be effective if the ITC did not have jurisdiction over the

respondent it wished to apply the order against, since exclusion practically became unavailable for enforcing Section 337 cease and desist orders. 176

Indeed, the ITC has conceded that civil enforcement of a

Section 337 cease and desist order requires in personam jurisdiction
over the person subject to the order. Thus, the Commission has taken
the position that it may have to find inpersonam jurisdiction to direct

cease and desist orders against "certain types of [unspecified]
nation of Presiding Officer Minchew, incorporated into ITC opinion by reference). Former Commission Chairman Leonard remarked that the question of nexus was one which the Commission
would "wrestle with" in Section 337 cases. Remarks of Will E. Leonard, Chairman, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, to the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Washington, D.C., May 10, 1976, 72 F.R.D. 239, 272 (1977) (question and answer
period). See also Easton & Neely, Unfair Competitionin US.Import Trade: Developments Since
the Trade Act of 1974, 5 INT'L TRADE L. J. 203, 207 (1980).
173 The rationale was that the addition of cease and desist orders to ITC powers under Section
337 did not alter the ITC's jurisdictional base since, at the time, the Commission's cease and desist
powers went
no further than allowing the Commission to modify a cease and desist order or to revoke it
and replace it with an order of exclusion. The cease and desist order itself merely compels
parties to refrain from unfair trade practices or risk exclusion of their products. This Commission has no independent power beyond that of exclusion.
Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-29,
Pub. No. 863 at 5, 6 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.(BNA) 5245, 5250, disapprovedby
President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
174 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Senate Finance Committee expressed
the view that the new civil enforcement mechanism would "provide a more flexible remedy" than
enforcing cease and desist orders by means of exclusion orders. TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF
1979, S.REP. No. 249, 96TH CONG., IST SEss., at 262 (1979), reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 381, 648 [hereinafter cited as SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, 1979].
175 See supra note 165.
176 It is unclear whether exclusion is now unavailable as an enforcement mechanism, for example, where there is no question of domestic monopoly, or where there is no possibility that an
exclusion order would be a remedy which could exceed the complainant's original injury. See
generaly supra note 165.
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activity.'
Since the 1979 amendments, the ITC has slowly begun to change
its view of the applicability of cease and desist orders to foreign respon-

dents. 178 It has gone as far as admitting that it could not apply a cease
and desist order against a foreign respondent who had "no offices or
assets in the U.S."'1 7 9 Indeed, the Commission announced that it would
not issue an inpersonam cease and desist order against foreign respon-

dents unless it determines that they are within its Section 337 in personam and subject matter jurisdiction. 80
If deemed necessary, however, it appears that the Commission can
gain inpersonam jurisdiction over foreign respondents on the basis of
the "intended effects" language of Section 337.181 However, if the
177 Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.No. 337-TA-97 (June
1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP.DEC. (BNA) 1342, 1346-47 n.6 (interlocutory appeal by respondents of
administrative law judge order denying their motions to be dismissed as parties), exclusion order
issued, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,352 (1981), revoked, 47 Fed. Reg. 2950 (1982).
178 See Certain Electric Slow Cookers, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.No. 337-TA-42, Pub. No.
994 at 7 (Aug. 1979); Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-87, Pub. No. 1160 at 28 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.
(BNA) 1212, 1225.
179 Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-87, Pub. No. 1160 at 28 (June 1981), 3 INt'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1212,
1224.
180 Certain Large Video Matrix Display Systems and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-75, Pub. No. 1158 at 30 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA)
1474, 1486. Even if it finds that it has personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the ITC announced that it will use its discretion to issue cease and desist orders, depending on the factual
circumstances of each case, and also weigh "the likely benefit to the domestic industry to be derived from the proposed relief against the likely harm to consumers and to the general public
interest. The availability and adequacy of other forms of relief will also be taken into consideration." Id Pub. No. 1158 at 31, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1468.
However, the Commission maintains that a separate, in rem-based cease and desist order
exists which is enforceable through exclusion. This is essentially an exclusion order which requires reporting. Id Pub. No. 1158 at 30 n.10, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 1486. In
Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 640 F.2d 1322 (C.C.P.A. 1981), the
court upheld this type of order (which, in this case, it called an exclusion order).
Presumably, the ITC's reasoning, relating to all cease and desist orders before Congress added civil enforcement provisions to Section 337, applies to this second type of in rem "cease and
desist" order. It is unclear why the ITC insists on calling this in rem order anything other than an
exclusion order, given the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals clear statement that exclusion
orders (as opposed to cease and desist orders) operate in rem, and not inpersonam. Sealed Air
Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 985-86 (C.C.P.A. 1981). It would seem
to be to the ITC's advantage to draw a clear distinction between cease and desist orders and
exclusion orders.
181 Judge Learned Hand best stated the "intended effects doctrine" in United States v. Alumiis settled law. . . that any state may
num Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945): "[lI]t
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends .. "
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976), similar to Section 1 of the Sherman Act (seesupra notes 86-89 and
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Commission uses this language to gain jurisdiction over foreign respondents, it must also observe the procedural due process considerations of
the "minimum contacts" doctrine.18 2 Additionally, even where there
are sufficient minimum contacts between the United States and the respondents, procedural due process further requires the Commission to
decline to exercise its in personam jurisdiction, either for reasons of
comity or where it has not given the respondent adequate notice of the

proceeding.'

83

accompanying text) states that Section 337 applies to any unfair act by an importer, owner, consignee, or their agent which has the effect or tendency to injure substantially a United States industry or to monopolize within the United States economy. The Commission has applied this
language in several investigations to claim in personam jurisdiction over respondents under the
"intended effects doctrine." See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-29, Pub. No. 863 (Feb. 1978), 1 IN'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245,
5250-53 (opinion of Commissioners Minchew, Moore, and Alberger), disapprovedby President, 43
Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978). In one case, while not passing directly on the ITC's reading of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals suggested that the Commission's "effects"
interpretation may not have been incorrect. The court noted that while the Commission did not
have to secure inpersonamjurisdiction over every person who was affected by an exclusion order
which required reporting, the respondents' conduct could have had sufficient effects on the United
States economy for the ITC to have gained personal jurisdiction over them. Sealed Air Corp. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
However, commentators have not agreed that the ITC has the power to gain personal jurisdiction over foreign respondents, unless the respondent "is involved in 'importation,' which case
law defines as the act of bringing articles into the United States. Under such a reading of Section
337, no cease and desist order could be issued directly against foreign exporters and manufactur... Hemmendinger, Barringer & Kossl, Section 337- A CaseforRepealor Change, 8 GA. J.
ers.
INT'L & COMP. L. 81, 102-103 (1978) (footnote omitted). See also Sealed Air Corp. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 995-98 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Nies, J., dissenting) ("Inpersonam jurisdiction cannot be found in the statute.").
182 The basis for this doctrine is the Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which emphasized that in order to subject a defendant to an in
personam judgment, due process requires that the defendant have certain "minimum contacts"
with the judicial forum. This is so a suit against that party in the forum does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id at 316. For a description of the operation
and bounds of the minimum contacts doctrine, see Victor, PLI SEMINAR, supra note 169, at 50-57.
See also Comment, The Minimum Contacts Standardand4ien Defendants, 12 L. & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus. 783 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Minimum Contacts].
Note, however, that the requirement of observing the minimum contacts doctrine applies only
when the Commission prescribes a cease and desist order against a respondent. It is not necessary
to have minimum contacts between a respondent and the United States in a Section 337 action
where the ITC issues an in rem order. See Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1342, 1344-48 (interlocutory appeal by respondents of an administrative law judge order denying their motions to be
dismissed as parties), exclusion order issued, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,352 (1981), revoked, 47 Fed. Reg.
2950 (1982).
183 See Holmes, Government Antitrustlctions and J~emedes Involving Foreign Commerce: Proceduraland Substantive Limitations, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 105 (1982); see also Victor, PLI
SEMINAR, supra note 169, at 67-69.
ITC Rule 210.13, 19 C.F.R. § 210.13 (1981), provides only for "service" of Section 337 coin-
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The Commission must also consider the intrusiveness of cease and
desist orders which it applies against foreign respondents. For example, the orders which the ITC attempted to apply against Japanese respondents in Certain Welded Stainless Steel Ppeand Tube 8 4 provided
for regular reporting and inspection of Japanese factories. This type of
intrusiveness, backed with either the coercive power of civil enforce-

ment or, in limited cases, a potential exclusion order, is a blatant example of the kind of extraterritorial application of United States law
which foreign nationals most reprehend. 18 5 The ITC should thus limit

the application of its personal jurisdiction to those foreign respondents
who clearly fall within its jurisdiction.
In contrast, there is no question that the Commission may assert

personal jurisdiction over domestic respondents who are "importers,
owners, consignees," or agents of such persons, as long as they have
committed unfair acts in connection with an importation.1 6 Indeed,
the Commission has indicated that a cease and desist order against
such persons is especially appropriate since they are located within the

United States and an exclusion order would not, therefore, operate efplaints. It does not specify any particular fashion of service. However, the ITC serves its complaints to foreign respondents through registered mail, and this is an acceptable form of service
against such respondents for notice pleading. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint
Gobin-Pont A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (registered mail service of notice
was permissible, but F.T.C. service of subpoenas by registered mail was a violation of international law). Respondents in Section 337 cases have twenty days to respond to a complaint after
service, 19 C.F.R. § 210.21 (1981), and may receive extensions of time "for good cause shown." 19
C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (1981). However, the ITC may deem a failure to file a timely response to be a
waiver of a respondent's right to appear. 19 C.F.R. § 210.21(d) (1981).
The ITC has never dismissed respondents because of improper service of process. See, e.g.
Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97, notice of
denial ofdismissalmotion, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,235 (1981) (motion to dismiss for improper service by
two citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany). However, the Commission has designated an
investigation as "more complicated," allowing for eighteen months instead of one year to complete the investigation when named foreign respondents did not answer the complaint or make
any appearance. Certain Electric Slow Cookers, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-42,
Pub. No. 994 at 10 (Aug. 1979). For an account of the difficulties which the ITC encounters when
dealing with unwilling foreign respondents, see Duvall, supra note 4, at 165.
184 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA29, Pub. No. 863 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, disapprovedby President, 43
Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
185 For a discussion of the reaction of the British government to the extraterritorial application
of United States antitrust laws, see Comment, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980.
Britains Response to US. Extraterritorial4ntitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 476
(1980). For an excellent discussion of the problems generally with the extraterritorial application
of United States law, see Rah, InternationalApplication of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and
Proposals,2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 336 (1980).
186 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976).
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fectively against them."8 7
Another reason that the ITC has been reluctant to apply cease and
desist orders is that they only reach named Section 337 respondents
over whom the Commission has jurisdiction.18 8 Hence, cease and desist orders are ineffective when there are many foreign respondents, or
where there is a high probability of later Section 337 violations by unjoined respondents, as in a case involving easily produceable goods. In
the former case, there is a problem of serving all of the parties with
notice, 8 9 as well as a problem of the ITC staff having to separately
monitor multiple cease and desist orders which it would have to issue
against each of the collective parties.' 9 In the latter case of subsequent
violations of the same nature by persons not named as respondents,
there would be a separate investigation for each Section 337 violation
alleged; before the ITC could issue a cease and desist order against any
respondent, it would have to find initially that it had personal jurisdiction over the respondent, and then find that the respondent violated
Section 337.191
187 Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No.
1126 at 14-15 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158, 1164. See also Certain Large
Video Matrix Display Systems and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337TA-75, Pub. No. 1158 at 29-30 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1474, 1486 (ITC
"does not renounce" its jurisdiction to issue cease and desist orders directed at certain kinds of
uses of imported articles after importation).
188 See supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Certain Copper Rod Production Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-52, Pub. No. 1017 (Nov. 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 503 1; Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-55,
Pub. No. 991 at 15 (July 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5400, 5407.
189 See supra note 184. But see Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No. 1126 at 7 (Jan. 1981) (ITC required named domestic respondents to
"serve" copies of cease and desist orders on a series of parties related to those respondents, but
unnamed in the investigation).
While one effect of the Stoves orders may be to put persons related to the respondents on
notice, "service" by respondents on parties who have never appeared before the Commission does
not bind those parties under the ITC's inpersonam jurisdiction. The ITC recognized this fact in
Reclosable Plastic Bags, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-22, Pub. No. 801 (Jan. 1977), 1
INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5284, 5290. Moreover, the Stoves order does not bind nonparties
since it was the result of an adjudicatory and not a rulemaking procedure. See Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
190 Commission Investigative Attorney's Written Comments Concerning Violation, Relief, and
the Public Interest 3 (Aug. 11, 1981) (filed in the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office,
Washington, D.C., in connection with Headboxes 1, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA82A, Pub. No. 1197 (Nov. 1981)). The effort required to monitor cease and desist orders, of
course, also limits the number and effectiveness of the cease and desist orders which the Commission may have outstanding at any one time. See Easton & Neeley, supra note 172, at 229.
191 See Reclosable Plastic Bags, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-22, Pub. No. 801
(Jan. 1977), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5284, 5290.
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As with exclusion orders, 92 the ITC has had problems in communicating the scope of its cease and desist orders to the parties whom
they affect. Hence, the Commission must take care to draft the orders

precisely, so that respondents will not be restrained any more than is
necessary to address their Section 337 violation.' 93 However, unlike

exclusion orders, cease and desist orders do not depend on implementation at Customs. '94 Since the Commission staff supervises cease and
desist orders and complainants are likely to supplement this administration by reporting violations of cease and desist orders, the ITC can
apply cease and desist orders more uniformly than exclusion orders.
This fact, combined with the fact that cease and desist orders only operate against specific respondents, makes cease and desist orders less
restrictive than exclusion orders.
In March, 1981, the Commission issued final rules which provide
for the enforcement of Commission orders, including cease and desist
orders.195 These rules set out procedures for modifying reporting requirements for cease and desist orders, 96 as well as procedures for en-

forcing the orders short of civil action. 197 The availability of these rules
192 See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
193 After the ITC issued a cease and desist order in Certain Apparatus for the Continuous
Production of Copper Rod, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-52, Pub. No. 1017 (Nov.
1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5006, for example, the respondents refused to sell spare
parts to a nonparty United States manufacturer which owned some of the respondents' machinery.
They were afraid that parts sales would violate the cease and desist order. Written Comments
Supplied by ASARCO, Inc. Regarding the Advisory Opinion Requested by the Krupp Respondents (Jan. 24, 1981) (filed in the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., in
connection with Certain Copper Rod Production Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-89, Pub. No. 1132 (1980), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5597). The United States
manufacturer complained to the Secretary of the Commission that the shutdown of his plant because of an inability to obtain parts would drastically affect the economy of the area surrounding
the plant. Letter of Alexander J. Gillespie, Jr., Sr. V.P., See'y, and Gen'l Counsel, ASARCO, Inc.
to Kenneth Mason, See'y, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n (Jan. 24, 1980) (filed in the Int'l Trade
Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., in connection with U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.
No. 337-TA-89, Pub. No. 1132 (1980), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5597). Concurrently, the
United States Trade Representative wrote the ITC Chairman, requesting the ITC to "proceed as
rapidly as possible to advise interested parties on the cease and desist order's applicability, and
take action to clarify and modify the orders as it proves necessary." Letter of Reuben 0. Askew,
United States Trade Representative, to Catherine Bedell, Chairman, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
(Jan. 30, 1980) (filed in the Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., in connection with U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-89, Pub. No. 1132 (1980), 2 INT'L TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 5597).
194 See Certain Large Video Matrix Display Systems and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-75, Pub. No. 1158 at 35-36 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP.
DEC. (BNA) 1474, 1487-88 (Stem, Comm'r, dissenting).
195 19 C.F.R. § 211.01 (1981).
196 Id § 211.55.
197 Id § 211.56(a), (c).
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to guide enforcement and administration of cease and desist orders,
along with the ITC's growing awareness of how to apply such orders,
may prompt the Commission to use its cease and desist power more
often.
C.

Temporary Orders

Subsection (e) of Section 337 provides that the Commission may
temporarily exclude articles from entry during the course of its investigation if it has reason to believe that there has been a violation of the
statute, and if exclusion is consistent with the public interest. 98 The

ITC may also issue temporary cease and desist orders. 199 When a violation of a standing cease and desist order is likely and would cause
irreparable harm, Commission rules also provide for temporary emergency action in the form of an exclusion order against the violating

party's goods.2z°
The ITC has applied temporary cease and desist orders on one

occasion,2 0° and has never taken temporary emergency action. In contrast, the ITC has prescribed a number of temporary exclusion orders,
and has developed standards for applying them. 2

Temporary exclu-

sion orders are available to complainants after the Commission's initial
investigation of injury, when the Commission's investigative attorneys
refer the complaint to the Administrative Law Judge for formal
proceedings.20 3
198 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976).
199 This is implied from the ITC's powers under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0 (Supp. IV 1980) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0 (1974)). Presumably, the same standards as those for final cease and desist
orders apply. See supra text accompanying notes 164-97.
200 19 C.F.R. § 211.58 (1981). The ITC may issue an emergency order without a hearing,
though the ITC must consider the public interest. It must also prescribe an applicable bond, allow
for appeal, submit the order for Presidential review, and proceed with a formal enforcement proceeding. Id; see also infra text accompanying notes 341-52.
201 Certain Coin-Operated Audiovisual Games and Components Thereof (Viz., Pac-Man and
Rally-X), U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-IO5, Pub. No. 1220 (Jan. 1982), 3 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1899; see also ITC Issues Temporary Cease and Desist Order in § 337
Coin-OperatedGames Case, [Oct.-Mar.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 112,
at 396-97 (Jan. 27, 1982). However, the ITC replaced the temporary cease and desist orders with
temporary exclusion orders when the Customs Service informed it that the cease and desist orders
would be unenforceable. 47 Fed. Reg. 28,479 (1982). In light of this, it is doubtful that the ITC
will prescribe temporary cease and desist orders again.
202 See Note, Section 337 Revitalization, supra note 5, at 183-191, for a review of the development of Section 337 temporary exclusion order standards.
203 See 19 C.F.R. § 210.41 (1981).
The ITC has also prescribed a temporary exclusion order to replace a permanent patentbased exclusion order. In that case, it revoked the permanent order (before the sixty day review
period had run) pending a district court's finding that the subject patent was invalid. Certain Steel
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As with the cease and desist order, the Commission views the issuance of a temporary exclusion order as an extraordinary remedy.2 "4
Although Section 337 requires only a "reason to believe" standard for
the issuance of the temporary order,20 5 the Commission requires a

more stringent standard. Complainants must show that they will incur
immediate and substantial harm if the temporary order does not issue.20 6 This standard, however, still falls short of the burden of proving

irreparable injury which plaintiffs must meet in a court of equity before
the court will grant plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. 0 7 Moreover, to
Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97, Pub. No. 1222 (Jan.
1982), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 2317. Respondents sued in the district court for withdrawal of the temporary order and bonding requirements, and the district court so ordered.
Ashlow, Ltd. v. Morgan Constr. Co., Civ. No. 81-936-5 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 1982). However, the
fourth circuit vacated this order, holding that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had the
sole authority to demand changes in ITC action. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n v. Ashlow,
Ltd., No. 82-1050 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 1982); see also Appellate Court Rules District Court Lacks
Jurisdiction, Vacates Rods Order, [Oct.-Mar.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
No. 116, at 484 (Feb. 24, 1982). Complicating the entire situation was the Administration's belief
that the ITC never effectively revoked the original exclusion order. Hence, the Administration
maintained that the sixty day review period had run, and the original order is open for review. At
the time, a mandamus action stood against the ITC in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
along with an action for review of the entire Rods investigation. White House Takes No Action in
Steel Rod Case, Attention Turns to Courts, [Oct.-Mar.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) No. 115, at 459 (Feb. 17, 1982). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals denied the writ
of mandamus. CCP, Refuses Writ ofMandamus Motion in SteelRodApparatusCase, [Oct.-Mar.]
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 119, at 578 (March 17, 1982).
204 Certain Luggage Products, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-39, Pub. No. 932
(Nov. 1978) (exclusion order issued), temporary exclusion orderissued, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,399, 35,400
(1978).
205 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976).
206 Certain Luggage Products, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-39, Pub. No. 932
(Nov. 1978) (exclusion order issued), temporaryexclusion orderissued, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,399, 35,400
(1978) ("substantial injury"); Meprobamate, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. L-37, Pub. No. 389 at 6
(Apr. 1971), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5049, 5052; see also 1974 Trade 4t Hearings-Senate, supra note 129, at 1588-89 (written statement of Harvey Kaye and Paul Plaia, Jr.).
There is some debate over whether it is proper for the ITC to adhere to the "immediate and
substantial harm" standard. While the standard is the one which the House version of the Trade
Act of 1974, H.R. 10710, expressed (see TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, REPORT OF THE HOUSE
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 10710, H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 78-79 (1973)), the final version of the Trade Act of 1974 removed the standard. Yet, the ITC
maintains that Congress never intended to reject the immediate and substantial harm standard,
and that it is within the ITC's discretion to use it. Expanded, Unsintered Polytetrafluoroethylene
in Tape Form, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-4, Pub. No. 769 at 18 (Apr. 1976). One
commentator noted that such a reading ignores the protectionist intent behind the Congress' provision of an otherwise low threshhold for temporary relief. Note, Section 337 Revitalization, supra
note 5, at 193-95.
207 "Immediate and substantial harm" is the usual prerequisite for judicial and injunctive relief. The only exception to this arises in copyright cases, where the plaintiff need only show a
primafacie case of infringement to obtain temporary relief. See Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb
Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 801 (1967).
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obtain a temporary exclusion order in a Section 337 action, complainants need only make aprimafacie showing that there has been a Section 337 violation.20 8 Only later, when the Commission makes its final
determination, need the complainant prove through a preponderance
of the evidence that respondents have violated the statute.20 9
Temporary exclusion orders, as with the preliminary relief of equity courts, must be in the public interest.210 Preliminary relief "may,
and frequently does go much further both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of the public interest than [courts] are accustomed to go
when only private interests are involved. ' 2 11 Similarly, the ITC, before
granting a temporary exclusion, considers the following: (1) whether
there is reason to believe that a Section 337 violation exists; (2) the
complainant's likelihood of success on the merits; (3) the certainty of
irreparable injury; (4) the likelihood of harm to other interested parties
if the exclusion is granted; and (5) the public interest.2 12 The Commission also applies a balancing test to determine whether temporary action should issue, namely, whether the effect of temporary relief on the
importer or other parties outweighs the immediate and substantial
harm that would fall on the complainant if the Commission does not
208 Meprobamate, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. L-37, Pub. No. 389 (Apr. 1971), 1 INT'L TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 5049, 505 1.
209 The Commission points to the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to Section 337,
which, in its view, make clear "that in order to obtain temporary relief [under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)]
a complainant need not produce sufficient information to establish a violation under section 337;
only in a final determination need a complainant show violation by preponderance of the evidence." Certain Copper Rod Production Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA52, Pub. No. 1017 (Nov. 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5597, 5599-600. Yet, up to 1980,
the ITC required complainants to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they were
entitled to a temporary exclusion order. While the ITC announced in 1980 that it would no longer
follow this standard, id, it suggested in a 1981 case that the preponderance of the evidence standard still operated. Certain Slide Fastener Stringers and Machines and Components Thereof for
Producing Such Slide Fastener Stringers, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-85, Pub. No.
1141 (Jan. 1981), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5646, 5647-48 [hereinafter cited as Slide Fastener Stringers].
210 However, the ITC has stated that a complainant will not receive a temporary exclusion
order simply because the order would not run counter to the public interest. Slide FastenerStringers, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm':. Ir¢. No. 337-TA-85, Pub. No. 1141 (Jan. 1981), 2 INT'L TRADE REP.
DEC. (BNA) 5646, 5656.
211 Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employers Dep't of the Am. Fed'n of Labor,
300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
212 Certain Luggage Products, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-39, Pub. No. 932
(Nov. 1978) (exclusion order issued), temporary exclusion orderissued, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,399, 35,401
(1978). The ITC based these five factors on those found in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and reiterated them in Certain Coin-Operated
Audiovisual Games (viz., Pac-Man and Rally-X), U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.No. 337-TA-105,
Pub. No. 1220 (Jan. 1982), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1899, 1901.
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issue the temporary order.2 13 This "balancing test" is reminiscent of
the inclinations of courts of equity to assess and balance competing
considerations in order to allow for the least amount of harm if the
court's preliminary ruling later turns out to be erroneous. 2 14 Accordingly, the Commission has issued temporary exclusion orders on only
Section 337. All
three occasions, one prior to the 1974 amendments to
2 15
three of the occasions involved patent infringement.

Congress' intent of making a temporary exclusion order easier to
acquire than judicial temporary relief is clear in the statutory language.
Complainants need only give the Commission "reason to believe" that
they are entitled to relief for such relief to issue.2 16 This "reason to

believe" standard arguably demands, at most, that the Commission require complainants to show "substantial injury" in order to obtain temporary action. Yet, the "irreparable injury" standard goes far to
protect the public interest against temporary orders which might later
be shown to have a false basis. If the present scheme was not available
and respondents could not enter their goods during a temporary order,
there would be more urgency for the Commission to require higher

standards of proof from complainants who seek temporary exclusion
orders.
At present, however, there is a practical question of whether the
213 Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97, Pub.
No. 1122 (Jan. 1982), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 2317, 2323; Certain Copper Rod Production Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-89, Pub. No. 1132 (Nov. 1979), 2 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5597, 5599-600, 5605. The Commission based its balancing test on that
of Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The ITC applied a similar test in Slide FastenerStringers, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-85, Pub. No. 1141 (Jan. 1981), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5646, 5647-48, noting
that a complainant who "raises serious questions regarding the existence of a section 337 violation,
presents a compelling case with respect to immediate and substantial harm to the domestic industry, and shows that the respondents will not suffer significant harm if relief is granted" may be
entitled to temporary relief. Accord Certain Coin-Operated Audiovisual Games (viz., Pac-man
and Rally-X), U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-105, Pub. No. 1220 (Jan. 1982), 3 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1899, 1902.
214 D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 488, 490 (1973).

The ITC has wide

discretion to accord temporary relief. Parties which might otherwise be entitled to such relief, for
example, may be denied it because they fail to comply with Commission discovery rules. See
Certain Ultrafiltration Membrane Systems and Components Thereof, Including Ultrafiltration
Membranes, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-107, denialof requestfor temporary relief,
46 Fed. Reg. 53,216 (1981).
215 Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. In'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97 Pub.
No. 1222 (Jan. 1982), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 2317, 2323-24; Copper Rod Production
Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-89, Pub. No. 1017 (Oct. 1980), 2 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5597; Meprobamate, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. L-37, Pub. No. 389
(Apr. 1971), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5049.
216 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976).
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Commission can accord adequate temporary relief to any complainant
making any showing. Former ITC Chairman Bill Alberger has noted
that hearings in temporary relief cases are time consuming, costly, and
often duplicative of final hearing testimony. Even if a petitioner can
successfully show the need for a temporary exclusion order, the ITC
ordinarily could not grant one until at least the fifth or sixth month of a
twelve or eighteen month investigation.2" 7 This is because the ITC carries out essentially the same full hearing when considering the issue of
a temporary order as it does when it considers a final order.2 18 The
Commission could hasten its temporary exclusion order proceedings by
not requiring a full evidentiary hearing. Instead, the Commission
could base the order on the parties' affidavits, depositions, and informal
statements.21 9
D.

Bonding

Section 337 empowers the Commission to place a bond on offending goods when it issues a temporary 22 0 or permanent order. 2z 2 The
ITC expresses this bond in terms of a percentage of the price of the
good, and respondents must forfeit the bond if a Section 337 order
becomes final.22 2 Hence, by introducing the chance that a bond forfeit
will occur, a Section 337 bond deters importation. A bond set when the
ITC applies a permanent order operates for a sixty day period, and
during this time the President reviews the Commission's overall determination. The bond becomes inoperable after the sixty day period runs

or after the President expressly approves or disapproves of the Com217 Alberger Urges Expanded Rolefor ALJs in Section 337 Actions, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE
REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 45, at A-6, A-7 (Sept. 24, 1980).
218 See Duvall, supra note 4, at 161. A side benefit of the full temporary exclusion order hearings, however, is that they can shorten a later hearing on permanent action and lead to settlement
agreements. Id at 161 n.22.
219 This approach to granting preliminary relief is acceptable in federal courts. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbart, 428 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1970); D. DOBBS, supra note 214,
at 446. Of course, the Commission would have to provide for fuller hearings in cases of nonappearing respondents, in order to fully safeguard the public interest.
The Commission has attempted to expedite temporary relief proceedings by directing its Administrative Law Judge to issue a recommended determination within forty-five days. Observers
believe that this could be a signal that the ITC may take quicker action on temporary relief motions. ITC moves to Expedite Temporary Relief in Toy Vehicle Patent Case, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 128, at 204 (May 19, 1982).
220 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976).
221 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
222 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976); see also C.S.D. 80-35, 14 Cust. B & Dec. 783 (1980) (when
special bond is required pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337, the ITC shall determine the value of the
bond).
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mission's determination.223
Customs regulations provide that Section 337 respondents may secure Commission-imposed bonds in the form of a special rider to their
normal entry bonds.2 2 4 This rider must provide for the release of merchandise to the Customs Bureau "pending final determinations of its

admissability," and it must also provide for the goods' "exportation or
destruction under Customs supervision if it is determined finally that
the merchandise shall be excluded from importation. 22 5
In its report on the 1974 Trade Act, the Senate Finance Committee

emphasized that in setting the amount of an entry bond, "the Commission shall determine, to the extent possible, the amount which would

offset any competitive advantage" which persons benefitting from the
importation of the bonded article received from their "unfair method

of competition or unfair act.' 22 6 Hence, while Congress intended that
the ITC use Section 337 bonds to deter importation, it did not intend
for the ITC to use Section 337 bonds to make foreign goods artifically
more expensive than domestic ones. The Commission incorporated
Congress' standard into its rules governing the determination of the

amount of the bond. 27 The Commission has on some occasions also
used standards different from but related to those which the Senate Finance Committee expressed. For example, where infringing products'
prices were higher than those of the domestic product, and where a

consumer market existed separately from the market which the domestic patent holder supplied, the Commission determined that it would
base the appropriate bond on a "reasonable royalty" to the patentee,
which it viewed as ten percent of sales profits.22 8 In another situation,
the Commission considered that the domestic complainant "appeared
223

rules).

19 U.S.C. § 133 7 (g)(3) (1976); see also 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(1) (1981) (Customs Service

19 C.F.R. § 113.14 (1981); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b)(2) (1981).
19 C.F.R. § 113.14 (1981). This regulation also provides the exact form of the bond rider.
226 TRADE ACT OF 1974, S. RaP. No. 1298, supra note 8,at 198, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws at 7331.
227 19 C.F.R. § 210.14(a)(3) (1981). In several cases, however, the ITC has appeared to depart
from the standard by imposing very high percentage bonds. See Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-55, Pub. No. 991 at 16 (July 1979), 2 IN'L TRADE REP.
DEC. (BNA) 5400 (482% ad valorem f.o.b. Hong Kong); Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No. 1126 at 18 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP.
DEC. (BNA) 1158, 1165 (200% ad valorem). It is unlikely that any merchandise will be entered
under bonds imposed at such high rates; indeed, the practicalities weigh against continued importation since the goods were probably imported initially because they are priced below comparable
domestic goods.
228 Reclosable Plastic Bags, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-22, Pub. No. 801 (Jan.
1977), 1 INVL TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5284, 5291.
224
225
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to have advantages in market share, marketing, and a well-known
product. 2 2 9 In that case, the ITC imposed a bond which equalized the
prices of the complainant's and respondent's products.
Indeed, the ITC has used bonds as a punitive measure. In Certain
Steel Rod TreatingApparatus and Components Thereof,2 3 ° the ITC imposed a 100% bond after it determined that respondents had used the
complainant's patented invention without authority, that respondents
were willing to advance large sums of money and incur large losses in
order to secure importation of their goods, and that, once functioning,
the respondents' apparatus could serve as a model for future sales, and
operate as a loss leader to help the respondents establish a foothold in
the United States market. 231 This punitive application of a bond is contrary to Congressional intent that the Commission apply bonds only to
offset competitive advantage.
The bonding question also arose in another case which involved
different configurations of a type of product. The Commission decided
not to impose a bond because "it would not serve the purpose of making the price of the imported and domestic articles equivalent unless
[the bond] were specially determined for each entry." The Commission
also noted that Section 337's objective of "not interfering with trade
and commerce" precluded the imposition of a bond.23 2 In another
case, involving luggage roller units, the ITC found that most of the
infringing units entered the United States attached to non-infringing
luggage. The Commission imposed a bond on the value of the infringing units, and also assessed a fiat eighty-five cent duty on each piece of
luggage that the roller units were attached to. 233 Still another case concerned the infringing products of three separate respondents. The ITC
calculated bonding percentages for each product, basing the percentages on the retail price differential between the complainants' and respondents' products.23 4 In a final case, the ITC imposed a bond at an
229 Certain Surveying Devices, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No. 1085
(July 1980), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5409, 5425.
230 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97, Pub. No. 1222 (Jan. 1982), 3 INT'L TRADE
REP. DEC . (BNA) 2317, 2324 (exclusion order suspended, temporary exclusion order entered),
exclusion order revoked, 47 Fed. Reg. 2950 (1982).
231 Id.

232 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA29, Pub. No. 863 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, disapprovedby President,43
Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
233 Certain Roller Units, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-44, Pub. No. 944 (Feb.
1979), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5503, 5506.
234 Certain Airless Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-90, Pub. No. 1199 at 22 (Nov. 1981). Compare this with Certain Exercising Devices, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-24, Pub. No. 813 at 8 (Apr. 1977), where the ITC declined to
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amount lower than that which the complainants requested, since the
complainants' product was superior in quality to the foreign infringing

product.

235

Generally, the ITC has prescribed Section 337 bonds on a straight
ad valorem basis,2 36 interpreting "advalorem" to be the equivalent of
the difference between the selling prices of the domestic and imported
articles. 237 The ITC has also levied Section 337 bonds on a cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.), 238 landed,2 39 and full value basis. 4 °
impose different bonding rates on two similar infringing products since the action would create
confusion in the administration of the prescribed exclusion order.
235 Certain Flexible Foam Sandals, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-47, Pub. No.
947 (Feb. 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5053, 5055-56.

236 Ad valorem is a latin term meaning "depending on the value of the items;" bonds determined by this standard are based on a fixed percentage of an item's dollar value. See Commission
Investigative Attorney's Post Hearing Brief to the Commission, June 17, 1981, at 6, (filed in the
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., in connection with Certain Spring
Assemblies, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-88, Pub. No. 1172 (Oct. 1981), 3 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1426) [hereinafter cited as Spring Assemblies Post Hearing Brief].
In several cases, the ITC has determined the ad valorem rate in accordance with the standards
of what was, at the time, Section 402 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a)
(1976). See, e.g., Pump Top Insulated Containers, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-59,
Pub. No. 1010 (Nov. 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5454 (63% ad valorem); Certain
Electric Slow Cookers, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-42, Pub. No. 994 (Aug. 1979)
(50% ad valorem bond). However, effective January 1, 1981, Congress completely revised 19
U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1976). See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
237 Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-87, Pub. No. 1160 at 31 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1212,
1225.
238 Certain Airless Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-90, Pub. No. 1199 at 22 (Nov. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 2041, 2050 (bonds
on three separate infringing goods, ranging from 17.8% to 50.6% c.i.f.); Headboxes II, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82A, Pub. No. 1197 at 15 (Nov. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.
(BNA) 1992, 1999 (100% ad valorem c.i.f. port of entry); Certain Spring Assemblies and Components Thereof and Methods of their Manufacture, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-88,
Pub. No. 1172 (Oct. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1426, 1448 (72% c.i.f.); Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA87, Pub. No. 1160 at 33 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1212, 1226 (54% c.i.f.).
Cost, insurance, and freight basis (c.i.f.) is "a quoted price that includes the handling charges,
insurance, and freight costs up to delivery, usually up to the point of entry." Spring Assemblies
Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 236.
239 Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-55, Pub. No. 991 at 16
(July 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5400, 5407; Certain Exercising Devices, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-24, Pub. No. 813 at 7 (Apr. 1977) (350% f.o.b. foreign port);
Chain Door Locks, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-8, Pub. No. 770 at 44 (Apr. 1976)
(50% f.o.b. foreign port). Landed basis, or f.o.b. land (freight free on board), is "a term identifying
the point from which a store is to pay transportation on incoming shipments. Where the shipping
point is FOB, the store must pay all charges from the vendor's shipping point. When the shipping
point is FOB store, the vendor must pay all charges up to the store's receiving dock." Spring
Assemblies Post Hearing Brief, supra note 236.
240 A full value bond is a 100% bond based on the assessed full value of the articles. See
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A troublesome feature of the ITC's use of Section 337 bonds, however, has been its random determinations of the value of goods. While
Section 337 bonds must be based on value, the ITC has not recognized
the thorny problem of customs valuation in its Section 337 bond calculations. Indeed, it has no standards for applying the traditional bases
of customs valuation, e.g., ad valorem, c.i.f., and so on, to Section 337
bonds. To eliminate competitive advantage, for example, the ITC in
two cases prescribed a bond equal to the difference between the wholesale price of the complainant's product and the value of the imported
product entered under the appropriate item heading of the Tariff
Schedules of the United States.24 1 It based another bond on the difference between the retail selling prices of the domestic and imported articles, 242 and computed a more recent bond on the basis of wholesale
price differentials.2 43 In another case, the ITC calculated the bond on
the basis of the median weighted prices of the respondents' and complainants' products. 2'
January 1, 1981 was the effective date of a complete revision of
United States law dealing with the appraisal value of imported articles
for purposes of the Tariff Schedules of the United States. The purpose
of this revision was to conform United States law to the Customs Valuation Protocol to the Agreement on Implementation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 4 5 The new standards arguably do not apply to Section 337 bonds, yet given the Commission's
role in United States trade policy, there is a strong argument for the
Commission to take note of the standards.
E.

Settlement

ITC rules, supported by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
decision in American Telephone & Telegraph v. United States InternaReclosable Plastic Bags, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-22, Pub. 801 (Jan. 1977), 1
INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5284, 5291 (100% f.o.b. foreign port).
241 Certain Flexible Foam Sandals, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-47, Pub. No.
947 (Feb. 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE Rm'. DEC. (BNA) 5053, 5055-56; Certain Exercising Devices, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-24, Pub. No. 813 at 7-8 (Apr. 1977).
242 Certain Surveying Devices, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-68, Pub. No. 1085
(July 1980), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5409, 5425.
243 Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-87, Pub. No. 1160 at 31 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1212,
1225.
244 Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No.
1126 at 18 (Jan. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1158, 1165.
245 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (Supp. IV 1980).

280
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tional Trade Commission,246 provide for the termination of Commis-

sion investigations if all complainants and one or more of the
respondents reach a settlement by licensing or other agreement. Under
the rules, the motion for termination submitted to the Commission
must contain "copies of the licensing or other agreement and any
agreements supplemental thereto," as well as the parties' affidavit stating that the parties have no other expressed or implied agreement be-

tween them concerning the subject matter of the investigation. 247 The
Commission requires this information when considering a settlement
including competiagreement in order to safeguard the public interest,
248

tive conditions in the United States economy.

The Commission has recognized settlement agreements as proper
bases for the termination of its investigations.24 9 According to Com-

mission settlement procedure, the ITC Administrative Law Judge first
views all of the complainants' and respondents' motions for termination, and then recommends to the Commission whether it should termi-

nate its investigation.25

The Commission publishes the presiding

officer's determination in the Federal Register, along with a nonconfidential summary of the parties' settlement agreement.2 5 1 Unless the

Commission orders otherwise, it will receive public comments on the
agreement for thirty days. The Commission will then decide whether
to terminate the investigation,2 52 or, under its independent enforcement
246 626 F.2d 841 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
247 19 C.F.R. § 210.51(c) (1981).
248 See 46 Fed. Reg. 17,526, 17,528 (1981) (explanation of 19 C.F.R. § 210.51 (1981)).
249 See generally Glick, Settling Unfair Trade PracticeCases Under Section 337 ofthe TariffAct
of1930, 21 HARV. INT'L L. J. 129 (1980). This article provides an extensive analysis of the ITC's
Section 337 settlement practice and the structuring of Section 337 settlement agreements and consent orders.
250 ITC Chief Administrative Law Judge Donald Duvall has described his use of the ITC's
settlement procedure in Duvall, supra note 4, at 166-67.
251 See, ag., Proposed Settlement Agreement, Chlorofluorohydrocarbon Drycleaning Process
Machines and Components Therefor, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-84, 46 Fed. Reg.
58,616 (1981), investigationterminatedon basis of settlement, 46 Fed. Reg. 58,616 (1981); Proposed
Settlement Agreement, Certain Vheel Locks and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-102, 46 Fed. Reg. 46,023 (1981), investigation terminatedon the basis of settlement, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,776 (1981); Proposed Settlement Agreement, Certain Universal Joint Kits,
Components Thereof, and Trunion Seals Used Therewith, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337TA-93, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,787 (1981), investigationterminatedon the basis ofsettlement, 46 Fed. Reg.
50,866 (1981).
252 See Proposed Settlement Agreement, Certain Universal Joint Kits, Components Thereof,
and Trunion Seals Used Therewith, supra note 251. Three considerations made by the ITC when
deciding to grant termination of a Section 337 investigation based on a settlement agreement are:
(1) whether the settlement agreement, within the framework of the relevant law, such as patent
law, does not appear to be anticompetitive; (2) whether termination would eliminate further government investigative expense; and (3) whether the ITC has received adverse public comments on
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power, whether to require that the parties dissolve the settlement agreement.25 3 A decision to terminate an investigation is not a final ITC
determination subject to Court of Customs and Patent Appeals review.2 54 After a termination based on the settlement agreement, the
Commission releases the parties from its direct supervision.
The main problem with settlement agreements is that they may be
anticompetitive since parties in Section 337 cases are usually competitors. As in civil settlement negotiations, Section 337 parties discuss settlement possibilities free of supervision from any government
authority, and those discussions may be opportunities for agreement on
prices and market allocations.2 5 Moreover, in Section 337 cases, complainants have the added leverage of being able to threaten respondents
with the possibility of an order which will exclude all of the respondent's products from the United States market.25 6 To avoid exclusion,
for example, respondents might choose to pay a high patent or trademark licensing fee, even though the complainant has weak rights in
trademark or patent. However, the Commission is aware of possible
anticompetitive settlements, as its rules2 57 and past practice 258 indicate.
the proposed settlement agreement. Certain Swivel Hooks" and Mounting Brackets, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-53, Pub. No. 983 (June 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA)
5342, 5343.
253 For example, the ITC might require that the parties dissolve a settlement agreement which
is anticompetitive. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.5 1(c) (1981).
254 The ITC makes no finding in the Section 337 settlement agreement and termination process
as to whether there has been a Section 337 violation. Hence, a termination order based on settlement is not a final determination under Section 337. 19 C.F.R. § 210.51(c)(2) (1981); 19 C.F.R.
§ 210.55 (1981). In Import Motors, Ltd. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 530 F.2d 940
(C.C.P.A. 1975), the court held that the ITC's dismissal of the appellants from a Section 337
investigation was not a reviewable final determination. This was because the dismissal was not an
action open to Presidential review under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1976), and because the dismissal did
not have the same effect on the parties as a final action. Since settlement agreements and terminations based thereon are not subject to Presidential review and both a complainant and a respondent must move that the Commission terminate an investigation on the basis of a settlement order,
it is unlikely that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals will hold that termination has such a
negative impact on the parties to make the order equivalent to a final order, and hence reviewable.
255 See Fishbach, The Need to Improve Consistency in the Application and Interpretationof Section 337 ofthe Tar!i9Act of 1930 and Section 5 of the FederalTrade CommissionAct, 8 GA. J. IN'L
& COMP. L. 65, 75-76 (1978).
256 Comments of the Department of Justice on Proposed Rulemaking, Subch. C pts. 210 and
211, 19 C.F.R. pts. 210 and 211, at 7 (1978) (filed with the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing
Office, Washington, D.C.). The Department suggested that a solution to the problem would be to
remove complainants from Section 337 litigation status, limiting them to status as intervenors
under ITC rules. Id
257 The Commission has explained the requirement of an affidavit in its settlement procedure
as "intended to allow the Commission to safeguard the public interest, including competitive conditions in the United States economy." 46 Fed. Reg. 17,526, 17,528 (1981) (explanation of 19
C.F.R. § 210.51 (1981)).
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Consequently, the Commission must approve all settlement agreements

which lead to termination of an investigation. Yet, the ITC has never
disapproved of any settlement agreement on the grounds that it was
anticompetitive.259
The ITC may avoid anticompetitive settlements, however, by using a procedure which is essentially a temporary settlement between the
ITC and a respondent. Under this procedure, the ITC will terminate a
party as a Section 337 respondent if that party agrees to refrain from
importing allegedly infringing goods during the relevant Section 337
investigation, and if the complainant agrees to the termination.2 60 This
informal procedure provides the benefits of flexibility over formal settlement and termination procedures. The drawbacks of the procedure,
of course, are that the former respondent becomes unreachable by a
cease and desist order unless joined again as a party respondent, and
compulsory means of securing information from that respondent are
lost for purposes of the investigation. However, for respondents who
must ordinarily weigh the costs of a Section 337 defense against those
of settlement, and who may be forced into settlement agreements as a
result, the procedure represents an attractive alternative. The ITC
should encourage complainants to open this alternative to respondents,
and should carefully scrutinize the motivations of those complainants
who do not do so.
F. Consent Orders
Commission rules provide for all complainants in a Section 337
investigation, one or more of the respondents, and the ITC investigative attorney to make a joint motion to terminate an investigation when
that motion is supported by a consent order.2 6 ' This consent procedure
258 See Certain Swivel Hooks and Mounting Brackets, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337TA-53, Pub. No. 983 (June 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5342, 5343, where the ITC
approved a settlement agreement and terminated the investigation, noting that the agreement,
"within the framework of our patent system, does not appear to be anticompetitive."
view of the Commission's
259 One commentator has viewed this fact harshly, stressing that "[i]n
cursory review of the settlement's impact upon the public interest, the rejection of such agreements
on public interest grounds appears to be founded more on theory than on practice." McDermid,
supra note 88, at 429-31.
260 Certain Vacuum Bottles and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.No. 337TA-108, notice of termination ofresfpondent, 47 Fed. Reg. 8107 (1982).
261 19 C.F.R. § 211.20(b) (1981). The parties may file a consent-based motion for termination
of an investigation at any time before the ITC begins a hearing on a possible Section 337 violation, or during or after that hearing, upon request "and good cause shown." Yet, after the parties
submit a consent order to the presiding officer, none may withdraw from the agreement, absent
good cause shown. (d.

After all three parties (complainant, respondent, and ITC Investigative Attorney) file their
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involves the ITC in the pre-termination negotiations between the litigants, as well as in the monitoring of consent orders which the Commission accepts.26 2
The Commission has utilized its consent power on several occasions. For example, the ITC concluded a final portion of the Cast Iron
Stoves case2 63 by approving a consent order under which respondents
agreed to cease importation of goods infringing a common law
trademark and to report to the Commission on the status of their
manufacturing. The Commission has also utilized a consent order procedure in cases of patent infringement, 264 predatory pricing,2 65 and
motion with the ITC for termination based on the consent order or with a presiding officer which
the Commission designates, the Commission publishes a notice of the order in the Federal Register, along with a nonconfidential summary of the consent agreement. The Commission also
"promptly" serves notice on the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of
Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission, along with other agencies which the ITC deems appropriate to receive notice. Id § 211.21(a).
ITC rules provide that a consent order must contain, in addition to the basic consent agreement: (1) an admission of all jurisdictional facts; (2) an express waiver of all rights to seek judicial review or otherwise challenge or contest the validity of the consent order; and (3) the parties'
statement of understanding that the ITC will, if necessary, enforce, modify, or revoke the consent
order as the Commission's rules provide. Id § 211.22(a). Finally, the consent agreement may
contain a statement that the parties' signing of the agreement does not constitute any admission of
a Section 337 violation. Id
The ITC may hold hearings on the order after it notifies the various federal agencies of the
order. Within twenty days of the time that the Commission publishes the proposed agreement in
the Federal Register for comment the Commission must consider all public interest factors, and
then decide whether to "(I) accept the [consent] agreement, issue the consent order and terminate
the investigation; (2) reject the agreement and deny the motion; or (3) take such other action as it
deems appropriate." Id § 211.21(c). The consent agreement does not bind the parties in later
ITC proceedings if the Commission rejects it. Id
262 Indeed, the Commission has refused to grant termination based on consent orders where
the ITC Investigative Attorney was not a party to negotiations, Coin-Operated Audio-Visual
Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-87, Pub. 1160 at 4
(June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEc. (BNA) 1212, 1215, and where the Investigative Attorney
has not signed the consent order. Certain Airtight Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.
No. 337-TA-106 (ITC-initiated action), termination notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,865 (1981) (reporting
the Administrative Law Judge's denial of Termination Motion 92-8 on July 31, 1981).
263 This was a separate action related to the Commission's original decision, Certain Airtight
Cast-Iron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-69, Pub. No. 1126 (Jan. 1981), 3
INT'L TRADE Rm,. DEC. (BNA) 1158. Significantly, it was the ITC's first self-initiated investigation under Section 337. The consent order will be in effect for seven years. Certain Airtight CastIron Stoves, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-106 (ITC initiated action), termination
notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,865 (1981); see also ITC Issues Consent Orders in Seff-Initiated Stoves
Investigations,[Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 93, at A-3 (Sept.
9, 1981).
264 Certain Cattle Whips, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-57, Pub. No. 993 (Aug.
1978), was the first patent infringement investigation under Section 337 to result in termination
based on a consent agreement. The second was Compact Cyclotrons with a Pre-Septum, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-61, Pub. No. 1024 (Dec. 1979), termination notice, 44 Fed.
Reg. 76,868 (1979). Following was Plastic Bouquet Holders, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
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false advertising. 66
The danger of anticompetitive agreements between parties is not
present when the ITC uses its consent order procedure because the
Commission is a party to all consent agreements. Indeed, consent orders are one of the Commission's most flexible forms of action since
statutory guidelines do not define the types of compliance which the
Commission and parties can agree on.267 Further, the Commission's
power to modify consent orders allows it to respond to changes in respondents' or complainants' situations or in the United States economy. 68 In addition, the ITC may use its consent power to terminate an
investigation against any number of a group of respondents, allowing it
to focus its investigation on remaining respondents.26 9 Finally, consent
agreements are one of the least troublesome of all ITC actions to enforce since the parties admit ITC jurisdiction over them for purposes of
consent.27°
Consent orders are not, however, a perfect Section 337 action.
One problem related to the ITC's use of consent orders is represented
in the lingering disagreement over whether the ITC should submit consent orders for presidential review. 271 The Commission has refused to
337-TA-80, consent orderpublished,45 Fed. Reg. 66,927 (1980), terminationnotice, 45 Fed. Reg.
83,036 (1980); Certain Adjustable Window Shades and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-83, consent orderpublished, 46 Fed. Reg. 9261 (1981), termination nolice, 46 Fed. Reg. 17,313 (1981); Certain Shell Brim Hats, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337TA-86, consent orderpublished,46 Fed. Reg. 16,160 (1981), terminationnotice, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,035
(1981). For a discussion of the Cattle *hips order, see Kaye & Plaia, 1979 Developments, sufpra
note 152, at 612-13.
265 Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-23,
termination notice, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,492 (1977).
266 Certain Surface Grinding Machines and Literature for the Promotion Thereof, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-95, consent orderpublished, 46 Fed. Reg. 47,895 (1981), termination notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1981).
267 The Commission's consent power flows from its applicable rules promulgated under 19
U.S.C. § 1335 (1976), which allows the ITC to make rules "necessary to carry out its functions and
duties."
268 The ITC may modify a consent order in two ways. First, it may change information requirements by simply notifying parties of its intention to do so and giving reasons for the modification. Parties may submit briefs to the Commission in response to the changed requirements and
the Commission may hold a hearing on the change. 19 C.F.R. § 211.55(b) (1981). A motion for a
major modification of the order, where there are "changed conditions of fact or law, or the public
interest," is similarly available through ITC review, publication in the Federal Register, collection
of public comments, and final Commission acceptance or rejection of the modification. Id
§ 211.57.
269 See 19 C.F.R. § 211.20(b) (1981) (all complainants, but not all respondents, must participate in the consent agreement).
270 Parties to a consent order admit the Commission's jurisdiction over them, 19 C.F.R.
§ 211.22(a) (1981), and all involved parties sign the order. Id § 211.20(b).
271 See the Letter from Robert S. Strauss, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, to

285
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submit the orders in all but one case 27 2 because of its view that termination of a Section 337 investigation based on a consent order is not a
finding of a statutory violation and, thus, is not a final determination.
The ITC maintains that only final determinations require presidential
review. 273 However, critics argue that the President should be able to
review the orders since their remedial effect is often the same as final
exclusion or cease and desist orders,27 4 and since the President must be
allowed to veto ITC actions which might adversely affect United States
policy. 275 Thus far, the argument over presidential review remains at a
standoff.
A final problem with consent orders is the practicality of commission monitoring. The more often the Commission uses the consent procedure, the more monitoring it must do, and this usually entails the
periodic inspection of respondents' facilities and the filing of reports.
As with cease and desist orders,2 7 6 many active consent orders would

put a great strain on the limited Commission staff.
G. Advisory Opinions
Respondents in ITC investigations may obtain advisory opinions
from the Commission on whether their "proposed new or altered
course of action" would violate either the Commission order against

them or Section

337.277

Apparently, Commission advisory opinions are

Daniel Minchew, Chairman, United States International Trade Commission (Feb. 21, 1978) (urging Presidential review of consent orders), submitted in response to Proposed Rules on Enforcement Procedures; Rules of Practice and Procedure, 43 Fed. Reg. 2883 (1978) (filed with the U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C.).
272 This case was Certain Compact Cyclotrons with a Pre-Septum, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-61, Pub. No. 1024 (Dec. 1979), terminationnotice, 44 Fed. Reg. 76,868 (1979). At
the time, the ITC had before it proposed rules which called for submission of consent agreements
for Presidential approval. Enforcement Procedures-Rules of Practice and Procedure, Proposed
Rule, 19 C.F.R. § 210.56(b)-(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 2883, 2888-89 (1978), amended and enacted as 19
C.F.R. § 210.56(b)-(c) (1981). The final rules call for no such review. Compare this with 19
C.F.R. §§ 211.20-211.22 (1981).
273 See 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.51(d), 210.55, 211.20-.22 (1981); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1976); see also
supra note 254.
274 See Letter from the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition to Kenneth R. Mason, Secretary, United States International Trade Commission (1980), submitted in response to
Proposed Rules on Enforcement Procedures, Rules of Practice and Procedure, 43 Fed. Reg. 2883
(1978) (filed with the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C.).
275 Glick, supra note 249, at 143.
276 See supra notes 190-91.
277 19 C.F.R. § 211.54(b) (1981). The ITC has issued two opinions that it has designated as
"advisory." The first of these dealt with the question of whether a respondent had violated a
Section 337 cease and desist order. Certain Apparatus for the Continuous Production of Copper
Rod, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-52, Pub. No. 1017 (Nov. 1979), 2 IN'L TRADE
REP. DEC. (BNA) 5006. The opinion was that there was no violation; complainants in the investi-
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not available to parties who were not named respondents in a Commiseven though a Commission determination might afsion investigation,
278
fect them.
The Commission will issue an advisory opinion when such opinion would "facilitate enforcement of Section 337, would be in the public interest and would benefit consumers and competitive conditions in
the United States. 27 9 In view of these factors, the ITC has set out four
requirements that respondents must meet in order to receive an advisory opinion. First, the respondent must demonstrate a "compelling
business need" for the advice it seeks:
An example of such need might be the obvious risk of building a productive facility for the manufacture of an article which may or may not be
covered by a United States patent. If the Commission ultimately determines that the manufactured article, although modified, infringes a
United States Patent, the building of the productive facility may be a
costly mistake.

Second, a party seeking the Commission's advice must take care to
frame its request as fully and accurately as possible. The Commission
relies upon the requester to state the facts accurately in its request; the
Commission's advice may be of little value if it is given in response to
incomplete or inaccurate information.
Third, the Commission does not wish to become involved in giving a

series of advisory opinions in response to reiterated requests based on
gation objected to this finding. Comments and Objections of Complainant Southwire Company,
Submitted Pursuant to Notice of Request for An Advisory Opinion, 45 Fed. Reg. 1950 (1980)
(filed with the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., in connection with
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-52).
The second advisory opinion interpreted an exclusion order entered upon a finding of patent
infringement. The respondent sought to import a redesigned version of the excluded product; the
ITC advised that the respondent's device fell within the exclusion order. Issuance of Advisory
Opinion in connection with Certain Surveying Devices, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337TA-68, Pub. No. 1085 (July 1980), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5409. See ITC Renders
Advirory Opinion on Scope of Exclusion Order, [Apr.-Sept.] INTL TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) No. 94, at A-l, A-2 (Sept. 16, 1981).
It is noteworthy that prior to issuing the above opinions, the Commission "rejected" a request
from the Copper Rod respondent for an advisory opinion. This rejection read strikingly like an
advisory opinion, however, answering a series of the respondent's questions about interpretation
of the cease and desist order against it. The only question which the ITC did not answer in its
"rejection" was whether the respondent could change its manufacturing processes without violating the order. The ITC maintained that such a question was inappropriate for the advisory opinion since the question required "very detailed examination of any process and extensive
investigation." Memorandum Regarding Krupp's Request for an Advisory Opinion (Feb. 2,
1981) (filed with the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., in connection
with U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-52).
278 However, non-respondents may bring action against the Commission, which could result in
a clarification of their position, by bringing suit as an adversely affected party under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
279 19 C.F.R. § 211.54(b) (1981).
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facts which differ only slightly from one request to the next. Therefore,
the party seeking advice should fully state its request in its first submission to the Commission.
Finally, the Commission will consider any equitable factor which
might affect the balance of interests among the parties and the
Commission.28 0
Indeed, the ITC's observance of the public interest is crucial in advisory opinion proceedings. In contrast to other Section 337 proceedings,
only the respondent presents testimony when it seeks an advisory opinion. This would be true even if a respondent requests an advisory opinion during an ongoing investigation, or during the same time period
that the respondent is involved in an ITC hearing, since an investigation or hearing on request would be separate from the ongoing Section
337 proceeding. Hence, there is the possibility that a respondent will
approach the Commission with an imbalanced set of facts, possibly
causing the ITC to give advice which leads to a dilution of its original
order or which gives way to new unfair import trade practices. Thus, in
cases where complicated questions inhere, the ITC should refuse to issue advisory opinions,2"' and should reopen the original investigation
if necessary.
The Commission reserves the right to reconsider its advisory opinion if the public interest requires. 2 In such cases, ITC rules provide
that the Commission will give the party who has received the advisory
opinion advance notice of the recision, and allow the party to submit its
views to the Commission.2 8 3 If the ITC refuses to reconsider its advisory opinions, they are not open to judicial review. 84
In addition to the clarifications that it may provide, a Commission
advisory opinion is valuable to respondents because they may rely on it
in good faith. If the Commission later determines that the respondents
are following its advisory opinion yet violating Section 337, the Com280 Certain Surveying Devices, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-68, issuance ofadisory opinion, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,120 (1981).
281 Analagous is the Federal Trade Commission's practice of not issuing advisory opinions
where "an informed opinion cannot be made or could be made only after extensive investigation,
clinical study, testing, or collateral inquiry." 16 C.F.R. § 1.1(b) (1981).
282 19 C.F.R. § 211.54(c) (1981).
283 Id
284 While the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has not ruled directly on this question, the
fact that advisory opinions are not binding on the parties, and are not final determinations subject
to presidential review, suggests that they are not reviewable. See Analysis of Public Comments on
Proposed Rules, 46 Fed. Reg. 17,526, 17,527 (1981), citing Floersheim v. Weinburger, 346 F. Supp.
950 (D.D.C. 1972). But see Import Motors Ltd. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 530 F.2d
940 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (actions not referrable for presidential review could be reviewable if they
have strong negative affect on parties).
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mission will not proceed against the respondents if they "fully, completely, and accurately" presented all "relevant facts" at the time of the
advisory opinion. Respondents must discontinue their unlawful actions once the Commission notifies them that its advisory opinion is no
longer valid.2 85 Thus, advisory opinions can effectively modify Commission actions, especially because respondents can rely on the advisory opinions.
Advisory opinions could alleviate the problem of divergent interpretations of final Commission determinations by Customs and the
Commission. Presumably, a respondent could present an advisory

opinion to Customs as determinative of the meaning of any Commission order applicable to the respondent.2 8 6 In turn, respondents could

use the procedure to avoid possible Section 337 action once Customs
allows their goods to enter the United States.
H.

Suspension of Proceedings

The ITC may suspend Section 337 investigations while judicial or
administrative proceedings involving the same subject matter are in
process. 2 8 7 Suspension is discretionary, 28 8 and when an investigation is
suspended, the time period within which the ITC must normally complete a Section 337 investigation (twelve or eighteen months) stops run-

ning.2 89 While complainants may use Section 337 at the same time that
they institute court and other proceedings to block offending im285 19 C.F.R. § 21.54(c) (1981).
286 The need for the Commission to take all action necessary to avoid imposing hinderances on
the free flow of fair trade is a crucial one, given Section 337's public interest standards. The ITC
can use its advisory opinion procedure to limit any undue restraints which its orders might cause
to parties at Customs, and thus prevent damaging economic distortions in the United States. See
Letter of Reuben 0. Askew, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, to Catherine Bedell,
Chairman, United States International Trade Commission (Apr. 25, 1980) (fied in the U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., in connection with Certain Apparatus for
the Continuous Production of Copper Rod, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-52, Pub.
No. 1017 (Nov. 1979), INT'L TRADE RaP. DEC. (BNA) 5597). The Special Trade Representative
asked the ITC to take quick action to issue an advisory opinion since:
The copper rod line subject to the contract, between [respondents in the Copper Rod Production Apparatus investigation] is essential to the completion of the multi-million dollar plant
now under construction by [one of the respondents]. It is important that we now avoid impeding the completion of this plant which is located in an area of Connecticut with chronically high unemployment. The economic ramifications of this plant can not be underestimated.
id
287 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(I) (1976).
288 Id; see infra notes 295-297 and accompanying text.
289 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1976). The ITC otherwise has one year to complete a Section 337

investigation, unless it designates the case as "more complicated." If it does so, the ITC may use a
total of eighteen months for a Section 337 investigation. d
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ports,290 the Commission must still consider the public interest in its

Section 337 proceedings.

291

This suggests that the Commission may

not ignore court or administrative proceedings which involve the same
subject matter as an ongoing 337 case, and especially may not ignore
the relief provided or the findings made.2 9 2 Indeed, there are at least
two instances of parallel proceedings where the public interest strongly
supports suspension of a Section 337 investigation.
The first instance where suspension should occur arises when parties before the Commission are concurrently litigating the validity of a
private right, such as a patent or trademark right, in a forum whose
finding of validity is conclusive.2 93 Such forums would include the Patent and Trademark Office, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
or a United States District Court. At its worst, the Commission's issuance of an order based on an alleged right, later found to be invalid in
one of these forums, would be a serious misapplication of Section 337,
and would injure the respondent exonerated in another forum. At the
very least, a later, conclusive finding of invalidity by another forum
would obligate the Commission to dissolve or revise its order. In this
type situation, the Commission would have wasted considerable time
and effort which could have been saved had the Commission suspended its Section 337 proceedings.29 4
290 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976); see also TRADE AcT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 8, at
197, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7329; Federal Trade Commission v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948) (a proceeding initiated in one government agency does not
bar concurrent litigation based upon similar facts or other questions of law before another
agency).
291 Specifically, those enumerated in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(e), (f)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
292 The Commission has not rejected this argument, noting in Coin-Operated Audio-Visual
Games and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-87, Pub. No. 1160 at
12-13 n.19 (June 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE Rae. DEC. (BNA) 1212, 1218 n.19, that it "has neither
accepted or denied that it has the power to remedy an unfair act or unfair method of competition"
without regard to other provisions of law.
For an example of a court ordering a stay of further court proceedings pending the completion of Section 337 proceedings, see Alberta Gas Chem., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9 (2d
Cir. 1981) (complaint alleging fraud and unfair competition).
293 The Commission's finding as to the validity of these rights would operate only for the purpose of Section 337. See Duvall, supra note 4, at 160. But see Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., No.
79-C-225, slip op. (E.D. Wisc. 1980) (plaintiffs statements before the ITC that its patent may have
been invalid had probative evidence in federal court action).
A Patent and Trademark Office determination that a registered patent or trademark was invalid would make such private rights unenforceable in United States courts.
294 Conversely, a Commission finding of invalidity where a forum whose decisions had wider
application held the opposite would either force the complainant to bring a new Section 337 claim,
or compel the Commission to initiate its own separate investigation. To protect the complainant,
however, the ITC may keep a temporary order in effect through the suspension period. See Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97, Pub. No. 1222
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The second instance in which the public interest strongly supports

suspension is where complainants have obviously brought action in
multiple forums, including the ITC under Section 337, in order to harass the respondents.2 9 5 A Section 337 investigation pending in addition
to other actions against a respondent has substantial harassment poten-

tial for the following three reasons: (1) Section 337 investigations can
go forward without regard to any other provisions of law; (2) the addition of the Commission investigative attorney to Section 337 discovery

procedure makes complainants' actions under the Section comparatively easier than those in other forums; and (3) Section 337 is a rela-

tively little known statute, especially to foreign respondents. Hence,
the ITC should take account of all actions against Section 337 respondents, and if one or several of those actions would give the complainant

adequate relief, or later provide the Commission with substantial information which it could apply to the Section 337 investigation, public
interest factors favor ITC suspension pending completion of the other

actions.296 The ITC could, prior to suspension, prescribe temporary action in order to forestall any injury to the complainant after an investigation has been suspended.2 9 7
The Commission has based its decisions to suspend Section 337
proceedings on three factors. It first examines whether continuing Section 337 proceedings will impose undue hardship on one or more of the

parties or possibly deprive them of due process. Next, the Commission
considers whether there is a relative advantage to consolidating its re-

sources for other investigations. Third, the Commission considers
whether concurrent litigation before a court or agency involves similar
(Jan. 1982), 3 INT'L TRADE COMM'h DEc. (BNA) 2317, 2325. For a discussion of temporary
orders, see supra text accompanying notes 198-219.
295 For example, in United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 195-96 (1963), the Court
viewed Singer's Section 337 action before the Tariff Commission to exclude infringing sewing
machines as part of an overall course of dealing, the aggregate of which was to violate the Sherman Act. Significantly, the Tariff Commission stayed its Section 337 proceedings when the government commenced its antitrust action. See also California Motor Transp. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (filing a multiplicity of actions against competitors for the purpose
of interfering with their right of access to agencies and courts is a Sherman Act violation). Cf.
Rosenthal,AntitrustRisks in Abusing the Import Relief Laws, 14 Swiss REV. OF INT'L AN=TITRUST
L. 31 (1982).
296 This approach could also alleviate the related problem of forum shopping (complainants
may seek Section 337 review because they feel that they can obtain more favorable treatment than
in federal courts). Forum shopping will remain a problem until the ITC recognizes the need for
uniform application of federal case law to Section 337 cases, especially where private rights such
as patents and copyrights are involved.
297 For a discussion of available temporary action, see supra notes 198-219 and accompanying
text.
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questions of law, similar parties, or similar industries and articles.29 8 In
the ITC's opinion, apparently, these factors are seldom of sufficient
strength when they are present to mandate suspension of Section 337
proceedings. Since 1974, for example, the Commission has seldom
granted a stay where there has been concurrent litigation of the private
rights involved in an ongoing Section 337 investigation.2 9 9 Its practice

is similar where there has been a multiplicity of concurrent actions
pending against a single respondent.30

°

Certainly, in some cases, it may be in the public interest for the
Commission to allow parties to use Commision procedures concur-

rently with those of another forum. One aspect of the public interest,
for example, could be Section 337's mandate that the ITC expedite Section 337 proceedings. 30 While the Section provides for the Commission to suspend the running of the twelve to eighteen month period
during which it must complete its investigations, the Commission asserts that policy underlying Section 337 forces it to conclude its investigations quickly. Indeed, one of Section 337's most attractive features is

that it provides for relatively fast action in response to injuries from
unfair import trade practices. The Commission must continue to provide this kind of fast relief so that it may take effective action, when

appropriate, against any unfair import trade practices which many
United States industries face. The number of investigations before the
Commission and the weight of the Commission's overall workload fur298 Duvall, supra note 4, at 161-62.
299 See Duvall, supra note 4, at 161. For example, the ITC refused to grant a stay in a recent
case where there was a concurrent challenge to patent validity in the Patent and Trademark Office. Grant of Leave to Review Order No. 7 and of Affirmance of Order No. 7, Certain Stabilized
Hull Units and Components Thereof and Sonar Units Utilizing Said Stabilized Hull Units, U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-103, investigation instituted, 46 Fed. Reg. 55,163 (1981),
terminated, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,048 (1982).
However, the ITC's resistance to suspending its proceedings may be decreasing. See Certain
Card Data Imprinters, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-104, grant of application to review order No. 123, reversalof orderNo. 123, andsuspension of investigation, 47 Fed. Reg. 7348
(1982), where the Commission granted suspension pending concurrent district court litigation.
See also Certain High-Voltage Circuit Interrupters, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-64,
investigationsuspended, 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5143, 5146-47, suspension order continued, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,667 (1982), where the ITC granted a stay when the primary examiner of the
Patent and Trademark Office decided against patentability during reissue proceedings contemporaneous with the ITC's Section 337 investigation.
300 The Commission's current practice contrasts with that during the 1950's when it would
defer Section 337 action pending the completion of litigation involving patent validity. See 1957
TARIFF COMM'N ANN. REP. 27-29; H. 6767 Hearings,supra note 66, at 1362-63 (statement of
Noel Hemmendinger). However, the Commission was not operating under statutory time constraints in the 1950s. See supra note 30.
301 The ITC has stayed within these time limits. Duvall, supra note 4, at 159. See also Duvall,
Adjudication UnderStatutory Time Limits.- The L TC.Experience, 32 AD. L. REV. 733, 744 (1980).
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ther argue for speedy disposition of Section 337 investigations. °2
However, it is apparent that the Commission's time and resource

constraints could be equally strong reasons for the suspension of proceedings when the Commission has difficulty carrying out a complete

investigation. Some information may not be within the Commission's
reach, but may be within the jurisdiction of a court or other administrative agency. Also, it may be difficult or costly for the Commission to

obtain needed information. If the information is available through another body,
suspension of proceedings would save Commission
30 3
resources.
Nevertheless, the Commission has resisted suggestions that it stay
proceedings in cases other than those for which Section 337(b)(3) pro-

vides. Commentators have suggested that the Commission refer antitrust complaints to the Justice Department or the Federal Trade
Commission since these agencies are "established antitrust enforcement

agencies with staffs and procedures capable of monitoring and seeking
enforcement of their remedies." 3" Section 337 conceivably provides
for this type of cooperation since it directs the Commission to seek advice from other agencies about Commission investigations. 30 5 The

Commission rejected this advice, arguing that:
[W]hile it is somewhat understandable for the Department of Justice to be
302 The ITC had fourteen cases before it in various stages of adjudication on December 1, 1981.
See ITC HEARINoS CALENDAR, supra note 5, at 9-11.

303 For example, Section 337 provides that the decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury "with
respect to the issue of less-than-fair value sales or subsidization and the matters necessary for such
decision" are conclusive on the Commission. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Under
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 46 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979), the Secretary of Commerce has
received this decision power from the Secretary of the Treasury. Thus, the ITC must incorporate
the Secretary's findings into its own decisions which may involve matters within the antidumping
or countervailing duty statutes. According to Section 337, the ITC must base any final actions
against violations on substantial evidence, in accordance with both the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), and the related standards for Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
review of all Section 337 actions. See supra notes 10-11.
Certainly, the Secretary's findings, which are conclusive on the Commission, would constitute
substantial evidence. By analogy, the Commission could use other administrative and judicial
findings as a basis for its Section 337 actions.
304 Hemmendinger, Barringer & Kossl, supra note 181, at 106. However, the same authors note
earlier in their article that:
[t]he legal case that the ITS must defer to the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission on matters also within their jurisdiction is decidedly less persuasive than the
case for deferral to the Treasury in antidumping and countervailing duty matters. Section
. The
337(a) explicitly provides the ITC with jurisdiction over unfair import practices ...
general policy arguments, however, such as avoiding duplicate proceedings, conflicting resolutions, or contradictory remedies still apply.
Id at 101 n.109.
305 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). In turn, 19 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976) requires federal agencies to cooperate with the ITC when the President directs them to do so.
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asserting their own pre-eminence in matters of Anti-trust law, it is disturbing to find them attempting to limit our jurisdiction under this statute.
This continuing opposition to Commission actions clearly within the purview of Section 337 is hardly the kind of 'advice and information' envisioned by sec. 337(b)(2). The Justice Department arguments are not
worthy of serious considerations because Section 337 has been 'in addition to other provisions of law' since it was passed in 1922.306
The Commission's reluctance to refer matters to other agencies is
politically understandable. The ITC has only begun to develop a Section 337 jurisprudence with respect to the Section's 1974 amendments.
Further, Section 337 arguably presents problems which only the Commission can deal with both because of its expertise and because of its
unique role in enforcing trade legislation. Yet the Commission must
weigh a range of domestic policy factors when it takes action against a
Section 337 violation. Considering the cumulative impact which federal administrative agencies have on the United States economy, there
is good reason for the Commission to consider the resources and remedies which other agencies can provide as it weighs the scope of its own
action.3 o7
I.

Informal Investigative Action

Section 603 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the International
Trade Commission to "conduct preliminary investigations to determine
the scope and manner of proceedings, and to consolidate proceedings
before it."30 8 Preliminary investigations do not require the ITC to have
personal or subject matter jurisdiction over parties which the ITC investigates. If a preliminary investigation indicates that a person may
have violated Section 337, the Commission may "afford such person
the opportunity to have the matter disposed of on an informal administrative basis," provided it deems that informal disposition will not ad30 9
versely affect the public interest.
Under its rules, the Commission considers five factors to determines whether to informally dispose of a probable Section 337 violation: (1) the nature and gravity of the practice; (2) whether the practice
is likely to recur; (3) the prior record and good faith of the person in306 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA29, Pub. No. 863 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, 5253, disapprovedby President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978).
307 The problem of overlap between the functions and jurisdiction of the ITC and other agencies could become more widespread as the ITC expands its application of Section 337. See Duvail, supra note 4, at 169-70.
308 19 U.S.C. § 2482 (1976).
309 19 C.F.R. § 211.10 (1981).
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volved; (4) the adequacy of assurance of voluntary compliance; and

(5) any other relevant factor that the Commission deems appropriate.
Informal disposition of the case usually involves a consent-based
settle31 0
party.
accused
the
and
Commission
ment between the
Although no rules guided the Commission's pre-1981 use of Sec-

tion 603 to dispose informally of Section 337 violations, the Commission has used the procedure on several occasions before and after that

date.3 1 An informal settlement must take place before a Commission
investigative attorney certifies a Section 337 complaint for hearing
before the Commission administrative law judge.312 This usually occurs about three weeks after a complaint is filed. Hence, informal dis-

position can be one of the speediest actions which the Commission can
provide.
Section 603 investigations are also useful when it is difficult to obtain information located abroad or when the United States industry is
small and the ITC needs more information before it takes up a full

Section 337 investigation.1 3 Finally, informal disposition is flexible
since it involves only the Commission and the accused party and does
not have to take any specific form, such as an exclusion order or a cease
and desist order, as required under formal Section 337 proceedings.3 1 4

For example, informal investigative action may end with a consent order under which the respondent agrees to cease importation, or with a
310 Id §§ 211.10(b), 211.20(a) (opportunity to submit proposed consent order prior to the institution of an investigation).
311 See, ag., Steel Jacks from Canada, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 603-TA-6, issuance of
consent order and termination, 45 Fed. Reg. 81,688 (1980); Certain Replica Black Powder Firearms, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 603-TA-4, issuance of consent orderand termination, 43
Fed. Reg. 673-74 (1978); Certain Stainless Steel Shears, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 603TA-8, termination of investigation, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,048-49 (1982).
312 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.12, 211.20 (1981).
313 See Duvall, supra note 4, at 163; Hemmendinger, Barringer & Kossl, supra note 181, at 113.
314 Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 659 F.2d 1039 (C.C.P.A.
198 1), in dicta, has cast doubt on the ITC's discretion to substitute an investigation under Section
603 for a Section 337 investigation. In Syntex, the majority stated that there is no basis, statutory
or otherwise, for a substitution of a Section 603 investigation for one under Section 337. 659 F.2d
at 1044. Yet the majority agreed that the ITC may conduct a preliminary investigation under
Section 603 in order to decide whether to institute a Section 337 investigation. 659 F.2d at 1044.
Judge Nies, concurring, also took this position. Id. at 1048. Thus, it seems that the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals will affirm the ITC's use of Section 603 investigative power as long
as the ITC does not rule out the possibility of a Section 337 investigation. This is an easy requirement for the ITC to meet.
In contrast, ITC Chief Administrative Law Judge Donald Duvall contends that a Section 603
investigation is permissible, notwithstanding whether the ITC intends to institute a Section 337
investigation. Duvall, suora note 4, at 163.
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respondent promising to alter the composition of its goods so that their
importation would not violate Section 337.
Informal dispositon satisfies the Commission's need for judicial
economy. However, since the complainant is not involved in an infor-

mal disposition, such action does not allow for the complainant to develop its case and argue for a particular Commission action. Yet, the
process of informal disposition allows the Commission to address a
Section 337 violation with a minimum disruption of trade since the

process takes place over a short period of time, and since it allows for
the Commission to work directly with the respondent.
J. Modification

As discussed previously, 315 Commission rules provide for it to
modify all actions where it retains jurisdiction over the parties. This
allows the Commission to cater its actions to parties' individual situations, specific subject matter, and the public interest; and to change its
actions if situations change.3 16 Commission practice has been to modify or vacate its actions if there has been a change of circumstances or
new information.3 17 Indeed, if a court or the Patent and Trademark

Office declares a patent invalid after the Commission takes action
against patent infringement, the Commission is bound to revoke that
action.3 18 Of course, whether the Commission will notice changed cir315 See supra note 261.
316 The ITC must consider both the public interest and the need to remedy private injury when
it takes action under Section. See 19 U.S.C. 1337(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Therefore, the
ITC should modify its actions when either of these considerations change. For example, in Notice, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Section 337 Case on Doxycycline, 44 Fed. Reg. 40,462 (1979), the Special Representative stated that since future conditions
as a consequence of the Doxycycline exclusion order might adversely affect the public interest, the
administration planned to monitor the order's impact and, if appropriate, would ask the ITC to
vacate the order.
317 A clear case for the modification of a Commission order would be, for example, when
former adversary parties agree on a licensing procedure for goods which the ITC had found to be
unfairly imported. Another example, reported in Safeguards: Aiberger Cites Needfor Caution in
Limiting President'sSection 201 Authority, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) No. 92, at A-14 (1981), is the ITC's modification of the exclusion order it issued in Certain
Large Video Matrix Display Units and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-75, Pub. No. 1158 (July 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1474. The modification
allowed for the entry of spare parts for a system located in the United States. Another instance of
the ITC's use of its modification power is its acceptance of a motion by respondents in Doxycycline, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-3, Pub. No. 964 (Apr. 1979), to modify an
exclusion order to allow trace amounts of doxycycline to enter the United States for Food and
Drug Administration testing. 46 Fed. Reg. 47,897 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 62,342 (1981).
318 19 U.S.C. § 1337(h) (1976). The Commission is charged with dissolving its orders if it finds
that the unfair import trade practice that gave rise to them has ceased. Id See also the decision of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals under the pre-1974 version of Section 337 in In re Orion
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cumstances and modify its actions depends on the Commission's and
the parties' diligence. The Commission, however, has a special responsibility to modify actions which later prove to be contrary to the public
interest.
K.

Substantive Rulemaking

The Commission made its first attempt at substantive rulemaking
in response to the requests of United States manufacturers of steel wire
rope. These manufacturers claimed injury under Section 337 because
their foreign competitors allegedly mismarked the country of origin on
foreign-produced steel wire rope.3 9
While it was considering a rulemaking procedure to answer the
steel wire rope manufacturers' complaints, the Commission envisioned
that it would issue rules at the end of a hearing process. The hearings
would consider all of the factors governing the issuance of other Commission actions, including the public interest. If parties proved to the
Commission that there was a Section 337 violation, and that public interest factors did not preclude the Commission action, the Commission
would promulgate final rules. Afterwards, the ITC would handle individual instances of rules violations through proceedings which would
be limited to the question of the applicability of a particular rule and
the violation of the rule?2
The Commission contemplated that rulemaking would differ from
other Section 337 action. Promulgation of a rule, and not action directed specifically against a respondent or import, would remedy the
complainant's injury. If persons later violated the rule, enforcement
Company, 71 F.2d 458 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (upon a patent being declared invalid, it is the President's
duty to correct any order based thereon). But of.Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-97, Pub. No. 1222 (Jan 1982), 3 INT'L TRADE REP.DEc. (BNA)
2317, 2319-20 (revocation at exclusion order not mandatory when a federal court finds the patent
involved to be invalid; however, temporary exclusion order entered instead of a permanent order,
based on "sound policy grounds).
Recently, a federal circuit court held that the patent that a Section 337 exclusion order was
based on was invalid, and the Supreme Court declined to review the decision. Stevenson v.
Grentec, Inc. 652 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,- U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2008 (1982). On its
own initiative, the ITC began consideration of whether it should set aside the exclusion order.
Certain Skateboards and Platforms Therefore, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-37, requestforpublic comment on possible dissolution of exclusion order, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,485-86 (1982).
319 45 Fed. Reg. 12,833 (1980).
320 4uthorizationof,4ppropriationsforthe U.S. Customs Service, U.S. InternationalTrade Commission, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,for Fiscal Year 1981, Hearings Before the
Section on InternationalTrade of the Senate Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-28
(1980) (testimony of ITC Chairman Catherine Bedell) [hereinafter cited as Authorization of
Appropriations].
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proceedings would only involve the Commission and the violators.3 2 '
However, the Commission withdrew its proposed. rules in the face
of much opposition from the trade community.3 2 2 Practitioners had
three main objections to the Commission's substantive rules. First,
they questioned whether Section 1335 of Title 19323 gave the Commission the power to make substantive rules, as opposed to the procedural
rules which the Commission had long promulgated under the statute.32 4 Second, they maintained that Section 337 required in each case
separate findings of injury, efficient and economic operation, and the
public interest, and that, hence, a proof of violation of the statute
would always have to be more involved than a simple showing that a
respondent had violated an ITC substantive rule. 325 Third, practitioners claimed that the specific rules which the ITC was attempting to promulgate governing country of origin marking violated United States
obligations under Article III, Section 4 of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).32 6 The ITC Office of Legal Services and
counsel for the steel wire rope manufacturers discounted each of the
three objections to Commission substantive rulemaking. 2 7
Case law and general agency practice support the argument that
Section 1335 of Title 19 gives the Commission authority to promulgate
321 Id at 28.
322 45 Fed. Reg. 81,605-06 (1980).
323 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976) empowers the ITC to "adopt such reasonable procedures and rules
and regulations as it deems necessary to carry out its functions and duties."
324 See Letter submitted by Christopher Dunn, Counsel, Arter, Hadden, & Hemmendinger,
Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Japan Wire Products Exporters' Association at 16 (1980) (on
file with the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., Docket No. 583). The
letter was submitted pursuant to Notice of February 27, 1980, Fed. Reg. 12,835 (1980).
325 See Letter of N. David Palmeter and Thomas Kossl, Daniels, Houlihan & Palmeter, P.C.,
to Kenneth R. Mason, Secretary, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, on behalf of the Korea Iron and Steel
Association of Seoul, Korea (1980) (on file with the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office,
Washington, D.C., Docket No. 583). The letter was submitted pursuant to Commission Notice of
February 27, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,835-37 (1980).
326 See Letter of N. David Palmeter and Thomas Kossl, supra note 325, at 9. See also Letter
submitted by Christopher Dunn, supra note 324, at 16.
327 Both the ITC Office of Legal Services and Counsel for the Committee of Domestic Steel
Wire Rope and Specialty Cable Manufacturers prepared extensive memoranda supporting the
ITC's issuance of substantive rules. Memorandum to the Commission from Robert D. Bannerman, Office of Legal Services, on Substantive Rulemaking Under 19 U.S.C. Sections 1335 and
1337 (June 27, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ITC Counsel Rules Memorandum]; Comments of the
Committee of Domestic Steel Wire Rope and Specialty Cable Manufacturers (April 28, 1980)
(submitted in response to Proposed Rule on Country of Origin Marking of Imported Steel Wire
Rope, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,835 (1980)) [hereinafter cited as Committee Rules Memorandum]. Copies
of both these documents are on file in the offices of the Northwestern Journal of International Law
& Business, and with the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Docketing Office, Washington, D.C., (Doe.
No. 583).
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substantive rules. First, neither Section 1335's language nor its legislative history refutes an inference that Congress gave the ITC authority
to make substantive rules.328 A series of decisions upholding substantive rules of agencies promulgated on the basis of generally worded
rulemaking statutes support this reading of Section 1335.329 Outside of
the question of Congressional intent, the only restriction on ITC
rulemaking power is that all agency rules must be reasonably related to

the statute which empowers them. 330 As long as the ITC relates any
substantive rulemaking it might do under Sections 1337 and 1335 to the
subject of unfair import competition, there seems to be no reason why
the Commission can not issue substantive rules to guide Section 337
administration.3 3'

Section 337's standards of injury and efficient and economic operation, however, prove difficult to express through substantive rules. Indeed, the public interest standards which each Section 337 action must
meet further suggest that the ITC must determine injury and economic
efficiency relative to each case.33 2 The ITC could, nonetheless, use
rules to indicate what might be an initial violation of the statute. For

example, a rule stating simply that importation of items infringing a
328 Congress enacted Section 1335 in 1958, adding it to the Commission's general powers after
deleting from what is now subsection (b)(1) of Section 337 the words "under and in accordance
with such rules as it may promulgate [under the Tariff act of 1930, ch. 497, sec. 337(c), 46 Stat. 703
(1930)]." These deleted words followed what is now the first sentence of subsection (b)(1), which
begins: "The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation ...." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1)
(1976). The legislative history of Section 1335 gives no clue as to the reason why Congress removed the language from the investigations portion of Section 337 and created a separate
rulemaking section. See TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1958, S. REP. No. 1838, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1958, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEws 3609, 3621. On its face,

however, the change seems to give the Commission general rulemaking power "necessary to carry
out its functions and duties," which include Section 337 enforcement and administration. See
Committee Rules Memorandum, supra note 327, at 2-3.
329 In NationalPetroleumRefiners Association, the court held that the Federal Trade Commis-

sion could promulgate substantive rules based on statutory language which charged it with making rules and regulations "for the purpose of carrying out the provisions" of 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46,
47-58 (1970). National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672, 698
(D.C. Cir. 1973). Similar decisions exist upholding a substantive rulemaking power for other
agencies on the basis of generally worded statutes; e.g.,
United States v.Storer Broadcasting Co.,

351 U.S. 192 (1956) (Federal Communications Commission); American Trucking Ass'n v. United
States, 344 U.S. 298, 311 (1953) (Interstate Commerce Commission); National Nutritional Foods
Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975) (Food and Drug
Administration); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Comptroller of the Currency);Pacific Coast European Conference v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
376 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Federal Maritime Commission). See Committee Rules Memorandum, supra note 327, at 2-9.
330 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 359 (1973).
331 See Committee Rules Memorandum, supra note 327, at 9-13.
332 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a), (d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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valid United States patent is an unfair import trade practice could be
the starting point for individual determinations of injury, economic efficiency, and the public interest. In short, substantive rules could eliminate one tier of consideration which the ITC now has to make during
each Section 337 investigation.
Finally, the GATT allows country of origin marking.3 33 The
GATT only prohibits a country from requiring more than basic marking of country of origin. 3

4

Commission rulemaking in Section 337 cases could have significant procedural benefits. First, rulemaking could allow the Commission to use its financial resources more efficiently since a determination
of what types of practices constituted a Section 337 violation would not
be necessary in each case falling within the rules. Second, rules would
provide some specific definition of what practices are "unfair," as opposed to the general definition of "unfair practices" which the Commission now applies. Third, the Commission could use its rules along with
a Section 603 informal disposition process to take quick action where
there are violations of Section 337.335
In its notice of dismissal of the rules, 33 6 however, the Commission
emphasized that, in its opinion, a number of factors outweighed the
benefits which the proposed rulemaking might have brought. First, in
the case of the steel wire rope manufacturers, the Commission argued
that it had little experience in dealing with allegations of mismarking
or the failure to mark country of origin as an unfair act or method of
competition. Second, the Commission's use of normal adjudicatory
proceedings would not only provide greater procedural rights for the
complainant and respondent parties, but would also develop a more
thorough record for the Commission. This is especially important in
those cases where the Commission is unfamiliar with the unfair acts.
Third, the Commission argued that pursuant to Section 337 it would
still have to make determinations of injury and economic and efficient
operation even if it had rules to guide its investigation. Thus, the Commission concluded, rulemaking would not save Commission resources,
since the Commission would still need to carry out a full scale investi333 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 142, art. IX.
334 The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva (1956)
Report of the Working Party on Trade and Customs Regulation, para. 13, GATT Doc. L/595
(1956), reprintedin GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 5th Supp. at 105-06 (1957).
335 Authorization of Appropriations, supra note 320, at 27-28. See also ITC Counsel Rules
Memorandum, supra note 327, at 12-20.
336 45 Fed. Reg. 81,605 (1980).
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gation of the injury.3 37
The final reason which the Commission gave for rejecting
rulemaking as a remedy, however, was probably the controlling one.
As the Commission noted, the new procedures which the Commission
would have to adopt to make findings in a rulemaking context would
actually make the use of rulemaking more burdensome than adjudication.33 8 The difficulty which the Commission has had adopting procedural rules bears this out: the Commission took three years to issue its
rules providing for the termination of Section 337 investigations and
enforcement of determinations.3 3 9 Making substantive rules and
adopting procedural rules to put the substantive rules into action would
certainly be "burdensome."
Administrative agencies have faced their greatest opposition when
they have formulated and enforced their rules. The ITC, with a
smaller budget and a less certain political position than other administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice
Department, withdrew its rules in the face of criticism. However, substantive rulemaking is legally available to the Commission. Moreover,
the Commission has already promulgated rules on regulatory impact,
which are a prerequisite to issuing substantive rules.340 Again, substantive rulemaking would be especially desirable because it would help to
regularize import trade by informing foreign manufacturers and
United States importers of what the Commission expects of them.
Rules could inject more certainty into the importation process, and
help the Commission direct its action upon finding a Section 337
violation.
L.

Enforcement of Actions

Congress amended Section 337 in 1979 to allow the ITC to enforce
its cease and desist orders with civil action. Before the amendments,
the Commission could only enforce its cease and desist orders through
exclusion. 34 ' Now, if respondents subject to a final cease and desist
order violate that order, they must pay a civil penalty "for each day on
337 Id. at 81,605-06. See also ITC Counsel Rules Memorandum, supra note 327, at 21-23.
338 45 Fed. Reg. 81,605, 81,606 (1980).
339 The Commission published its first version of the rules at 43 Fed. Reg. 2886 (1978). The
final rules appeared at 46 Fed. Reg. 17,526, 17,530 (1981).
340 45 Fed. Reg. 12,833 (1980).
341 See S. REP. No.249, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
381, 648. The Senate Finance committee expressed the view that civil enforcement would be more
"flexible" than enforcement through exclusion since exclusion was "too draconian" a remedy in
some cases, and was not "always to the public benefit." Id
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which an importation of articles, or their sale, occurs in violation of the
order of not more than $10,000 of the domestic value of the articles
entered or sold on such day in violation of the order. ' 34 2 The Commission may sue for this penalty in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, or in the federal court for the district in which the
violation occurs. Moreover, during the action, the court "may issue
mandatory injunctions incorporating relief sought by the Commission
as they deem appropriate
in the enforcement of such final orders of the
34 3
Commission."
The Commission has not used Section 337's provisions for civil
action, 3" nor has it used any of the other enforcement mechanisms
available to it under its rules. These mechanisms include the power to
engage in informal enforcement proceedings, to bring federal district
court action "pursuant to section 337(f)," to enforce orders other than
cease and desist orders, or to institute enforcement proceedings in the
Commission.3 4 5
Significantly, the Commission maintains that enforcement of its
orders is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act 346 since it
regards the enforcement hearing as the equivalent of a pre-trial conference. 3 47 Once it considers the hearing officer's recommendation, possibly made without any prior hearing, the ITC must then decide whether
to modify the original, violated action, to bring action in a United
States District Court, or to revoke the original action "and direct that
the articles concerned be excluded from entry into the United
342 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
343 id

344 Departmentsof Commerce,Justice,and State, The JudiciaryandRelated.4gencies',4ppropriationsfor 1982, HearingsBefore a Subcomm. ofthe House Committeeon Appropriations,97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 519, 558 (1981) (statement of ITC Chairman Bill Alberger). Chairman Alberger testified
on February 18, 1981; the ITC has brought no civil enforcement actions from that time to date.
345 19 C.F.R. § 211.56 (1981). Enforcement proceedings within the Commission begin when
the ITC dockets a complaint with its hearing officer, setting forth in that complaint the violations
of the ITC order. When the complaint is docketed, the Commission must serve it on the alleged
violator, who must file a response. If there is no response, the Commission may accept that the
facts alleged in the complaint are true or it can proceed without notice and "take evidence on the
allegations or charges set forth in the complaint." Id § 211.56(c)(1).
346 Id § 211.56(c)(2). In response to public comments that a failure to apply the Administrative Procedure Act in enforcement hearings would result in unfair hearings, the Commission replied that "a formal trial type proceeding is not warranted since the Commission's interest in
effective enforcement proceedings outweighs the parties' interest in being afforded a full hearing.
Furthermore, Section 5(b) of the APA, which encourages settlement, does not indicate that it was
intended to apply to informal attempts to arrive at and enforce settlements. Additionally, the
reviewability of final Commission orders provides a due process safeguard." 46 Fed. Reg. 17,526,
17,527 (1981).
347 46 Fed. Reg. 17,526, 17,527 (1981).

Unfair Import Trade Practices

4:234(1982)
States. 348 The Commission's consideration of the public interest controls whatever enforcement decisions the Commission makes. 4 9
Finally, if the Commission determines that a party is about to violate an order so that the violation would prejudice later Commission
enforcement, the Commission may "immediately" revoke the order
and replace it with "an appropriate exclusion order.' 35 ° The Commission must consider the public interest before it takes such "temporary
emergency action," and must institute a formal enforcement proceeding if it did not do so when it invoked the emergency exclusion
order.351
No one has yet challenged the Commission's enforcement rules in
civil action. Certainly, there is no question that the Commission may
require parties to provide information,3 52 may within certain bounds
modify its own orders, and may bring district court action !f parties
violate an ITC cease and desist order. However, it is not clear whether
Congress intended for the Commission to be able to issue an exclusion
order when there is a violation of a cease and desist order.3 5 3 Further,
the Commission's power to bring a district court action in cases other
than the enforcement of a cease and desist order is questionable. The
language of Section 337 suggests that Congress intended to limit the
Commission's ability to seek district court action to those situations involving enforcement of a cease and desist order.3 54
V.

SCOPE OF ACTION AGAINST SECTION 337 VIOLATIONS

A.

Public Interest and Policy Considerations

As a result of the 1974 amendments to Section 337, the International Trade Commission gained the potential to play a dynamic role
in United States trade policy through its administration of Section 337.
The amendments affirmed the Commission's practice of exercising jurisdiction over a range of unfair import trade practices, and, at the
time, increased the Commission's power to eliminate those practices.
348 19 C.F.R. § 211.56(c)(3) (1981).
349 Id § 211.56(c)(4).

350 Id. § 211.58.
351 Id
352 See id § 211.51.
353 See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 341. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(t) (Supp. IV 1980) (cease
and desist orders to be imposed in lieu of exclusion orders).
354 The language of Section 337(f)(2) specifically limits Commission civil action to enforcement
of cease and desist orders, and provides that the Commission may only take civil action against a

party when a cease and desist order operates against that party. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) (Supp.
IV 1980).
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Since it now has the responsibility of taking action in the public interest, the challenge to the Commission is not to simply choose a legally
permissible Section 337 action, but an advisable one. Section 337 no
longer contemplates "remedies" for the private injuries of individual
complainants. The statute as amended recognizes that an unfair import trade practice which may cause immediate injury to a United
States industry has an impact on the United States economy as a whole.
In Canadian Tarpoly v. UnitedStates InternationalTrade Commis3 55
sion, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals heard a challenge to
a patent-based exclusion order. The plaintiff claimed that the ITC had
exceeded its statutory authority, and had taken "arbitrary and capricious" action that was "a clear abuse of discretion" 356 because it included the plaintiff's product in the exclusion order even though the
plaintiff was not a respondent to the investigation. The court held
against the plaintiff and affirmed the Commission's order, stating that:
Administrative agencies have considerable latitude to shape their remedies within the scope of their statutory authority ... having wide discretion in dealing with problems entrusted to them, and in determining the
choice of remedy deemed adequate to cope with unlawful practices ....
The relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly for the administrative
agency and its special competence .... 357
Hence, the ITC has considerable authority to take action in administering Section 337. Such authority extends as far as necessary to relieve
an injured domestic industry, yet stops when relief to the industry
could be detrimental to the United States economy as a whole.
Commission assessment of the public interest controls the scope of
the action which it takes after finding a Section 337 violation.3 18 For
example, in some cases, the Commission has prescribed an exclusion
order which reaches all imported goods similar to the goods of the injured domestic industry. While protecting the industry, such an order
may, in many cases, adversely affect "the public health and welfare,
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of
like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
355 640 F.2d 1322 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
356 Id. at 1324.
357 Id. at 1326. In support of this proposition, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cited a
series of well known cases which affirmed exercises of administrative discretion: Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 392 (1959); General Protective Comm. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 346 U.S. 521, 534 (1954); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683, 726 (1948); SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 207-09 (1947) ("Chenery IL"); Jacob Siegel
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 327 U.S. 608, 611-613 (1946).
358 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)-(f) (Supp. IV 1980); 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.14, 210.55 (1981).
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States consumers. ' 35 9 In contrast, an order drawn only against the particular unfairly imported goods which injured the industry may not
have a negative effect on the public interest, though may serve to protect the industry against a particular distortion in import trade.
On two occasions, the Commission held that public interest considerations precluded Section 337 action, even though the statute was
violated. In the first of these cases, CertainAutomatic Crankpin Grinders,360 a domestic manufacturer of auto part manufacturing machinery
brought a Section 337 action against a Canadian corporation for patent
infringement. 3 6 1 The Commission held that the need of the American
auto industry for the machinery was foremost since the domestic patentee could not adequately supply the industry, the machines were crucial
to the industry's being able to produce fuel-efficient cars, and fuel efficiency was crucial to the United States economy. The public interest in
this case thus outweighed the need to remedy the private injury of the
patentee.
The second case in which the ITC withheld action because of public interest considerations is Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration
Tubes.362 The complainants brought a Section 337 action alleging patent infringement, and the Commission found that the respondent had
infringed the complainant's patent. The ITC also found, however, that
acceleration tubes generally had only a limited use in academic research, and were essential to that research. The Commission identified
the controlling issue as:
whether the superior performance at lower cost of the Dowlish [respondent's] tubes in some applications justifies overriding the patent owner's
rights. We are not persuaded that High Voltage [complainant] will withdraw from the field if no exclusion order is issued. The patent has but
two years to run; High Voltage is reasonably assured of replacement sales
to the overwhelming majority of U.S. installations that still use its tubes,
not to mention its substantial overseas market ....

[WI]e are not con-

vinced that [financial reward] is the only motivation to engage in the development of basic science research. As we have noted, there is
considerable encouragement by the government for research, a necessity
in view of the lack of immediately profitable commercial application of
the results and the probative expense of the equipment needed to carry it
out. Researchers, we believe, are not motivated solely by expectation of a
profit in the way that holders of more conventional product and process
359 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)-(f) (Supp. IV 1980); 19 C.F.R. § 210.14 (1981).
360 Certain Automatic Crankpin Grinders, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-60, Pub.
No. 1022 (Dec. 1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REp. DEc. (BNA) 5121.
361 Id
362 Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-67,
Pub. No. 1119 (Dec. 1980), 2 INT'L TRADE RE. DEC. (BNA) 5572.
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363

patents are ....

The test which the Commission presented in Acceleration Tubes
for whether public interest factors preclude remedy in a Section 337
patent violation action might apply generally to Commission determinations of public interest and remedy. The Commission noted that the
threshold question is whether there is a public health and welfare interest in the invention, "that is, whether a remedy under section 337
would have an impact on the public health and welfare. '" 3 4 If the remedy might have a negative impact, the opinion continued, the Commission must balance that impact against the damage to the patentholder's
rights which would occur if the remedy did not issue. 365 Applying
these standards in Acceleration Tubes, the ITC concluded that the public interest in permitting research "with a wide range of devices" outweighed the value of ensuring a reward to the patentholder.3 6 6
Most Commission determinations do not contain as thorough a
discussion of public interest considerations as do the Crankpin Grinders
or Acceleration Tubes decisions. In most decisions, the ITC has based
its public interest findings on the fact that no one has opposed its published determinations. Since there has often been no opposition, the
ITC has as often concluded that the determinations must not be against
the public interest. Following Crankpin Grinders,the ITC has most frequently been concerned with whether complainant-manufacturers can
meet domestic demand if a Commission order stops some or all of the
competing imports. In one case, the Commission satisfied its concern
by accepting complainant counsel's statement that his client would not
raise prices if the ITC excluded competing imports.36 7 In another case,

the Commission noted that if imported products were excluded, domestic competitors of the complainant could satisfy domestic demand. In
this case, the ITC also concluded that exclusion would not harm the
public interest, since the complainant's product, a sterile thermometer
sheath, was more beneficial to public health than the imported nonsterile sheath.36 8

The President may disapprove of ITC final determinations for
"policy reasons" within 60 days after the Commission submits those
363
364
365
366

Id,
Id,

2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 5584.
2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 5581.

Id
Id,

2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) at 5584.

367 Certain Surveying Devices, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-68, Pub. No. 1085
(July 1980), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5409, 5424.
368 Certain Thermometer Sheath Packages, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.No. 337-TA-56, Pub.
No. 992 (July 1979), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5466, 5478.
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determinations to him for review. 369 Much debate surrounds whether

Congress intended for the President's policy considerations in Section
337 cases to include both domestic and foreign policy. 370 On the one
hand, the President arguably may reject Commission determinations
only for foreign policy reasons. Indeed, Congress intended to remove

the issue of the domestic impact of tariff legislation from political considerations by making the ITC an independent agency, and by requir-

ing the ITC to consider the public interest. Leaving the President to
consider only foreign policy in connection with Section 337 determinations could, thus, be seen as a proper demarcation, given the President's

unique role in directing United States foreign policy.3 71 On the other
hand, the executive branch naturally maintains that the President has
every right to examine both the domestic and foreign policy impact of
Section 337 determinations.37 2
While the President may approve or disappove final ITC determinations, he does not have the power to revise them. Only the Commis-

sion can make Section 337 findings and prescribe the action which it
will take on the basis of those findings. Furthermore, only the Supreme
Court, after petition by writ of certiorari,or the Court of Customs and

Patent Appeals may overturn the ITC's Section 337 findings and final
actions.37 3 Yet the President has an undeniable influence over Commission orders because of his approval power. In May, 1981, General
369 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
370 See ProposedSection 337 GuidelinesArouse Debate Over Executive Branch'sRole in Review
Process,[Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 80, at B-1-B-3 (June 3,
1981).
371 Actions under Section 337 can have significant foreign policy implications. For example,
Canada filed a complaint under Article XXIII (national treatment) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), supra note 142, protesting the ITC's exclusion of infringing Canadian
products in In re Spring Assemblies and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv.No.
337-TA-88, Pub. No. 1172 (Oct. 1981), 3 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 1426. The Canadians'
general complaint was that Section 337 has built-in discriminatory elements since it is directed
solely at foreign infringement, while domestic infringers may go unprosecuted. United States
officials responded that if Canada felt so strongly that Section 337 was discriminatory, it was
"pretty strange that no other countries [had] associated themselves with the complaint." GATT
PanelHears U.S. and CanadianArguments on Article XXIII Complaint, [Oct.-Mar.] INT'L TRADE
REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 115, at 462-63 (Feb. 17, 1982). The GATT panel finally
dismissed Canada's complaint. GA7'PanelRejects CanadianCharges ofDiscriminationinAssemblies Case, [Apr.-Sept.] INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 128, at 196 (May 19,
1982).
372 United States Trade Representative General Counsel Donald deKieffer has maintained
that the executive branch has every right to examine issues of domestic policy in the Commission's
Section 337 determinations. See ProposedSection 337 Guidelines Arouse Debate Over Executive
Branch'sRole in Review Process,supra note 370, at B-1.
373 TRADE ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 8,at 199, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 7331-32. ("The President's power to intervene would not be for the pur-
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Counsel to the United States Trade Representative Donald deKieffer
circulated a memorandum outlining both the domestic and foreign policy criteria which a subcommittee of the Trade Policy Committee
would consider in its review of Section 337 actions.37 4 The criteria,
which the subcommittee was to use to "determine and evaluate domestic policy in a particular case," included a range of factors related to the
public policy considerations which the ITC was supposed to have already embodied in its determination. These factors were:
-was the unfair practice found a patent infringement or some other unfair trade practice;
-how many respondents were involved in the practice and what was the
finding of violation with respect to each;
-what is the product-ie., is it readily available, high technology, defense related, etc.
-what is the use of the product-novelty item, medical item, raw material, etc.
-what is the nature of the industry---ie., labor or capital intensive, high
technology, localized regionally, etc.
-how many producers of the product or of like products are there and
what are their relative market shares-domestically and abroad;
-what is the market for the product, ie., individual purchasers, age of
purchasers, industry, health care facilities, etc.
-what is the price of the product and what does it cost to produce-both
domestic and foreign products; and
-what substitutes for the product are there.37 5
pose of reversing a Commission finding of violation of Section 337; such finding is determined
solely by the Commission, subject to judicial review.")
374 There is a four step process in the review of final ITC Section 337 determinations. The
determination goes first to the Section 337 Subcommittee, an interagency group composed of
working staff. The Section 337 Subcommittee's recommendation goes to the Trade Policy Staff
Committee, which is an interagency committee of civil service staff. If this latter committee's
decision is unanimous regarding the course of action which the President should take on the determination, its decision will often go directly to the United States Trade Representative for transmission to the President. See McDermid supra note 88, at 470. The third step in review of Section
337 determinations comes before an interagency committee of Assistant or Under Secretaries, the
Trade Policy Committee Review Group. This group's recommendations then go to the cabinet
level Trade Policy Staff Committee, which transmits its findings to the President. See id For a
short summary of the operations of the Trade Policy Committee, see H. KAYE, P. PLAIA & M.
HERTZBERG, supra note 4 at § 3.05.
The United States Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) has announced a changed format for
collecting public comments on Section 337 final determinations. Under this arrangement, the
U.S.T.R. will be reluctant to review domestic policy issues which the parties could have presented
to the ITC but did not. The purpose of this change is to develop a more thorough record on
domestic policy issues at Commission hearings for the Executive's use in Section 337 review. This
would give the Executive more time to consider foreign policy issues which inhere in the Section
337 determination. 46 Fed. Reg. 46,857 (1981).
375 Memorandum of Donald E. deKieffer, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, on Review of Section 337 Determinations and Orders, at 2-3 (May 13, 1981) (copy
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General Counsel deKieffer emphasized in the memorandum that while
the weight which the subcommittee would give the above criteria
would vary from case to case, "generally speaking, the determination
and the order will be looked at to see whether the practice complained
of will be resolved without producing burdensome or adverse side effects or without causing disruption in U.S. trading relations or negotiations abroad."3'76 Thus, the General Counsel concluded, while
complainants should request remedies which do not have "adverse side
effects" or cause "distortion," "the government in formulating and in
reviewing the determinations and orders, should not lose sight of the
need to resolve the problem of the complainant."3'77
The General Counsel's list of domestic policy criteria represents
the kind of extensive policy review which Congress intended for the
Commission to undertake when it makes Section 337 determinations.
Indeed, this review is quite compatible with the standards which the
ITC applied in Acceleration Tubes. In each Section 337 investigation,
the ITC must balance both the individual complainant's and the publie's interest, and when it concludes that it should act against a Section
337 violation, the ITC must determine the appropriate action.
Each complaint which the Commission investigates describes a situation involving a certain combination of unfair trade practices, goods,
and parties. The action which the Commission takes as its investigation proceeds in each case depends on the unique combination of practices, goods, and parties in the particular case. However, for the
purpose of analysis, it is useful to look separately at each of the three
categories of practices, goods, and parties. The combination of each of
these categories is unique to each Section 337 case. An understanding
of the dynamics of each category gives way to an understanding of how
on file at offices of Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business) [hereinafter cited as
deKieffer Memorandum]. The foreign policy considerations which the Memorandum listed (and

which the Commission is not charged to take account of under Section 337) were:
-is

the determination and order consistent with the international obligations of the United

States as expressed in any international agreement to which the U.S. is a party;
-is the determination and order consistent with negotiation positions of the U.S. in bilateral
and multilateral negotiations;
-how broad [sic] will the order issued in the case be applied;
-in what country or countries are the imports in question produced;
-what country or countries produce like products which are apt to be affected by the determination and order,

-what is the status of our relations with the above countries;
-what are the attitudes of the above countries toward the determination and order,
-are there any other foreign policy factors which should be considered in any particular
case.

Id
376 Id at 3.
377 id
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combinations of categories must affect the scope of Commission action
in order for the Commission to properly administer Section 337.
B.

ITC Action and Unfair Import Trade Practices

The types of unfair import trade practices which appear in Section
337 cases can be divided into five groups: (1) patent infringement;
(2) antitrust-based allegations; (3) general unfair import trade practices
(such as trademark infringement and passing off); (4) underpricing;
and (5) allegations of a combination of unfair trade practices.
1. Patent Infringement
Claims of patent infringement present the ITC with a special
problem. While the Commission feels compelled to protect patent monopoly rights, no Section 337 action must adversely affect "competitive
conditions in the United States economy" or United States
consumers.

37 8

The Commission has applied exclusion orders in all but one case
where imports have infringed a United States patent, and where an
exclusion order was not contrary to the public interest." 9 Consistently,
the ITC has maintained that:
To argue that [issuing an exclusion order where there is patent infringement] is overly-broad misses the point of the philosophy underlying our
patent system and the systems of other countries. Only merchandise
which appropriates the idea protected by the patent is excluded from this
market. Noninfringing merchandise may be imported into this country.
With a narrowly-drawn exclusion order, the burden which is shifted to
importers is not an unnecessary burden when compared to the scope of
the patentholder's protection.3
Yet, on two occasions, the Commission has decided against issuing exclusion orders on public interest grounds.38 ' Indeed, Congress expressed its intention that a Commission finding of patent infringement
not evoke an automatic exclusion order when it refused to require that
378 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
379 Certain Apparatus for the Continuous Production of Copper Rod, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Inv. No. 337-TA-52, Pub. No. 1017 (May 1978), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEc. (BNA) 5006. The ITC
held that a cease and desist order was most appropriate where there was a Section 337 violation
based on the infringement of a method patent since the order would allow for the monitoring of
the respondent's operations for further possible infringement.
380 HeadboxesI, U.S. Int'l Trade Commn'n Inv. No. 337-TA-82, Pub. 1138 (Apr. 1981), 2 INT'L
TRADE REP. DEc. (BNA) 5481, 5496, disapprovedby President, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981). See
also Certain Above Ground Swimming Pools, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-26, Pub.
No. 815 at 3 (Apr. 1977) ("When an exclusion order is based on a determination of patent infringement ... the general public benefits because the validity of the patent is upheld.").
381 See supra notes 360-66 and accompanying text.
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there always be exclusion orders in Section 337 patent infringement
cases. 3 82 Also, several members of the Commission have pointed out
that "Section 337 is not merely a patent-based jurisdiction for the remedying of private rights. The Commission's historical role has been to
gauge the effect of unfair acts on the domestic industry as a whole, and
to determine the needs to protect otherwise efficient U.S. industries
383
from substantial harm.
The Commission has gained most of its Section 337 jurisprudence
through the adjudication of patent infringement investigations. However, the ITC developed its patent expertise not by Congressional design but by convenience and Congressional acquiescence. 38 4 The first
case which gave rise to the ITC's consideration of patent-based disputes involved an injury to a domestic patentee caused by the large
scale importation of infringing articles through a shifting number of
ports of entry. This case of shifting importation, the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals noted, was distinct from the one
which the domestic manufacture of infringing articles presented:
In the case of the sale of articles manufactured in the United States the
infringing manufacturer can be proceeded aginst and thus the unfair
practice can be reached at its source. Domestic patentees have no effective means through the courts of preventing the sale of imported merchandise in violation of their patent rights. .

.

. [The domestic patentee]

is required to proceed against each individual dealer selling the infringing
articles, which of course would lead to a multiplicity of suits with little
likelihood that all infringing dealers could be reached. The cost of numerous suits with the small amount of damages which may be recovered
in any one suit discourages resort to the courts. Moreover, a decree obtained against one dealer would have no binding effect upon others, and
by the simple expedient of changing the consignees the effect of a decree
when secured would be nullified. Unless, therefore, section [337] may be
invoked to reach the foreign articles at the time and place of importation
by forbidding entry into the United Siates of those articles which upon
the facts in a particular case.are found to violate rights of domestic manufacturer, such domestic manufacturers have no adequate remedy.3 5
After the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' declaration, however,
the Commission considered patent-based cases in which there was little
possibility that imports would shift or arrive in large numbers. Under
382 See supra note 66.

383 Certain Surveying Devices, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-68, Pub. No. 1085
(July 1980), 2 INT'L TRADE REIP. DEC. (BNA) 5409, 5427 (dissenting opinion of Chairman Alberger and Commissioner Stem).
384 See smupra notes 66-68.
385 Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 260 (C.C.P.A. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
852 (1930).
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this application of Section 337, domestic patentees could gain a complete exclusion of articles which might possibly infringe their patents
without the inconvenience of proceeding in several federal courts to
obtain limited exclusion. Furthermore, the Commission could not consider patent invalidity as a defense until the 1974 Trade Act. 386 While
a patentee who seeks enforcement from a court risks having his patent
declared invalid, patentees who argued before the Commission prior to
1974 risked only the chance of not getting an exclusion order. Indeed,
the "risk" to patentees who now proceed before the Commission is similarly low since the ITC's pronouncements on patent validity are for the
purposes of Section 337 only, and are not binding in other forums.
Patent infringement is a politically easy issue for the Commission
to deal with. It is easy to support the Constitutional guarantee of monopoly rights for patentees, since few disagree that the right should be
protected within some geographical area. However, patent rights are
private rights, while the Commission must accord its actions in thepublie interest under the 1974 amendments. For the Commission to continue to hold that any patent infringement is a per se violation of
Section 337 runs counter to the Congressional intent behind the present
Section. This view is reinforced by Congress' express declaration that
the federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent rights
questions.38 7 The Commission erodes this exclusive patent jurisdiction
as the Commission becomes more firmly established as a forum for the
adjudication of patent rights.
The Commission may now consider patent validity as a defense to
a charge of a Section 337 violation. 3 8 To preserve "competitive conditions in the United States economy," the Commission must be highly
critical of whether the complainant's patent is valid. Moreover, since
there might be irreparable harm resulting from actions which the ITC
later finds to have been based on an invalid patent, the injury standard
for gaining temporary relief in patent infringement-based Section 337
cases must be high. If a complainant meets the injury standard and
action would not be contrary to the public interest, the ITC should then
draw the scope of its orders as closely as possible to the bounds of the
patentee's specific patent.3" 9 Any entry bond which the ITC sets should
386 Congress allowed for the defense of patent invalidity or misuse in Section 337 cases by
amending subsection (c) of Section 337 to allow for all "legal and equitable defenses" to be
presented in ITC hearings. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
387 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
388 See 19 C.F.R. §211.56 (1981).
389 ITC rules provide for the Commission to consider the possibility that the domestic patentee/complainant has misused its patent. 19 C.F.R. § 210.21(b)(3) (1981). The ITC should be wary
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not exceed an amount which offsets the comparative advantage which
the alleged infringer might have in the United States market. Using
these standards, the Commission may best balance the patentee's private interest with the public interest of encouraging a free import trade.
Parties or specific goods notwithstanding, the ideal remedial arrangements in patent infringement cases are those which allow for
Commission monitoring, yet which limit exclusion to that essential for
the protection of the domestic patentee's rights. Consent orders or informal dispositions are the most desirable of such arrangements since
they allow for parties to admit ITC jurisdiction and for the Commission to most flexibly address its action to specific cases of infringement.
If parties will not agree on consent orders or informal disposition, and
the ITC can obtain inpersonam jurisdiction over the respondent,3 90 the
Commission should then apply a cease and desist order. The order
would provide not only for monitoring and action directed toward a
specific party or parties, but also for enforcement. Only where the
Commission can not obtain inpersonam jurisdiction should it issue an
exclusion order, preferably one that is narrowly drawn, and which allows for specific determinations of whether the order covers certain articles. This type of in rem order would be similar in form to the one
which the Commission used in the MulticellularPlasticFilm case.3 9t
Application of a cease and desist order or an exclusion order with
a reporting mechanism covering imports would also allow the Commission to depart from its former practices of excluding articles which it
suspects might contributorily infringe a United States patent. In contributory infringement cases,potentialinjury is usually alleged since no
injury occurs until persons in the United States change the device after
it passes through the port of entry. The best approach to the threat of
contributory infringement is for the Commission to allow the entry of
goods if the respondent certifies that they will not be sold or used for
purposes which the complainant's patent covers. 3 92 Any additional acof misuse when the complainant and respondent approach it with a settlement agreement since
there are strong possibilities that a foreign manufacturer may feel compelled to settle because of
the potential order which the Commission may issue against it. Thus, before the Commission

allows for settlement in patent cases, it must fully consider whether the complainant's patent is
valid.
390 For a discussion of the problems in the Commission's obtaining personal jurisdiction over
foreign manufacturers, see supra notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
391 U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-54, Pub. No. 987, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC.
(BNA) 5056, 5064, af'd, Canadian Tarpoly v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 640 F.2d 1322
(C.C.P.A. 1981). For a discussion of this order, see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
392 The Commission provided for this kind of certification in one case where the infringing
good had two pieces which, if not assembled, would not separately infringe the complainant's
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tion by the Commission would cause the remedy to exceed the injury.
In a patent infringement investigation, the Commission should issue a broad exclusion order against the goods of unnamed foreign
manufacturers only if there is a certain threat of a significant amount of
shifting importation. In such case, the rationale behind the broad exclusion order would be that shifting importation, and not primarily the
infringement, is the cause of "substantial injury" to the domestic patentee since it would be extremely difficult for the patentee to obtain effective relief from injury by shifting imports in a forum other than the
Commission.3 9 3 The broader the exclusion order, however, the more
the Commission should consider the public interest. Great numbers of
imports are an indication of domestic demand. Patents, on the other
hand, are private rights. If the public interest outweighs the Commission's enforcement of such private rights, the Commission should leave
the question of action against infringement to federal courts.
2. Antitrust-basedAllegations
The purpose of American antitrust legislation is to promote competition. Increasingly, the major competition with American industries
comes from abroad. Given the Commission's unique role in regulating
trade, it must take an affirmative view of its obligation not to flag
"competitive conditions in the United States economy ' 394 by viewing
Section 337 as legislation designed to remedy particular private
claims.39 5

When it passed the 1974 amendments to Section 337, Congress
emphasized that the public interest must be the overriding consideration when the Commission administers Section 337.396 Attention to the
public interest is crucial to the proper application of the statute because
of its attractiveness to complainants who might wish to use it to restrict
competition. Once a complaint is filed, the Commission investigative
staff develops the case. Since the Commission carries out major investigative work for complainants, the cost of obtaining Section 337 relief
patent. Convertable Game Tables, and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No.
337-TA-2, Pub. No. 705 (Apr. 1976), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5094.
393 See, e.g., Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 259 (C.C.P.A. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 852 (1930).
394 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(e) (1976).
395 For example, in Anheuser-Busch v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961),
the court emphasizes that "[a]ntitrust legislation is concerned primarily with the health of the
competitive process, not with the individual competitor who must sink or swim in competitive
enterprise." Id at 840.
396 TRADE ACT OF 1974, S. REP.No. 1298, supra note 8, at 197, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7330.
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is low compared to the cost of civil litigation. As with any legal action,
any time that relief is worth less to a plaintiff than to a defendant, there
is a risk that the plaintiff will use the possibility of relief against the
defendant in an extortionate way. Thus, the Commission must be wary
of complainants who intend only to delay or blockfairy competing
imports.
The Commission should not take action in response to complaints
by any domestic industry which carries on price gouging or monopoly
practices. Indeed, the ITC must be open to all antitrust defenses which
respondents may make, including allegations of the Noerr "sham" exception,39 7 under which a complaint brought in order to restrain trade
may be adjudged invalid. If the Commission suspects that a complainant has the intent of restraining trade through a Section 337 action, it
should mold its action accordingly. For example, if it issues a consent
order, the Commission could require, the domestic industry as well as
the respondent to report on their respective pricing policies. If the parties do not agree to settle by consent, a cease and desist order is appropriate. Such an order would allow the Commission to admit complying
respondents' goods into the United States economy.
However, there is no reason why the Commission may not apply
an exclusion order when it finds that foreign producers have violated
Section 337 by entering into a monopoly or conspiracy. In this case,
exclusion promotes the public interest of encouraging competitive conditions in the United States economy. It focuses on competition between United States and foreign manufacturers, and allows the United
States industry to become competitive with foreign monopolists. The
Commission must, of course, not award exclusion if an oligopoly situation exists in the United States industry, though, because the exclusion
will have a negative effect on overall competition in the domestic economy. However, if domestic oligopoly does not exist, the ITC should
apply an exclusion order which remains in effect as long as it takes for
either the United States industry to develop and compete with the foreign monopoly, or for the foreign monopoly to dissolve.
An additional attractive feature of the use of exclusion orders
397 Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). While
lobbying activities are not illegal, even for anticompetitive purposes, there may be a Sherman Act
violation when attempts to influence governmental action amount to nothing more than harass-

ment of a competitor, or a mere "sham." See Rosenthal, supra note 295, at 33-38; see generally
roblems, in PRAcA
Applebaum, Dumping Problems, Voluntary Restraints,and Other ImportRelief
TICING LAW INSTITUTE, 17TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST LAW SEMINAR, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 135, 144-45 (Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Ser.
No. 259, 1977).
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against the goods of foreign combinations is that exclusion orders,
based in rem, are the least intrusive of any type of United States antitrust action, in contrast to cease and desist orders or treble damages
awards. The problems of extraterritorial application of United States
law would not arise if the Commission applied an exclusion order
against the goods of a foreign monopoly, except in the case that manufacturers might have to approach the Commission to prove that they
were not part of the alleged monopoly which violated Section 337.
3. General UnfairImport Trade Practices
The issues which the Commission must face when it deals with
unfair trade practices such as infringement of trademarks and trade
dress, mislabeling, and passing off involve much clearer lines of policy
than the issues involved in Section 337 patent infringement or antitrust
cases. Indeed, private and public interests are coincident in the area of
general unfair trade practices. Trademarks, trade dress, and labels
identify products' origins to consumers and give them an indication of
the nature and quality of the product. As in the case of imports which
infringe patents, imported goods which infringe trademarks or trade
dress or which are mislabled injure the domestic manufacturer who has
invested in the development and promotion of his product. However,
such goods also injure the public, since it cannot count on a certain
product and product quality which it expects.
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 protects registered trademarks at Customs by prohibiting any importation of foreign made merchandise bearing a trademark owned by "a citizen of, or by a
corporation or association created or organized within, the United
States. . 398 Similar legislation covers the proper labeling of such
goods as wool products, 399 hazardous substances, 40 ° textile fiber products, 4° ' and gold plated jewelry,40 2 and makes proper labeling a prerequisite for entry into the United States. There are strict penalties for
violating these pieces of legislation, and provisions for exclusion orders
and civil relief are common. 4 ° 3 Thus, where the Commission finds

trademark or trade dress infringement or mislabeling, it is especially
398 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
399 Wool Products Labeling Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1976).
400 Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1273 (Supp. IV 1980).
401 Textile Fiber Products Identification Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (1976).
402 Jewelers' Hall Mark Acts of 1905 & 1906, 15 U.S.C. §§ 291-300 (1976).
403 For example, the Jeweler's Hallmark Acts of 1905 & 1906 provide for criminal sanctions,
condemnation of nonconforming goods, injunctive relief, and the collection of reasonable attorney's fees from violators of the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 298 (1976).
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appropriate for the Commission to apply its strongest measures "in addition to other provisions of law" against the unfair trade practice. Unlike cases of patent infringement, Customs officials can readily discern
articles which infringe trademarks or trade dress. Moreover, the basis
of trademark and trade dress infringement questions is the courts', or in
Section 337 cases, the Commission's subjective judgment of whether a
respondent's mark would confuse a "reasonable person" as to origin.
Hence, the Commission can appropriately apply a broad exclusion order in the case of trademark and trade dress infringement. The type of
order which the Commission issued in Certain Novelty Glasses40 4 is
highly appropriate in Section 337 cases involving general unfair trade
practices. After finding trade dress infringement, the ITC issued an
exclusion order to run "until the Commission has determined that the
complainants no longer use the trade dress in issue in this investigation." The Commission ordered the complainants to report every six
months on whether they continued to use the trade dress, thus assuring
that the complainants did not extend their rights over the dress beyond
the time that they would have been entitled to them. Similarly, when
respondents, would cease trademark infringement or passing off, when
complainants would cease using their trademark, or when respondents
or complainats would cease manufacturing a good involved in an investigation, the Commission could provide for the exclusion order to
become inoperative.
4. Underpricing
The Commission has considered several situations of underpricing. All of these involved difficult investigations and had significant
evidentiary problems because foreign manufacturers refused to provide
the Commission with pricing information. 40 There are likely to be
similar evidentiary problems in future Section 337 investigations of underpricing. Since the Commission must examine the pricing policies of
respondents involved in an unfair pricing investigation, the Commis404 Certain Novelty Glasses, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337-TA-55, Pub. No. 991 (July
1979), 2 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5400, 5407.
405 In Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Inv. No. 337TA-29, Pub. No. 863 (Feb. 1978), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5245, 5270, disapprovedby
President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978), Vice Chairman Parker and Chairman Bedell dissented
because the prices on which the ITC based its decision in the case were submitted only under oath
by the complainant and related only to the lowest price "paid or charged by an importer for
various categories of welded stainless pipe and tube, by quarters, for a period of several years. In
general, these prices are of no probative value since they are evidently only of the lowest price
charged by an importer in that quarter for a particular category of welded stainless steel pipe and
tube supplied by the same unknown Japanese exporter or manufacturer."
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sion can properly impose two measures. After the ITC finds "reason to
believe" that there is a violation, it can use its cease and desist power to
require specific importers to show that the goods they wish to import
are not underpriced. Or, the Commission may direct an exclusion
against the goods in question, and permit importation if foreign manufacturers show that they have not underpriced their goods. This use of
an exclusion order restricts the problem of extraterritorial application
of United States law.
If it finds a situation of underpricing, the Commission also may
declare that the case falls within the Treasury Department's antidumping jurisdiction, and refer the action to the Department of Treasury.
The Treasury Department can then impose incremental pricing remedies and equalize the competitive advantage of the underpricing foreign manufacturer over the long run. This remedy would impose less
of a restraint on commerce than would an exclusion or cease and desist
order, and, in cases where the United States industry tends toward oligopoly, would have more of an ongoing positive effect on competitive
conditions in the United States economy.
5. Mixed Allegalions
Often, complainants who appear before the Commission allege a
combination of unfair trade practices. This presents the ITC with the
question of whether to deal with those practices together, or whether to
concentrate on one practice alone.
When there are mixed allegations, the scope of a Commission order often depends on which practice the Commission deals with. In
Convertable Game Tables,4 °6 the Commission found that the respondents had infringed the complainant's patent and marketed infringing
goods through the advertisement of a fictitious price. The Commission
directed its action against the patent infringement, and not against the
false advertising. Action against the infringement, the Commission observed, would remain in effect beyond the time that the respondents
ceased their fictitious advertising. Additionally, it would be a broader
order since it could run against all current and potential infringers of
the complainant's patent, and
not just the few specific respondents who
40 7
ran false advertisements.
406 Convertable Game Tables and Components Thereof, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-34,
Pub. No. 705 (Dec. 1974), 1 INT'L TRADE REP. DEC. (BNA) 5094.
407 Cease and desist orders were not available to the Commission when it considered the Convertable Game Tables case. Id Such an order would have been preferable here and in similar
cases since the Commission could tailor the order to cover the different types of unfair import
trade practices and, at the same time, direct its action to specific parties.
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However, the Commission's goal when there are allegations of
multiple unfair import trade practices should be to focus on the practice which substantially injures the complainant. It should not base
action on a practice because it promotes the most comprehensive order.
There may be investigations in which both patent infringement and
trademark infringement occur, but where the United States industry is
large and not harmed by the particular instance of patent infringement.
Such an instance would be one in which the ITC might draw a broad
exclusion order against trademark infringement, and a narrow order
against patent infringement.40 8
In the past, the Commission has asserted that Section 337(b)(3)
allowed it to investigate "alleged acts and effects" which fall under the
antidumping 40 9 or countervailing duty statutes, 410 provided that the
acts and effects occur in the same matter before the Commission as a
part of the same investigation which established a basis for Section 337
relief. Subsection (b)(3) of Section 337 requires that in a case where
violations of Sections 1303, 1671, or 1673 arise, the Commission must
promptly notify the Secretary of Commerce, so that he can take such
action as the antidumping and countervailing duty laws provide.41
Decisions which the Secretary or administering authority makes under
the sections with respect to the issue of less-than-fair value sales or subsidization and the matters necessary for such decision "shall be conclusive upon the Commission. 4 12 Certainly, where the Commission
encounters complaints which contain incidents of unfair trade practices
and the specific unfair practices of less-than-fair value sales or subsidization, the Commission must allow the Secretary of the Treasury or the
proper administering authority to take action against those practices.
After the Commission defers action to the Secretary, however, it should
consider whether the allegations remaining in the original complaint
408 Section 337 does not preclude the Commission from issuing more than one exclusion order,
all of various breadths, to deal with multiple unfair import trade practices. Section 337 only
prohibits the ITC from using both an exclusion order and a cease and desist order against one
party who has committed one violation. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) ("In lieu of [exclusion orders or temporary exclusion]. . the Commission may issue.. . an order directing such
person to cease and desist.
...
).
409 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. IV 1980); 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976). For a short description of this
legislation, see Garfinkel, supra note 4, at 243-44.
410 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV 1980). For a short description of this legislation, see Garfinkel,
supra note 4, at 241-43.
411 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). While the text of the statute reads that the Secretary of the Treasury shall make determinations under the Countervailing Duty and Antidumping
Acts, the Treasury passed this duty on to the Secretary of Commerce. Reorganization Plan No. 3
of 1979, 46 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979).

412 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
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are sufficient to support Section 337 action.41 3 Furthermore, the ITC
should consider whether the Secretary's actions will remedy the general
unfair import trade practice allegations before the Commission. Although Commission action under Section 337 is "in addition to any
other provisions of law," in certain cases, the incidence of Treasury and
Commission measures which bear on the importation of a single product may be contrary to the public interest. The Commission should,
accordingly, guide the scope of its action in those situations where the
Treasury can also be expected to take action.41 4
C.

Goods

Section 337 allows for complaints to originate from all types of
United States industry, large to small, from manufacturers to importers. The goods which these industries sell range from high technology
to simplicity. Deliveries of the goods to consumers may be once a year
or once a minute. Thus, when the Commission considers action against
an unfair practice, it must also consider the situation of a particular
industry, and the situation of that industry in the domestic economy.
Congress gave the Commission in rem exclusion power to deal
with large numbers of shifting importations that injured otherwise
helpless United States industries. Imposition of an exclusion order is
uniquely appropriate in such case since the substantial injury to the
domestic industry is the absence of effective remedies outside of those
available under Section 337. If there are a number of foreign manufacturers whose goods, if imported, would unfairly injure the industry, the
Commission should direct a broad order excluding all of the potentially unfairly imported goods. Also, such a broad order is appropriate
where a foreign manufacturer can easily cause an unfair injury to a
United States industry because it can easily reproduce and export that
industry's product in a short period of time. In contrast, if production
time is long or if the Commission finds that there is a limited number of
foreign producers, it should direct its order only against those producers. This type of action is least restrictive on the flow of trade, and
sufficiently answers the needs of injured complainants.
413 The Senate Finance Committee specifically contemplated that such consideration would be
appropriate. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 341, at 29.
414 The relationship between the Secretary and the Commission in taking action in situations
where there are possible violations of Section 337 and of the countervailing duty or antidumping
laws should follow the model of the relationship between the Justice Department and Federal
Trade Commission in the administration of concurrent jurisdiction over certain antitrust laws.
Fischbach, supra note 255, at 67; see also Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the
Department of Justice and the FTC. The Liason Procedure, 31 Bus. LAW. 2075 (1976).
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However, the Commission must always be aware that the importation of a certain good might be beneficial to the United States economy, though it may have been imported as the result of an unfair
import trade practice. After a consideration of the public interest, the
Commission might consider admitting goods
for particularuses, while
41 5
excluding goods destined for general use.
D.

Parties

Subsection (a) of Section 337 provides that the Commission shall
take action against owners, importers, consignees, or their agents who
unfairly compete or act in "the importation of articles into the United
States." Hence, the parties who appear-or who do not appearbefore the Commission often vary as much as the goods they sell.
As this comment has discussed, it is not settled whether Section
337 extends in personam jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers who
do not import directly into the United States. 4 16 However, these persons occasionally submit themselves to the ITC's jurisdiction after the
Commission serves them with notice of an investigation, or for purposes of a consent order. The Commission should allow this voluntary
submission. The foreign manufacturer may view compliance as worth
the continued importation of his goods into the United States. In such
cases, however, the Commission should make certain that domestic
manufacturers do not compel foreign manufacturers to enter into intrusive consent orders when other arrangements, such as informal settlement or exclusion orders allowing for reporting, are available.
When there are foreign manufacturers who do not submit to the
Commission's jurisdiction, however, the Commission should also take
care in drafting its orders. Though a broad exclusion order may be
appropriate in cases of shifting imports, in other cases, the Commission
should, whenever, possible specify that an exclusion order operates
only against the goods of particular manufacturers. Sections 337(d)
and (e) strongly suggest this approach by directing that the ITC should
exclude the "articles concerned" of persons who violate Section 337.
This limited action would reach the injury of the domestic industry,
and at the same time minimize possible injury to the public interest.
In contrast, the Commission should apply cease and desist orders
against United States citizens who refuse to submit to consent or settlement agreements. While exclusion orders are appropriate where there
415 See, e.g., supra note 317.
416 See supra notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
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are many shifting importers, cease and desist orders are most preferable
over persons inside the United States since the ITC may easily obtain
jurisdiction over them. Cease and desist orders allow for active Commission participation in the provision of relief and also allow for the
modification of the order in changed circumstances. At the same time,
cease and desist orders compel persons inside the United States to comply with Section 337 under the threat of Commission or civil
enforcement.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The role of the International Trade Commission in the administration of Section 337 is changing. Slowly, the Commission is moving
away from its protectionist view of Section 337 administration and
coming to appreciate that the public interest must be the factor which
controls the Commission's Section 337 action. Former ITC Chairman
Bill Alberger noted that laws such as Section 337 "can be compatible
with, and may even promote, a successful competition policy-including improving the international competitiveness of our industries-if
those who administer the laws understand their proper scope and
objectives. ' 4 17 The International Trade Commission has in Section 337
a law which provides for flexible action when the Commission determines that an unfair import trade practice has injured a United States
industry. With the goal of the public interest in mind, the ITC can take
action which reflects a balance of the private interest in remedy and the
public interest in economic well being, and thus administer Section 337
to eliminate import trade distortions, and to promote an open United
States trade policy.
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